Youth Unemployment

Baroness Byford: asked Her Majesty's Government:
	Whether progress in reducing youth unemployment, especially in the countryside, is satisfactory.

Baroness Hollis of Heigham: My Lords, we are making good progress in reducing unemployment among young people. Since 1997 youth unemployment has fallen by more than 40 per cent, in rural areas by nearly 50 per cent, and is around its lowest level since the mid-1970s. Long-term youth unemployment has been virtually eradicated.

Baroness Byford: My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. Two weeks ago at Prime Minister's Questions, the Prime Minister said that there were only some 4,500 young people on the dole. I understand that the correct figure is 244,000, of whom 44,000 have been unemployed for more than six months. Can the Minister explain how the Government separate those who are unemployed in rural areas and those who are unemployed in urban areas? What analysis is used?

Baroness Hollis of Heigham: My Lords, the noble Baroness is right that at any one point in time the snapshot, churning figure of labour mobility for young people is 233,000. But for six months those young people are on JSA and within that six months 80 per cent of them will go back into work. After six months, the New Deal kicks in. Therefore, when my right honourable friend the Prime Minister said that there were 4,900 young people on the dole, he was referring to a period 12 months on when people have either gone back into work or come through the New Deal. So the noble Baroness's statistics are right in that respect.
	As to rural areas, long-term rural unemployment for young people has been virtually eliminated. Perhaps I may give the figures for the noble Baroness's own county. Whereas in 1997 there were about 600 young people who had been unemployed for more than six months, the figure is now one-third of that. Our figure of 4,900 compares favourably with the figure of the mid-1980s, which was 350,000.

Baroness Turner of Camden: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that one of the contributory factors in rural poverty is that rural wages tend to be very much lower than urban wages. Can anything be done to rectify the imbalance? Would tax credits help? What is the Government's policy?

Baroness Hollis of Heigham: My Lords, one of the problems is that while total household incomes in rural areas are higher than the national average, individual rural wages are somewhat lower than urban wages. My noble friend is right. That is why I am so pleased that working families tax credit is being claimed in rural communities. For example, for a farmer and his partner with two children on an average farmer's income of £7,000 to £7,500, tax credits will bring that income up to £12,000. Approximately 17,500 farmers and farm labourers are currently claiming working families tax credit.

Baroness Sharp of Guildford: My Lords, the Minister will know that the highest levels of unemployment for young people have traditionally been among those with few or no qualifications. How successful have been initiatives such as the educational maintenance allowance in rural areas in keeping young people at school and helping them gain higher qualifications?

Baroness Hollis of Heigham: My Lords, the noble Baroness is right. The New Deal research, the Rowntree report and the recent ERSC research, which was published a few weeks ago, show that the employment option of the New Deal is working very successfully for young people. As a result, there are fewer young people unemployed in rural areas than in urban areas. The problem lies in getting people into the education and full-time training option. It is difficult. Working with the Department for Education and Skills, we are introducing Internet access, home learning, learning and skills council developments and so on. However, there is a problem. Whereas it is relatively easy to get local employers to work with and take a socially responsible attitude towards young people in their area, educational facilities of the kind needed often may be some distance away and transport can be the core of the problem.

Lord Glentoran: My Lords, a recent article in The Times entitled "Blair backs plan for countryside's lost generation", went on to refer to,
	"the blueprint to champion rural youth".
	When are we likely to see this plan? How many people is it envisaged will be involved? How will it be funded?

Baroness Hollis of Heigham: My Lords, I am not familiar with the details of the blueprint for youth referred to by the noble Lord. I do not know whether it is an initiative of the Home Office or the Department for Education and Skills. I shall write to the noble Lord.

The Lord Bishop of Hereford: My Lords, the Minister mentioned the problem of transport. Is she aware of how serious is the difficulty for young people in isolated rural areas of travelling to whatever work may be available? Is she conscious that there are schemes to provide mobility or to help with it, such as that of the Prince's Trust, by the provision of mopeds or motor-bikes or even some help with the licensing and insuring of an old car? Is there any scheme to co-ordinate those efforts across the country so that help with mobility is available to young people in isolated areas everywhere?

Baroness Hollis of Heigham: My Lords, that is an extremely pertinent point. As my noble friend Lord Whitty told the House a couple of weeks ago, rural bus services are improving and nearly half of all rural households now have a bus service of at least one per hour regularity. However, that still leaves many people without access to reliable bus services. However, not only are the New Deal schemes helping young people with bicycles, insuring cars and so on, but approximately 65 "action for jobs" teams are operating in the most remote and inaccessible rural areas and providing mopeds, scooters, and so on. These seem to be having a real impact on youth unemployment in those areas.

Lord Archer of Sandwell: My Lords, will my noble friend confirm that one of the problems in the countryside is the lack of affordable housing for young people? What became of socially rented accommodation?

Baroness Hollis of Heigham: My Lords, my noble and learned friend is right. One of the problems in the countryside is that younger, poorer people are leaving but younger, richer people are moving in. One of the reasons why such people are leaving is, I suspect, the lack of access to affordable housing. Statistics indicate that in the 180 or so rural districts there are now some 677,000 social houses for rent.
	The indication is that, as of December 2001, 1.5 million local authority council houses have been sold.

Baroness Byford: My Lords, perhaps I may press the Minister to answer the point in my supplementary question; namely, how the analysis is done. She did not state how many young people in rural areas find employment in those areas, rather than having to move to towns to find work. Will she clarify the point?

Baroness Hollis of Heigham: My Lords, I can tell the noble Baroness how the statistics are arrived at. Basically, the districts are broken down into five categories: remote rural, accessible rural, the former coalfields, urban and metropolitan. The first three are regarded as rural, the last two as urban/metropolitan. There are about 181 districts in the first three categories and about 173 in the last two. The statistics are arrived at on that basis. We have tried to cut it the other way, by looking at popular settlement sizes of 10,000, and that does not work. Therefore, we have adopted those definitions. We cannot break down the statistics beyond that. Clearly, some young people are able to find work in their village or the immediate area, others in market towns, and others in larger towns. It is the case—I am sure this is what really matters—that more young people between 18 and 25 are in work in the country as a whole. Secondly, compared to the 350,000 young people who were long-term unemployed in 1985, there are now under 5,000. I am sure that the noble Baroness will rejoice at those statistics.

Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, since 1997 the Government have taken billions of pounds in stamp duty from housing. How much of that money has been spent on alleviating the problems of rural housing?

Baroness Hollis of Heigham: My Lords, that question is rather wide of the Question on the Order Paper. I repeat: this Government are seeking to rebuild affordable housing stock by making available some 3,000 extra houses a year in settlements of under 3,000, and a further 6,000 for larger rural settlements. The combination of the pressure on second homes and the sale of council housing stock has resulted in young people being unable to find the affordable housing they might have found even 10 years ago.

World Food Summit

Lord Howell of Guildford: asked Her Majesty's Government:
	What was the outcome of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation meeting held recently in Rome.

Baroness Amos: My Lords, the declaration of the World Food Summit, which was held in Rome on 10th to 13th June, sets out a number of areas which are important to the achievement of the millennium development goal of halving the proportion of people who suffer from hunger by 2015. The declaration highlights the need for poverty reduction as the key to reducing hunger. A copy of the declaration is available in the Library.

Lord Howell of Guildford: My Lords, I thank the Minister for that helpful reply indicating the detailed information on this matter. However, in the light of the rather unwelcome presence at the FAO conference of Mr Robert Mugabe, does she agree that since he is responsible for the catastrophic fall in agricultural production in his own country—which will affect the whole of southern and central Africa and add to the horrific problems of the growing drought—there is a case for tougher restrictions on his movements and those of his unpleasant colleagues, who seem to be travelling freely around Europe and the world at present? Does she support the making of laws to that end in the European Parliament this week?

Baroness Amos: My Lords, we have discussed this topic previously. The travel ban contains within it the possibility of individuals from Zimbabwe travelling to attend, for example, UN conferences. Noble Lords may know that Fidel Castro, for example, who is not permitted to enter the United States, has attended 41 UN meetings.

Baroness Scott of Needham Market: My Lords, does the Minister agree with the sentiments expressed by her colleague in another place, Clare Short, that the organisation is old-fashioned and in need of improvement? Does she agree also with the comments made by representatives of the poorer countries that the whole event had been a waste of time?

Baroness Amos: My Lords, we are concerned that this meeting took place only five years after the previous meeting. We should have preferred it to be a plus-10 rather than plus-five meeting. We are engaged in trying to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the FAO. To that end, we have provided nearly £13 million to the organisation, including nearly £3 million in extra budgetary resources in 2000. We have also committed resources to the World Food Programme in relation to immediate humanitarian emergencies across the world.

Lord Carter: My Lords, is my noble friend aware of the FAO estimate only last autumn that the number of malnourished people in the world will fall from 800 million—including 160 million children—to 600 million by 2015, a reduction of 25 per cent? Is she now saying that the original target is to be restored; namely, halving the number of starving people by 2015? If so, that is a change since last year.

Baroness Amos: My Lords, we remain committed to the original target. That has always been the provision. The figures are a cause for concern. Noble Lords will know, for example, that in terms of reaching the poverty target in Africa, the indicators are going backwards, not forwards. We also question the basis of some of the figures published by the FAO. It examines food availability, not who is hungry, and why. That said, we accept that we need to do more and will continue to do so. We have recently published a strategy document, Eliminating Hunger.

Baroness Sharples: My Lords, what does Fidel Castro have to do with the Question on the Order Paper?

Baroness Amos: My Lords, I could ask the noble Baroness what Zimbabwe has to do with the Question on the Order Paper. The noble Lord, Lord Howell, asked a specific question about the travel ban on Mr Mugabe. In answering that question I made it clear that in agreeing the travel ban, the EU recognises that it is bound by international obligations that allow individuals to attend international UN meetings. That applies in this instance, as it applies in the instance of Fidel Castro. He is under a travel ban to the United States, but he has attended UN meetings there 41 times.

Baroness Whitaker: My Lords, is my noble friend aware of the DfID document Eliminating Hunger? I imagine that she may be. If so, would she agree with it that poverty reduction initiatives which focus on food security and trade reform are really the best way to eliminate hunger?

Baroness Amos: My Lords, I agree with my noble friend that it is critical that we look at issues to do with hunger and food security in the round. That means looking at trade policy, education, health, issues to do with the economy, governance, peace and security, democracy and social protection.

Lord Alton of Liverpool: My Lords, has the Minister had a chance to look at the report in today's newspapers about the perilous situation in Botswana, where more than one in three of the population has now been diagnosed HIV-positive? Was the AIDS pandemic that is sweeping Africa discussed at Rome? If so, what was the outcome?

Baroness Amos: My Lords, I am not aware of whether that subject was discussed at Rome. However, our paper on Eliminating Hunger looks specifically at the impact of HIV/AIDS. As I said before, the issue cannot be looked at in isolation.

Central Office of Information

Lord McNally: asked Her Majesty's Government:
	What qualities they will be seeking in the next chief executive of the Central Office of Information and what will be the method of appointment.

Lord Macdonald of Tradeston: My Lords, the chief executive will require excellent business and management skills, expert knowledge of the communications sector and credibility across that sector and across government. The competition will be open, supervised by the Civil Service Commissioners and conducted under their rules for the appointment of senior civil servants. Search consultants will help identify suitable candidates for this specialist post.

Lord McNally: My Lords, does the Minister recall that when we raised the question of the probity of the relationship between the head of the COI and the Government's communications director in 10 Downing Street, Mr Alastair Campbell, he told the House that that relationship
	"will strengthen the co-ordination and planning of departmental publicity strategies across Whitehall".—[Official Report, 29/5/02; col. 1352.]?
	That arrangement lasted three weeks after the Minister gave the House that assurance. Will the new head of the COI still have a reporting arrangement with Mr Campbell? In making the appointment, will any attempt be made to take the opinion of the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, the First Civil Service Commissioner, who has doubted the probity of that relationship, or of Sir Nigel Wicks, who has tried to call Mr Campbell before his committee and had that request refused? When will the Government realise that this hybrid relationship between a political appointee and a neutral Civil Service damages both?

Lord Macdonald of Tradeston: My Lords, I emphasise again that the chief executive of the COI is answerable to Ministers at the Cabinet Office. She is not answerable to the Prime Minister's director of communications and strategies. I made that clear last time I spoke on the subject. I think that the noble Lord is referring obliquely to the resignation of Carol Fisher, the chief executive of the Central Office of Information, five months after her contract had expired. She made it clear that she chose not to renew that contract, saying:
	"Alastair Campbell and I have enjoyed a good working relationship based on mutual respect. He has only ever been completely helpful to me".

Lord Corbett of Castle Vale: My Lords, can my noble friend assure your Lordships' House that the Central Office of Information, or any other government agency, will not in any way facilitate the showing of the anti-euro cinema advertisement with the ludicrous Rik Mayall impersonating Adolf Hitler, who did such great damage to our continent?

Lord Macdonald of Tradeston: My Lords, the example referred to emphasises the need for the strict conventions of propriety, which are always observed by the COI, based on objectivity and explanatory tone. My noble friend can be assured that the COI would not be involved in any such advertising.

Baroness Blatch: My Lords, given the Civil Service status of Mr Alastair Campbell and whether he has a role in marketing strategy across Whitehall, and the status of his colleague Mr Charles Powell, does the Minister agree that they should both be accountable to parliamentary committees—

Noble Lords: Jonathan Powell.

Baroness Blatch: My Lords, I apologise to Mr Powell's brother, who may be sitting in the House.
	Does the Minister agree that both those gentlemen should be accountable through parliamentary committees, particularly the Committee on Standards in Public Life?

Lord Macdonald of Tradeston: My Lords, I refer the noble Baroness to the Companion, because her question is very wide of the one that I am answering.

Lord Lipsey: My Lords, does my noble friend share my growing suspicion that the current "Get Campbell" campaign owes a great deal to the fact that he is damned good at his job?

Lord Macdonald of Tradeston: My Lords, Mr Campbell's job in this case is simply to take advice when it is offered by the chief executive of the Central Office of Information. His interest is in co-ordination across government departments, but only for substance and synergy and for best practice to try to get better overall value for money for the taxpayer.

Baroness Gardner of Parkes: My Lords, what does the noble Lord mean by saying that questions are wide of the mark? Surely we believe that standards in public life have to go through everything. This House has taken a firm line on that and adopted it as definite policy.

Lord Macdonald of Tradeston: My Lords, I was answering a question on the qualities that we shall seek in the next chief executive of the Central Office of Information. The question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Blatch, was wide of that issue.

Lord McNally: My Lords, less than three weeks before the resignation of the COI director, the Minister had called in aid in an Answer to this House her relationship with Mr Alastair Campbell. It is quite proper for the rest of the House to inquire about Mr Alastair Campbell's relationship with the next head of the COI. As for the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, does the Minister agree that it is not Mr Campbell's ability or otherwise that is in question, but whether his relationship with career civil servants is bringing into doubt the impartiality and neutrality of our Civil Service, which has been its greatest strength for 130 years?

Lord Macdonald of Tradeston: My Lords, that gives me an opportunity to repeat yet again the answer that I thought I had given clearly and emphatically to the noble Lord. Carol Fisher is not answerable to Alastair Campbell. She is answerable to the Ministers at the Cabinet Office.

World War II Debt

Lord Laird: asked Her Majesty's Government:
	What steps they will take to mark the final repayment of Second World War debt to the United States Government when £244 million is paid in 2006.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, the Government have no current plans to mark the completion of the repayment of the United Kingdom's World War II debt to the United States Government.

Lord Laird: My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply. Does he recognise the concern at the recent disclosure that the USA is still demanding war debt repayment from the United Kingdom, almost 60 years after the war? In view of the UK rightly standing alongside the United States to defend freedom around the world, do the Government consider that that freedom comes at a price? In view of the United States' recent imposition of tax on steel imports from the UK, what do the Government consider to be the state of the special relationship?

Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, we should cast our minds back to the dark days after the war, when the economy of the United Kingdom was greatly helped by Marshall aid and lend-lease. We have never suggested that we should be relieved from repayment of that debt and we are not going to do so now. The special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States is in no way damaged by the fact that that generosity has been honoured over the past 50 years.

Lord Campbell of Croy: My Lords, is this payment part of the lend-lease scheme under which the United States supplied munitions, vehicles and many other requirements including food and other provisions that were needed badly by us in the last part of the war?

Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, I referred to lend-lease in the context of the generosity of the United States throughout that period. However, the debt that we are talking about now is separate; it was negotiated in December 1945.

Lord Stoddart of Swindon: My Lords, will the noble Lord remind me as to exactly how much the loan was, and how much we have repaid since then in principal and interest?

Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, the loan originally was £1,075 million, of which £244 million is outstanding. The basis of the loan is that interest is paid at 2 per cent. Therefore, we are currently receiving a greater return on our dollar assets than we are paying in interest to pay off the loan. It is a very advantageous loan for us.

Lord Saatchi: My Lords, in the wider context of our debt to America—and I hope that this question does not go too wide of that on the Order Paper—may I ask the Minister to pass on to the Prime Minister our respect for the support he has given to America in the war against terrorism and also for his steadfast refusal to be drawn into the wave of anti-Americanism which seems to have engulfed large parts of Europe?

Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, I think that that is wide of the Question on the Order Paper. However, I shall pass on the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Saatchi. About three months ago, there was an attack on us in the Observer which claimed that British foreign policy was subservient to the United States because of this loan. That is utterly absurd. It also does not lead me to think that it is because of our debt to the United States that we have supported in so many respects the United States' policy.

Finance Bill

Brought from the Commons endorsed with the certificate of the Speaker that the Bill is a Money Bill; read a first time, and to be printed.

Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill

Lord Filkin: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
	Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Filkin.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.
	House in Committee accordingly.
	[THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES in the Chair.]
	Clause 1 [Naturalisation: knowledge of language and society]:

Lord Tordoff: In calling Amendment No. 1, I should point out that, if the amendment were to be agreed to, I would not be able to call Amendments Nos. 2 to 4 inclusive because of pre-emption.

Lord Dholakia: moved Amendment No. 1:
	Page 1, line 4, leave out subsection (1).

Lord Dholakia: I should like first to say how delighted we are that the noble Lord, Lord Filkin, will be dealing with this Bill in Committee in his new capacity as Minister. He has been very helpful to us in a number of ways which I shall mention later. I also know that he hopes that we will all follow the strict timetable that has been set to enable us to complete our consideration in Committee within the next six Sittings. I should perhaps tell him now that many of our amendments are not so much amendments of substance as a means of clarifying the Government's intentions.
	We are concerned about Clause 1 because of the Bill's lack of clarity on the issue of,
	"Naturalisation: knowledge of language and society".
	On Second Reading, we generally welcomed the provisions in Part 1. Nevertheless, we have many concerns about the provisions which we seek to remedy with our amendments in this group. Amendment No. 1 is grouped with our Amendments Nos. 2, 6, 7, 9 and 11. The group also includes Amendments Nos. 3 and 4 which were tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, and the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay of St Johns.
	The combined effect of our Amendments Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7 and 9 is to remove the requirement to have,
	"sufficient knowledge about life in the United Kingdom",
	for nationality purposes. There are legitimate concerns that such knowledge cannot be tested. Moreover, the Government have nowhere provided their definition of the term,
	"life in the United Kingdom".
	Reservations have been expressed about the meaning of that term. How can such knowledge be taught, and who will assess it? That concern has been expressed in various briefings from immigration agencies.
	There are also fears that the criteria might operate as barriers to citizenship which are not imposed on those born in the United Kingdom. The Commission for Racial Equality, which the Government established to advise them on issues of race and community relations, has called for a consultation process on the issue and said that citizenship should be taught to all. Some of our amendments would remove the word "sufficient" from provisions requiring "sufficient knowledge". The amendments would not only lower the threshold of knowledge that an applicant must attain, but allow us to probe the Government on precisely what they regard as "necessary" and "sufficient".
	Our last amendment, Amendment No. 11, proposes that implementation of Clause 1 should wait until such time as the Secretary of State indicates the requirements that individuals must meet to demonstrate sufficient knowledge about life in the United Kingdom. I beg to move.

Viscount Bridgeman: I rise to speak to Amendments Nos. 3 and 4 which were tabled by my noble friend Lady Anelay and myself. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Filkin, for his very helpful letter following Second Reading. It was particularly helpful on the points which we raised in relation to Clause 1. I reiterate the support which I gave on that occasion on behalf of these Benches for the principle of ensuring that applicants for naturalisation have an understanding of the British way of life and all that goes with it. I think that we are coming from a slightly different direction on this matter from that pursued by the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia.
	With respect to Amendment No. 3, the Government currently refer only to knowledge of life in the United Kingdom. Will the Minister say whether the Government believe that applicants for naturalisation should have some appreciation not only of the nature of life in the United Kingdom as it currently is, but also of the history of our country? Do the Government believe that the word "life" is broad enough to include history? Like the Government, we would not wish to make the test too onerous. Equally, however, it might be thought that to have some understanding of the country's history would be useful as part of the preparation for naturalisation.
	Amendment No. 4 seeks to probe what aspects of current life in the United Kingdom the Government wish to ensure that applicants for naturalisation have knowledge of. In Standing Committee in another place, the then Minister Miss Angela Eagle said:
	"we envisage a fairly general view, rather than one that is restricted to the democratic process and constitution, but it would be wrong of me to stand here and say that we have a curriculum absolutely sorted out".—[Official Report, Commons Standing Committee E, 30/04/02; col. 17.]
	Obviously, knowledge of the democratic process is important. However, it would be helpful if the Government could give some further indication of what general aspects of life in the United Kingdom they have in mind. The four criteria in Amendment No. 4 which we have mentioned—namely political, civic, economic and cultural life—are four broad areas which might be considered.
	Miss Eagle also said in another place on 30th April that the Government were putting together a group of experts from the Department for Education and Skills and the Home Office to determine the detail of the curriculum. In his letter to me of 2nd July, the Minister said that an announcement about the group would be made shortly. Perhaps he might be able to give us an update on the progress that has been made. Will the group consist only of civil servants or will there be outside experts on it as well? Do the Government intend to amend the Bill so as to make the group's position in determining the curriculum clear on the face of the Bill?
	In respect of the amendments in the group tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Dholakia and Lord Avebury, I welcome the Minister's commitment in his letter to me, which was copied to the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, that the requirement of sufficient knowledge will be interpreted so as to ensure that it is of practical benefit which actually helps people to feel more welcomed into United Kingdom society.
	In relation to Amendment No. 11 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, perhaps the Minister will be able to tell the Committee when the draft curriculum will be published and whether the Government envisage a long period of consultation or whether, subject to the Bill becoming an Act, they intend to implement these provisions sooner rather than later. I look forward to the Minister's response.

Lord Avebury: I do not think that much divides the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, and I on these amendments. We both agree that it is a good idea that people applying for citizenship should have access to the fullest possible knowledge of life in the United Kingdom, including the matters which are dealt with in his amendment. It would be excellent if all those people had knowledge of our electoral system, of the way in which democracy works in this country, of the rights of individuals, of how individuals access those rights and so on as they will need that knowledge if they are to play their full part as citizens. I share the doubts expressed in another place by my honourable friend the Member for Bermondsey who questioned the one-size-fits-all provisions in relation to the area of the country in which a person lives. As he pointed out, in his constituency of Bermondsey life is very different from that in Gloucester, which was the constituency of the honourable Member who spoke immediately before him.
	There are also major differences as regards people's need to know about life in this country according to their professions or occupations. I think of my friends who have settled in this country over the years who come from all sorts of backgrounds: lawyers, doctors, photographers, police chiefs and an ex-brigadier. Each of them has sufficient knowledge of life in the United Kingdom for their own purposes, as most of us do, but they might not be capable of passing a general examination of the sort that the Government have in mind.
	I do not know whether the Minister ever watches "Big Brother" on television. If he does, he will have seen a person who thought that Cambridge was part of London, that the River Thames flowed through Cambridge and that East Anglia was somewhere in the neighbourhood of Tunisia. That person probably gets on admirably within her own milieu, but I think that she might have some difficulty with the examination proposed by the Government. Are we in fact requiring higher standards from applicants than many of our existing citizens could achieve?
	I wish to mention another aspect of the matter which I do not believe was mentioned in the other place. According to the working group chaired by Claus Moser on improving literacy and numeracy, some 7 million adults in England alone are functionally illiterate. He gave as an example of that that they could not find a plumber in the Yellow Pages. However, one cannot find a plumber anywhere else either! He said that a staggering 30 to 50 per cent have numeracy problems. He gave as examples the fact that they would not be able to calculate the size of a room 21 by 14 feet even with the aid of a calculator and that if they tendered £2 for items which cost separately 68p and 45p, they would not know what they ought to expect by way of change.
	I know that those estimates have been challenged but in some groups the picture is even worse. The Chief Inspector of Prisons, quoting a survey of 5,963 young people screened by the prisoners' learning support unit of the DfES in 2000-01, said that 37.6 per cent had the numeracy expected of a seven year-old and 31.4 per cent had a reading ability lower than that of a seven year-old. Those people would have great difficulty with almost any test that the Minister and his civil servants can devise.
	Therefore, it is important that we should not only have the general assurances that were given in the letter that the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, quoted, but should also see what the test is before we give approval to the proposal. That is why my noble friend and I in Amendment No. 11 have said that the test should be published before the order is laid bringing this clause into effect. I hope that the Government will accept this modest amendment.

Lord Moser: I wish to speak in support of Amendment No. 1 and to speak with qualms to Amendments Nos. 3 and 4. I should declare my involvement in this field as I am a member of the advisory committee of a new, important institution at King's College which deals with asylum and refugee issues. I refer to the Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees. Our purpose is to throw light on this difficult field through statistics and research.
	I should also declare a retrospective interest in that I was a successful asylum seeker about 60 years ago and have lived happily in this country ever since. I rather dread the idea that I might even now be asked to pass an examination on the institutions, the civics and the politics of this country. If I had been asked to do so in 1948, I would certainly have failed and missed the opportunity to become a naturalised citizen and possibly the opportunity to become a Member of this great Chamber.
	I refer to the matter of acquiring knowledge about our country. I hope that the tone of the clause on requirements for naturalisation will not be typical of the tone adopted by the Government throughout discussion on this issue and throughout the Bill. What seems to me of enormous importance at all stages of the process—from that of first seeking asylum all the way through to naturalisation—is that the tone emanating from government and from public sources generally should be well informed by the latest correct figures. The general public should not, as now, have a false idea of the scale of the problem. The tone should be rational, well informed, positive and on the whole welcoming.
	Throughout history—certainly throughout this century—the various phases of refugees have brought great benefits to this country. I do not just think of the well-known contributions to the sciences, the arts and so on, but of those made at all levels of society. The public attitude and public comment should be, first, positive, welcoming, warm and conscious of the benefits that refugees can bring and, secondly, aware of the problems, the challenges and the risks that may be involved.
	Those thoughts are relevant to Clause 1 and, indeed, to the whole of Part 1 of the Bill, although I am conscious that those are by no means the most controversial parts of the Bill, to which we shall come later. Clause 1 asks for knowledge of English and a knowledge of the society of this country. I have no problem as regards a knowledge of English. It is obviously desirable that at the point of naturalisation one should speak the language fairly well whatever one's accent and that one should have a good knowledge of English. I welcome the fact that the Bill encourages the provision of good quality English language teaching. That has constituted a great problem in the past.
	I feel quite differently about the requirement to command sufficient knowledge about life in the United Kingdom, let alone the amendment suggesting particular reference to history, political and civic institutions and so on. I realise that this matter is still in the melting pot and fairly vague but I dread the thought that a committee of curriculum experts at the Department for Education and Skills and the Home Office may get together and create syllabuses, curricula and teaching arrangements and that future followers of my quest for naturalisation so many years ago will have that high hurdle to jump.
	My preference is for the clause to disappear altogether and for the requirements be taken, as it were, in the good spirit in which they operated when I was naturalised. If not, we must take ultimate care in setting the height of the hurdles that applicants for naturalisation have to jump.
	I say in passing as I conclude, that I find a curious mismatch between this requirement for knowledge in order to achieve true integration and a later provision in the Bill, which in my view deprives the children of refugees of the chance of really good integration through being part of our mainstream education system. The requirement is that such children should be educated in accommodation centres. For all of those reasons I strongly support Amendment No. 1.

Baroness Uddin: I am very pleased to follow the noble Lord, Lord Moser, who eloquently argued for everything for which all of us who have spoken on this issue wish. I was particularly touched by his statement that in an ideal world we should not have to deal with this clause at all. Given that we do have to, I support the proposal to eliminate "sufficient", which was advanced by the noble Lords, Lord Dholakia and Lord Avebury.
	I want to discuss the clause in general and Amendments Nos. 3, 4 and 11. Much has been said in this regard so I shall not delay the Committee for long. It worries me deeply that there is a requirement to learn English. All of us would wish every person in this country, whether new, old or established, to speak perfectly good English.
	I have just come from a conference on children and ethnic minority attainments in our British education system. We discussed many problems, such as how to teach British children and ensure that they reach a good standard in English, citizenship, and so on. What efforts will be different as a result of the proposals? What provisions will be available for people who need assistance so that they are learnt before they seek the stamp of approval?
	What standards are we setting with regard to understanding the life in and having knowledge about Britain? I agree wholeheartedly with the CRE suggestion that there should be consultation and, in Amendment No. 11, the suggestions about the time limit and the need to publish a draft before the Act is effective. That is critical.
	Having spent nearly 25 years battling within the education system locally in places such as Tower Hamlets, I am not confident that citizenship classes or the curriculum will address the current nature of Britain, which is multi-faith, multi-racial and multi-lingual. How will the curriculum address that fundamental issue? For example, a whole host of nonsensical remarks have been made—my intelligence defies me to come up with a more appropriate word, but "nonsense" will do for now. They include comments about Muslim isolationists and arranged marriages—so-called forced marriages—not being an acceptable part of British behaviour. Such comments have preceded our discussions on the Bill. How will we ensure that a British standard is applicable across the board and that flexibility—the provision states that flexibility is allowed—will not be used to intervene and make harsher judgments? Who will decide who is right to be British and who is not?
	There are many concerns in this regard. The Committee needs reassurance on those matters. The approach is well meaning and good but we should find a way effectively to monitor in some way those who will apply the laws. They will not have the benefit of enlightened discussions and they may not have the training that we desire.

Earl Russell: The questions asked by my noble friend Lord Dholakia need some answering. Nevertheless, I understand what the Home Secretary is driving at in the clause. We should be careful not to require of newly arrived people in this country a higher standard in terms of our institutions and customs than we have ourselves. It is easy to underrate the amount of ignorance that there is among ourselves. I recall one of my undergraduate pupils—by definition not one of the less educated people in this country—to whom I had set an essay on the Parliament of 1628. He came back with a lengthy discussion of the writ of "alias corpus".
	That is an extreme case. However, I am yet to meet anyone outside political circles who knows how to go about registering to vote. Large numbers of people who I meet, in university circles and otherwise, do not appreciate that before a Bill can become law it has to be approved by both Houses except as required by the Parliament Acts. I hardly ever meet anyone who knows the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings in law.
	If we are ignorant about such matters, is it fair to require new applicants for citizenship to know what we do not? I believe that one could already argue that immigrants and newly arrived people in this country tend to have higher standards of knowledge in such matters than we do because they realise that they need to find out whereas we, suffering as we do from an information overload, tend very often to have an extremely effective mechanism for cutting out.
	I am sorry to say that I was tempted by the suggestion of the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, about requiring some knowledge of our history. However, the matter is a little more complicated than he suggests. The more general, brief and abbreviated one's picture of history, the greater the degree of variation and the more often it will need revision. Were I to be tested for citizenship by the standards of history that were current at the time that I sat my degree, I believe that I would be failed. Certain of my colleagues, I believe, would fail me at the moment, and I might fail some of them. After all, if one thinks of 1066 and All That—all the history that you can remember is in this little book—many of us cannot remember that now, although we can remember a very great deal else. Any tests of required knowledge in history would need to be upgraded at least once every five years and the selection of the people to do the upgrading would lead to an academic in-fight of an intensity that I dread to contemplate. This is not as easy as it looks.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: The noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, enunciated the anxieties of a number of people about the traps into which the Government might fall in terms of implementing the clause. Nevertheless, the Government have decided to do this; it is extremely important. They may be helped by the discussions that have just taken place. I hope that they listened in particular to the noble Lord, Lord Moser. As he said, he was a successful asylum seeker. He is perhaps one of the most successful citizens of this country whom any of us have had the privilege to meet. However, what he said was not based on that; it was based on a great understanding of the traps into which the Government could fall in relation to this matter.
	I believe that the requirements must be set out in a very positive way. They must be based on what the asylum seeker will need to know in order to get on in this country. It should not be a question of being admitted but of getting on and succeeding. That is the point. If the requirements were set out in that context and were kept simple, flexible and capable of being adjusted according to circumstances, I am sure that that would help very much.
	If people realise why they are being tested, it will not frighten them. It will help them to see that one must make an effort in order to succeed in a new country. That is the point, and people will understand that if the test is carried out properly. I believe that the Government have taken on a very difficult task, but I wish them well in it. It is very important.

The Earl of Onslow: I am very interested in the word "sufficient". I also want to draw the Committee's attention to Lord Bauer—an extremely distinguished Member of this House who died, I believe, three months ago. Lord Bauer was 19 years old when he came to this country. I know that he did not speak English. He applied to seven Cambridge colleges, was accepted by five, and went on to become Professor Lord Bauer. I wonder whether he would have passed this test.
	Does the test mean that applicants must know about the heptarchy, which Mr Prescott is busily reinventing? Does it mean that they have to know about Canute or Trafalgar? Or does it mean that they have to know the details of the social security system or the difference between criminal and civil law?
	I understand exactly what the Government are trying to do. But I suspect that they are reacting to a fairly sloppy tabloid headline: old people must know something about the country when they arrive here. I believe that it is reasonable to assume that those who make the effort to arrive here are those who have the greatest "get up and go". The first generation of West Indian immigrants were the go-ahead ones who wanted to come here to make a life for themselves. It has been much easier for them than possibly for some of their children because they have been caught, it has been said, between two stools.
	We have only to consider the immense success of a large percentage of Ugandan-Asian and Asian people who have come to this country. They have contributed enormously to our civilisation and welfare. I have only to look around this Chamber. Many of its Members look like refugees from the bigger cock-ups of British imperialism. We are extremely grateful for their presence here because they add tone, as someone said of cavalry regiments in 1890, to what would otherwise be a vulgar brawl. I know what the Government are doing, but let us try to bear those factors in mind because the situation is not nearly as easy as it appears.

Lord Greaves: These amendments relate to Clause 1, which is about knowledge of language and life in the UK. The first question that I want to ask the Minister concerns knowledge of language. Frankly, many people in this country are not literate. They may speak two or three languages, one of which may not be English. If they are asked to write a letter or read a newspaper, they will struggle. Therefore, will arrangements be made for people who are in that position and who are of an age at which it is not possible to become literate in a written language so that they can pass any tests or requirements in spoken English? After all, in terms of getting on in their communities and talking to people locally, spoken English is more important than written English.
	My second point is that there appears to be an assumption that a large number of people are reluctant to learn English. I declare an interest in that my wife is an ESOL teacher. The evidence that I have from various places in the North West is that the demand for ESOL classes is greater than the current provision. That demand comes from people who have come to this country in a perfectly ordinary manner. Some have come in order to get married; some are refugees; and others have come to take up jobs. Are the Government aware that these provisions in the Bill, if enacted, will result in a considerable extra resource being required for the provision of ESOL classes? Who will provide them? How will the funding mechanism take place? And what will the Government do to ensure that such classes are provided? It would be unfair to impose requirements on people which they cannot fulfil because of a lack of provision within the education system.
	I give two examples. At a conference in Bolton at the end of last week, it was reported that there are 900 refugee and asylum seeker students in FE in Bolton, but the number of requests for FE provision totals 1,500. Therefore, some 600 people who are desperate to learn English are waiting to go on courses. The idea that people will have to be forced to undertake such learning is, in many cases, a myth.
	In my own area, some 10 or 12 people a week turn up at Nelson and Colne College and ask for basic English classes as a second or third language. If good practice dictates that classes should contain eight or 10 students, that means that an extra classful of students per week is waiting to be taught. Thus, the waiting list grows. This is an important issue. Perhaps it is not one with which the Minister will have to deal in relation to this Bill. Nevertheless, it is a vital issue which the Government will have to face, and I wonder whether some answers can be given to those points.
	So far as concerns the British way of life, whatever that may be, I heard a nice story this week about two British citizens. One was born in Pakistan and the other was her daughter, who was born and grew up here. At present, the daughter is in Pakistan visiting her family. The mother, in this country, reported that a few days ago she had a telephone conversation with her daughter in Pakistan. They were both in tears on opposite ends of the telephone. When asked why, they said, "Because England lost to Brazil in the football". I believe that stories such as that need to be told in order to balance some of the other stories that one reads in the tabloids.
	I speak in support of the amendments tabled by my noble friends. I do not believe that I can support the amendment which states that a knowledge of history is relevant. If that were to be introduced, I can imagine suggesting that the Anglo-Saxon, Viking and Danish invasion should play a large part. Surely those invaders comprised the single largest influx of illegal immigrants ever to this country. I believe that I speak as someone who has several genes belonging to those groups in my blood, or wherever our genes appear.
	I turn to the subject of the nature of the test. I notice that one option is attendance on a course without a test at the end of it. I believe that if the Government are not careful, they will be open to ridicule in relation to the nature of the test and the exact knowledge required. I am reminded of the present theory examination which forms part of the driving test. It consists of multiple choice questions. One may be asked to choose between four answers, one of which is correct; one of which may be correct, and the other two of which are ludicrous. That kind of test on fairly basic matters might jeopardise the whole issue.
	Participation in discussions, on a course or on a citizenship programme, perhaps along the lines of that which exists in the United States, may be more appropriate than expecting people to write an essay or to answer stereotyped questions which inevitably would be the subject of detailed coaching within different communities.
	Looking through the bookshelves in my house yesterday I found a book published two or three years ago entitled, Britain, the country and its people: an introduction for learners of English. Clearly, there will be a whole new industry and opportunity for people to make money when the curricula are published. The book is by James O'Driscoll. I suspect that with that name he is "taking the Michael" a little.
	Page 96 is headed The House of Lords. It is a little out of date because it pre-dates the stage 1 reform. It reads:
	"The House of Lords (like the monarchy) has little, if any, real power any more."
	It continues:
	"Political parties are, in fact, especially keen to send their older members who once belonged to the leadership of the party to the House of Lords. It is a way of rewarding them with prestige while at the same time getting them out of the way of the present party leaders in the Commons, where their status and reputation might otherwise create trouble for party unity. Informally, this practice has become known as being 'kicked upstairs'."
	I can imagine a multiple-choice test which states, "When political parties want to get rid of MPs, are they: sent on holiday to Torremolinos; sent to the moon, or kicked upstairs to the House of Lords?" That is obviously a slightly exaggerated example. However, if we are not careful, that is the kind of banal level we shall reach. The Government must be careful on this issue.

Lord Dubs: The Government have this part of the Bill just about right. In my experience as head of the Refugee Council for seven or eight years, I found that asylum seekers were highly motivated individuals who picked up English and understood life in this country fairly quickly. Indeed, that was their main aim: to master enough of the language and the culture of this country in order to obtain jobs and make a contribution.
	I have one brief story to tell. At that time the Refugee Council ran a young people's home for Ethiopian and Eritrean asylum seekers aged between 13 and 16 or 17 years. They had not been here long when I went to meet them. I sat down and spoke to them and they said, "One of the things the Refugee Council should understand"—these were people who had been in the country only weeks—is that it should select staff for this home who understand the psychological circumstances which gave rise to our coming to this country". That was not bad.

Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville: I rise briefly to commend both the nature of the clause and the debate which has occurred upon it. I have lived in the United States twice. My children when young lived there and were subjected in school to an introduction to citizenship within the United States. It is no bad thing that we are getting round to the same issues, even if it is a little late.
	I pay tribute to my noble friends on the Front Bench for their amendment in the context of the spirit of the debate. The noble Earl, Lord Russell, is agreeably disarming about his knowledge of history. Ten days ago I mentioned to him that I had no prior knowledge of the rising against Cromwell in 1655 and he enlightened me at some length, including considerable local detail in Nottinghamshire. He alluded to Canute. The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, referred to the Vikings. A Reader's Digest atlas, devoted to the United Kingdom, has one page which relates to the colour of hair, which shows a precise correlation to how far the Vikings managed to get. That is an index of the immobility which has occurred in this nation over 1,000 years. The immigration into this country in the second half of the last century has done a great deal to shake up such immobility and to get us moving.
	I refer to lines 15 to 17 of page 1 of the Bill, to which no amendment in this group refers, but which we shall reach in Amendment No. 5. Other noble Lords have referred to the teaching and learning of English. Before the Bill was debated in the Commons I attended a briefing by a number of the outside relevant bodies. I said how important it is for there to be an improvement in the level of English, for a whole series of reasons in the interests of immigrants, quite apart from those of the economy. A representative from one of the bodies said that that was not the right thing for me to say and that the clause we were discussing on that occasion was harsh. I argued my case again. He said that the trouble was the inadequate provision for the learning of English—to which the noble Lord, Lord Greaves referred—and said that there is great pressure for that to be improved.
	I can only say as I said to him, that it is an ill wind which blows nobody any good. However, the pressure to which he referred, for more teaching of English to immigrants, was the first time the issue had been raised with me as a Member of Parliament in a quarter of a century. If the Bill has the effect of increasing pressure for classes to be provided for the learning of English, that will be a major step forward.

Lord Bhatia: As an immigrant of 30 years ago, perhaps I may share with Members of the Committee some of my experiences of English language learning. I do not believe that we should impose conditions which are not at present imposed on the citizens of this country.
	Perhaps I may relate an example which I faced 30 years ago when I acquired a business in the City of London. Thirty or 40 people worked in the company, of which I was managing director and chairman. A board of directors came with the company. We agreed that between us we would watch what happened and in one month's time review my role. The company, which had been around for 200 years, was involved in exports and imports, export financing, and so forth.
	Four weeks later I met with the board. The first question I was asked was, "What would you like to contribute to what is already going on? What is the added value, as managing director, that you want to bring?" I imposed a condition on the staff of the company, and said, "I should like to see each and every piece of paper which leaves this company; that is, all the correspondence written by 30 people in the company to our clients, both in this country and abroad." I checked such correspondence for about four weeks. I commented to the board that one of the major things I found unacceptable was that the staff were unable to write good English. Over a period, the company realised that all important documents, important letters to clients or to government departments would have to pass across my desk for the English to be corrected and presented in the correct form.

Lord Filkin: I thank Members of the Committee for the courteous words spoken by both Front Benches, which are appreciated. The opportunity afforded by the amendments to discuss the new requirements relating to knowledge of life in the United Kingdom which the Bill proposes to introduce is useful. I believe most people would agree that it is not unreasonable to impose some requirement. Indeed, combined with the language requirement, there is potential value to the individual and to society if we get it right. I agree that we need to be careful about being over-prescriptive in that regard.
	The Government's preference is to emphasise that applicants should have acquired knowledge of life in the United Kingdom, which is likely to be useful and will help them better to integrate. That is four square with the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Carnegy of Lour, and the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, about accessing democracy and rights. However, we want to take expert advice on this and to consult widely on precisely what an applicant should be expected to know and what therefore would need to be covered in courses and in learning material.
	The Home Secretary has asked Professor Sir Bernard Crick, who has advised the Government on the development of citizenship education in schools and for 16 to 18-year olds, to chair an advisory group of external people. That group will be asked to advise on the detailed content of a curriculum and how it might be delivered. We shall also want to consult more widely when we have some provisional proposals.
	It would be a mistake if the Bill was too prescriptive about the requirement and, perhaps unintentionally, constrained subsequent thinking or the development of thinking over time. I believe, therefore, that it would be better to retain the admittedly broad wording rather than to attempt greater precision in the Bill.
	I turn to the individual amendments. I have explained, in relation to Amendment No. 1, why the Government believe that this new requirement is reasonable and potentially useful to the individual and society.
	In relation to Amendments Nos. 2, 7 and 9, I understand the concerns of noble Lords that the word "sufficient" is imprecise. I point out, however, that that parallels the existing requirement in paragraph 5(c) of Schedule 1 to the 1981 Act which requires an applicant to have,
	"sufficient knowledge of the English language".
	In that sense, therefore, it is well precedented.
	Perhaps more fundamentally, my concern is that if we omit the word "sufficient" it might imply a more onerous requirement than we intend. Clearly, we do not expect applicants to have a comprehensive knowledge of all aspects of life in the United Kingdom. I do not think that any Member of the Committee could even claim that, as the noble Earl, Lord Russell, has clearly advised us. Including the word "sufficient" recognises that the requirement is comparative: it needs to be sufficient for the purpose of someone seeking naturalisation but no more. Quite what "sufficient" will mean in practice, we think can better be taken forward by seeking the advice of the expert group already mentioned and then by setting that out in the regulations to be laid before Parliament. However, we do not envisage anything onerous. It would be entirely counter-productive to put serious obstacles in the way of people who are keen to become British citizens.
	Amendment No. 6 would remove the regulation-making power which enables the Home Secretary to determine how the test of sufficient knowledge of life in the United Kingdom can be determined. If, as I hope Members of the Committee agree, the underlying requirement should be retained in the Bill then it clearly makes sense to have some means of testing whether or not it is met. That is the purpose of the regulation-making power.
	The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, raised the issue of "one size fits all". That is a good question and a serious one for the advisory group and the Government to consider. People are citizens of the United Kingdom. Therefore, one would expect some commonality. On the other hand, how the Government works, for example, in Scotland and Wales is different. Therefore, those are issues which ought at least to be reflected on without expecting people to have a degree in constitutional law.
	It was pointed out that accessing a plumber is difficult. That is a fairly general complaint for anyone who lives in London, irrespective of whether or not one has citizenship, but perhaps that is by the by.
	Points were made about arithmetic, geography and history. Those are issues that the advisory group will relate to. But, in a sense, we are not seeking to test whether people have met GCSE standards in five grades or more but whether they have sufficient knowledge to get by in Britain. We shall keep returning to that matter. Clearly, there are issues about illiteracy and handicap which both the advisory group and the Government will be considering carefully.
	I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Moser, about the tone of the Bill. I think that its tone is right. I also believe that it is right subsequently. No doubt we can debate that issue later.
	I have talked about flexibility in respect of numeracy and literacy. The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, raised the issue of knowledge of language. We believe that is relevant because there is clear research evidence that people with some working knowledge of English have significantly increased changes of getting work and employment—if they are of an appropriate age and have an inclination to do so. Therefore, as was signalled by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, one of the benefits of the Bill may be that, by citizenship requiring an extension of further teaching of English, a wide range of other benefits may be opened up by increasing literacy.
	The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, asked whether there will be an adequate supply of courses. By and large we expect colleges of further education to develop courses relevant to the syllabus that is eventually identified. In terms of English language it is crucial that we get an adequate supply in place. We are aware of some of the supply problems and there is a mapping exercise under way to identify those shortfalls.
	I turn to Amendment No. 11. It seeks to prohibit the Home Secretary from making a commencement order in relation to this part of the Bill until he has published a draft of the proposed citizenship curriculum. I can assure the Committee that there will be wide consultation on the content and form of the proposed curriculum before we implement this part of the Bill.
	In the nature of things, it will take some considerable time to develop curriculum proposals and then to translate them into courses and learning materials. There will be plenty of opportunity for those with an interest to contribute to the process. It does not seem to me, therefore, necessary to include such a provision on the face of the Bill.

Earl Russell: Does the Minister understand that there is no distrust of the Government's willingness to consult; the problem is the tendency of those likely to be consulted to distrust each other?

Lord Filkin: I take the noble Earl's point. One does not expect by consultation necessarily to get a consensus, but it is important that everyone has had an opportunity to express their views. Therefore, the Government are aware of a diversity of views in that respect.

The Earl of Onslow: The noble Lord says that there will be a curriculum and there will be a test. Presumably there will be a pass mark. Let us assume that the test is simple and that the pass mark is 25 per cent. What happens if a young Moser clone appears at the door and—unlike the noble Lord—fails and only gets 24 per cent? Will he be told to go away and take another test? I can see enormous bureaucracy and fun arriving down this route. It will be complicated; it is going to be bureaucratic and difficult. I am sympathetic to what the Government are trying to do, but I do not much like the way that they are doing it.

The Countess of Mar: I follow up a point made by the noble Lord. First, I declare an interest as a member of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. I apologise for not having been here for Second Reading. That was due to circumstances beyond my control. I also declare an interest as one of the "cock-ups" of colonisation mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Onslow: I was born in Kenya, my father was born in Karachi and my grandfather was born in Simla.
	For many years the General Medical Council has required doctors from abroad coming to this country to pass an English test. Is it not the case that now that that has settled down it is not a problem?

Lord Filkin: On the last point, yes, indeed. However, I would caution the Committee against getting unduly apprehensive about this matter at this stage. Admittedly the terms "syllabus" and "pass" may have a dire tone to them, but the intent is to set out requirements about someone getting by and being a successful citizen in Britain rather than proving that they are academic, intellectual or that they have a deep understanding of the constitution.
	If Members of the Committee wait to see the outcome of both the consultation process and the ensuing regulations, it should become clear that that is the commitment and the intent. The aim is to help people to become citizens. The course that will be provided will be the mechanism which raises them to the necessary standard and which certifies to the Secretary of State that they have achieved that standard.

Lord Avebury: I am reassured to some extent by what the Minister has said about Amendment No. 11 and the Government's intention to complete the consultations before they introduce this part of the Bill. Will the consultations that Sir Bernard Crick is embarking on with a wide range of organisations be held in public? Will Sir Bernard issue an open invitation to educators and others to come forward with their views so that the process can be seen by members of the public?

Lord Filkin: My Lords, I am almost certain that that is the case—in the absence of any confirmation, I am sure that it should be. Sir Bernard will want to hear the widest range of views, as would only be right in a proper reflective process. That process will take time, and it will take time for the necessary improvements in supply that we have discussed to be put in place.
	Turning to Amendments Nos. 3 and 4, as I said, it would not be right to be over-prescriptive at this stage about the content of the curriculum. No doubt, we all have different views about the extent to which a knowledge of the history of the United Kingdom should figure in the curriculum. I should probably be biased in that respect, but I think that such provision would often fail the test of what one needs to get by as a successful citizen. I fear that at present plenty of successful citizens have a poor knowledge of history.
	I therefore hope that, in the light of those positive assurances, the noble Lords who tabled the amendments will not press them and will actively participate with others in the consultation process on what we believe to be the positive development of citizenship and our intent to extend it more vigorously to more people in Britain, should they be prepared to take up that invitation.

Baroness Uddin: My Lords, will my noble friend assure the Committee that the advisory group will ensure that it contains the broadest of representation, including members who understand the full implications of the cultural, linguistic and other background on which it will be making judgments, with particular reference to the multi-faith, multi-cultural nature of Britain?

Lord Filkin: My Lords, I do not at present know what may be the membership of the advisory group, but I should be extremely surprised if those viewpoints were not adequately represented on it.

Lord Dholakia: My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. I again stress that we ought not to lose sight of the fact that a substantial number of people from the minorities that we are discussing were born in this country as British subjects. They will not be subject to the language requirements, because they are part and parcel of this country. We are therefore talking of a small group of people for whom communication is difficult. None of us disagrees about the need for English: it is right and proper that people should be able to communicate. Although I do not necessarily agree with the noble Countess, Lady Mar, who mentioned tests for doctors, they caused problems in their early days, although they have now been sorted out.
	The Bill is likely to be reported in October. Will it be possible between now and October for Sir Bernard Crick to state what he has in mind when we discuss life in Britain? That would give us some guidance on whether to pursue the matter on Report. The point that the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, made is important. Many solutions to problems of language and life in this country are to be found from within the relevant communities themselves. The noble Earl and the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, cited the need for those minorities to be able to make use of available facilities. Until now, there has been no particular process by which to educate people. They have taken the matter into their own hands. The noble Lord, Lord Bhatia, is right.
	When I first came to this country, I had a poor knowledge of English. Every time that someone asked me a question, I had literally to translate it into my own language and, like on satellite television, there was a gap before I gave a reply. The problem was that whenever I went to a comedy in a theatre, I always laughed last after everyone else had finished. I think that they thought that I was a bit foolish or that I must have discovered something. The greatest joy in my life occurred one day when I jumped out of the bath and said, "Eureka!" because for the first time in my life I had dreamt in English. I had made it.
	Communities themselves have solutions to the problems. There is a serious problem of people who have culturally found it impossible to go to school in their homeland—many elderly people, and so on. They should be part of the process. I hope that we shall be gentle in considering the process. Any further information that the Minister can provide will be useful. We do not want a quick fix. We must bear in mind variation across the country and not simply devise policy on the basis of problems in the North of England. I hope that before Report the Minister will provide some explanation on the basis of which we can consider what needs to be done. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendments Nos. 2 to 4 not moved.]

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: moved Amendment No. 5:
	Page 1, line 17, after "language" insert "or sign language"

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: My Lords, this is a simple amendment which, I hope, is uncontroversial, but which would assist profoundly deaf people if the Government were to accept it. I thank the Royal National Institute for Deaf People, the British Deaf Association and the Immigration Advisory Service for their helpful briefing on the matter.
	The amendment's effect would be to include sign language as a language the sufficient knowledge of which could enable a person to make a successful application for naturalisation. What will be the legal status of sign language under Clause 1? Clause 1(3) enables provision to be made by regulations to determine whether a person has sufficient knowledge about a language before he can successfully apply for naturalisation. We have just had an extensive and sensitive debate on that matter.
	Will a person who is deaf or hard of hearing and who uses sign language be catered for in those provisions without discrimination against him/her? If so, how? The RNID and the BDA share my concern about that. The problem is that the working of the clause as drafted appears to be based on the idea that the only languages in existence are spoken languages and that the only indigenous languages in the UK are English, Welsh and Scottish Gaelic.
	Will there be facilities for teaching people whose language is not English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic to learn sign language that is understood in the UK? Will those facilities be sufficient for the number of applicants wanting to use them? I listened with great care to the points made about current facilities for teaching English. The amendment takes us a stage further, because people will need even greater ability if they have to teach sign language as well.
	For some deaf people. sign language is their first, or certainly their preferred, language. It is surely beyond dispute that British Sign Language—and, indeed, other forms of sign language—is a language in its own right, with its own vocabulary and syntax. We must also remember that sign languages vary throughout the world in the same way as spoken languages.
	Is the Minister aware that the BDA has recently received a number of calls to its helpline asking for advice in cases of deaf people from overseas who are seeking asylum? Do the Government have figures for the number of people who are deaf or hard of hearing who currently seek naturalisation and who use sign language? I listened carefully to what the Minister had to say about the advisory committee to be chaired by Professor Crick. The Minister referred en passant to illiteracy and handicap as being within the committee's remit. Is the issue of sign language therefore swept up by the committee, or will the Government, as I hope that they will, consider it separately as a language in its own right?
	I also follow up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia. We anticipate that the Bill will be reported in October. Can the Government assure us that any regulations to be proposed to address concerns raised on languages and in general will be available to the House before Report, so that we are able properly to address those matters? I beg to move.

Baroness Uddin: My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, has raised a fundamental point to which we do not often adhere in discussion of nationality and immigration. In fact, I think that it may be almost the first time that it has been raised. I welcome the amendment and support what the noble Baroness said. I have nothing to add, except to say that it is critical that her concerns are taken on board. I look forward to hearing what the Government have to say, and hope that that information will then be relayed to those outside, because many disabled organisations work with disabled people. There is the issue not only of sign language but of the use of Braille and other systems. The principle is good and needs to be established, and the fears and anxieties that have arisen from the discussion need to be put out.

Lord Dholakia: We also support the amendment. We should look not only at what to include but also at exclusions from the provision; particularly whether people who suffer from mental illness should be allowed or expected to take the test.
	Within the communities are people who are not part of the mainstream process within which they would receive the same benefits as indigenous people. We have to be careful in terms of their attainment of sign language and of other disabilities from which they may suffer. I hope that the Minister will look not only at what should be included but also at what should be excluded, particularly among people applying for citizenship who cannot comply because of their condition.

Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville: The presence on the Front Bench of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, encourages me to think that the Government might accept the amendment or a variant of it. On the Homelessness Bill, which he piloted through Grand Committee, my noble friend Lady Hanham moved an amendment seeking that tenants should have read to them a particular document that was necessary as part of the procedure. Of course, that is the mirror case to what we are talking about. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, accepted the spirit of the amendment and I hope that his contiguous presence might cause the Minister to do so too on this occasion.

Lord Filkin: I am sure the Committee will recognise that my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer's contiguous presence always has a benign influence on me.
	The Government understand the concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, that those who use sign language should not be disadvantaged in any way in seeking British citizenship. It is our firm intent that the Bill should not have such an effect. The present nationality instructions and the relevant guide, both of which are public documents, make it clear that applicants can demonstrate sufficient knowledge of the relevant language through sign language. That will continue to be the case.
	The debate is how sign language is to be tested. The exact requirements need to be considered further. As I am sure the noble Baroness knows, there are many forms of sign language. We would like to consider the matter in more detail and consult organisations with expertise such as the British Deaf Association, RNID and others. I hope that the noble Baroness will therefore be content to withdraw the amendment while we reflect and return to the matter on Report, recognising that it is unlikely that the consultation process through Sir Bernard Crick will have been completed by then and that regulations will not necessarily be ready, but no doubt we should be in a better position to share with the House the work carried out over the summer.
	There are two interconnected issues: first, how people who need to communicate in sign language can be assessed in ways that do not disadvantage them; secondly, exemptions. As the Committee knows, the Bill gives the Home Secretary powers to make exemptions from some of the evaluation criteria for certain people. It was envisaged that a person of 65 or more might not be expected to comply, just as people with certain disabilities might not be expected to comply. There might be a debate as to whether a person who could communicate only in sign language should be exempt in certain circumstances, such as if he was older, or whether it would be in his interests if he was younger to be helped to communicate as well as he could to maximise his contribution to and benefits from his citizenship.
	The issues require careful thought and we would like to use the summer for it, taking up some of the points on consultation that have been mentioned. I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: I thank the Minister for his reply, although I was disappointed with parts of it. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, and my noble friend Lord Brooke for their support. I am grateful that support came from around the Committee. As the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, said, it is important that organisations outside the House are not alarmed by the process being implemented. The House has an effective role to play in debates on the issues in Clause 1, particularly because so many of the amendments tabled in another place were not called because of programming Motions. This is one example of an important matter that could not be debated through lack of time. I am therefore grateful to Members of the Committee for giving their time to the debate.
	I am disappointed that the close relationship on the Front Bench between the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Filkin, did not bring forth fruit at this stage, but I accept that the summer provides proper time for reflection. My patience will not last for ever and I was disappointed to hear that the conclusions from the Crick advisory committee may not be ready for Report stage. I will consider carefully the amendments I table on Report to take account of how far that committee has reached in its deliberations and of whether the Government are prepared to bring forward regulations at that stage or by Third Reading.
	Those people preparing to make applications for naturalisation need to know how to approach the application in a proper manner. Having heard the Minister's response, I am prepared at this stage to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Skelmersdale: In calling Amendment No. 6, I must inform the Committee that if it is agreed to I cannot call Amendment No. 7.

[Amendments Nos. 6 and 7 not moved.]

Lord Dholakia: moved Amendment No. 8:
	Page 2, line 1, at beginning insert—
	"( ) No regulation shall be made under subsection (1)(ba) or (bb) without prior consultation with, and agreement from—
	(a) the Commission for Racial Equality,
	(b) the Citizenship Foundation, and
	(c) the Immigration Advisory Service."

Lord Dholakia: I was delighted when the Minister mentioned Sir Bernard Crick and the consultations likely to take place. There was some resistance in the other place to the need to involve certain key organisations in the process, particularly when regulations have been made. That is why our amendment seeks that no regulation should be made without prior consultation with and agreement from the Commission for Racial Equality, the Citizenship Foundation and the Immigration Advisory Service.
	In Second Reading brief, the Commission for Racial Equality pointed out to us that there had been no proper consultation with interested parties as to what constitutes citizenship and what defines a British citizen: values, rights, ways and so on. The amendment allows us to argue the case for full and frank consultation and to stress that the definition of those terms is not only a matter for the Government; others should be consulted.
	The amendment is straightforward and follows logically from the previous one. I hope that the Minister will be sympathetic. A number of those organisations have carried out useful work. The list I have mentioned is not exclusive, but they were not chosen accidentally. The Commission for Racial Equality self-evidently has an interest and would like to be consulted. The Citizenship Foundation has made it its business to think through these issues and is keen to be engaged in the debate. The Immigration Advisory Service sees the practicalities of these matters in large volumes all the time. They are crucial organisations.
	There are varying opinions on what constitutes citizenship: is it our values, our rights, or our way of life? The proposition is that we should have full and frank consultation. If we are to succeed we need to have ownership of what is being proposed. That can best come by consulting those who have carried out valuable work.
	My honourable friend Simon Hughes, MP for North Southwark and Bermondsey, mentioned the commission for citizenship set up between 1987 and 1989 by the noble Lord, Lord Weatherill, when he was Speaker in the Commons. I should remind the Minister that David Blunkett, the Home Secretary, was a member of that body. The other members were some extremely important people: John Monks, who was, at that time, only the deputy general secretary of the TUC, Ted Wragg, Ben Whittaker, Maurice Stonefrost, John Beishon, Rodney Bickerstaffe, and a number of others.
	The concern then expressed was that much time was spent on deciding how "citizenship" should be defined. I do not want to start inventing the wheel in this particular matter, but it must be possible to bring these people into the consultation process, especially when the regulations have been made. It will be a tremendous help to use the expertise of those people who have knowledge of such matters, and who have been involved in such work.
	It is not our intention that such organisations should exercise a veto over the regulations that the Government will make; this amendment is designed simply to ensure that they participate in the consultation process on the basis of their particular knowledge. This recommendation is nothing new. If one looks at the Government's strategies under the Crime and Disorder Act, there is a partnership approach within which a number of organisations have been brought together and on the basis of which policies are pursued. I hope that that approach will be possible as regards the key organisations in relation to the regulations and the consultation process. I beg to move.

Lord Borrie: The noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, has made a good case for the inclusion of organisations such as the ones specified in the amendment. He will know in more detail than I—and, indeed, for the reasons that he gave—whether those organisations are the main bodies concerned, or whether there are others that should be consulted. Towards the end of his remarks the noble Lord said that it was not his intention that all, or any, of the organisations should have a veto on the regulations. However, I hope the noble Lord will agree that, as it stands, the amendment refers not only to "consultation with" but also "agreement" by each of those bodies. Therefore, on his own explanation of the purposes of the amendment, it must surely be deficient. I believe that it would be advisable to provide that such bodies should be consulted on these matters. However, it is a matter for the Minister to say whether or not that should be specified on the face of the Bill.

Lord Avebury: As far as possible, we wish to have agreement on such matters. That is why the word "agreement" has been placed in the text of the amendment. I well understand the objections made to this proposal when it was discussed in another place. However, we have moved on a little from that stage. We now have a committee under Sir Bernard Crick. I do not know whether the Minister is to nominate all the members of that committee, or whether advice will be taken from Sir Bernard on who his colleagues will be. The Minister was a little indefinite when questioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, in that respect. If the Commission for Racial Equality, the Citizenship Foundation, and the Immigration Advisory Service were asked to nominate individuals who could serve on the committee with Sir Bernard, that might be a good way to satisfy the requirement in the amendment that there should be prior consultation with such bodies, especially those, as my noble friend said, with almost unrivalled expertise when looking at the question of citizenship.
	In that connection, can the Minister say whether Sir Bernard will start with a blank sheet of paper? The more we discuss the matter, the more Ministers lift the veil a little and say what they believe is meant by,
	"sufficient knowledge about life in the United Kingdom".
	The Minister was good enough to agree with me that there was perhaps a difference in this requirement as regards Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and England, but that is not the only difference that might exist. As I tried to point out when we discussed a previous amendment, there are also differences between the nature of the person's life in the United Kingdom; for example, the occupation that he will take up, and the milieu in which he will live. The latter may vary enormously between one applicant for citizenship and another.
	I believe, therefore, that it would be a good idea for the Minister to confirm in his response that he will ensure that the Commission for Racial Equality, the Citizenship Foundation, and the IAS are invited to give their views. I do not mean exclusively, because there will be more than four members of the proposed committee. I take the point made earlier about the necessity for drawing on the widest possible advice. With due regard to the necessity for making this an open process in which anyone can take part, priority must surely be given to the claims of organisations with particular knowledge in such matters when considering both the selection of the membership of Sir Bernard's committee, and the invitations to give evidence.
	Perhaps I may also point out to the Minister that we have a similar procedure in this Chamber. I have in mind Select Committees, which invite evidence from members of the public. General invitations are sent out, to which anyone can respond. Oral evidence may then be required from particular witnesses with special knowledge. If Sir Bernard were to adopt a similar approach, it would be most useful. I hope that the noble Lord will give consideration to that suggestion.

Viscount Bridgeman: This amendment is identical to one that was tabled in Standing Committee in another place. As my honourable friend Humfrey Malins made clear, we support the thinking behind the amendment; namely, that there should be consultation with the appropriate non-governmental organisations on the nature and content of the tests that applicants for naturalisation will have to sit. Our only concern with this amendment is that, as has been mentioned, we do not believe that it goes far enough. The doubts expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, about any question of a veto should, I believe, be properly addressed at a later stage of this Bill
	The amendment names three organisations only, while there are many other organisations that ought properly to be consulted. I shall not detain Members of the Committee with a list. My honourable friend Humfrey Malins made some suggestions in Standing Committee in another place (Official Report, Commons Standing Committee E, 30/4/02; col. 22). I welcome the commitment made by the Government during the consideration of this amendment in another place to consultation with non-governmental organisations on the regulations. The Minister at that time, Angela Eagle, said in the Standing Committee that, when determining the contents of these regulations, the Government would,
	"consult and listen to the best expert advice".—[Official Report, Commons Standing Committee E, 30/4/02; col. 23.]
	I hope that the Minister will be able to confirm that commitment this afternoon. I know that the noble Lord has spoken about the possible composition of this committee under Sir Bernard Crick, but anything that he can add as a result of this amendment will be most welcome.

Lord Alton of Liverpool: In speaking briefly to Amendment No. 8, perhaps I may remind Members of the Committee that I have a potential interest as I hold a chair in citizenship at Liverpool John Moore's University. I strongly support the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, has laid before the Committee, although I do not believe that it is necessarily right in its detail. It would be better if it were framed in a more generic way. All of us have some reservations about putting long lists of organisations into primary legislation. However, as the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, just said, there are many other organisations apart from the three specified in the amendment that could also be included. I have in mind, for example, the Institute for Citizenship, which could stand alongside the three already mentioned in the amendment. Doubtless, there are many other such organisations.
	As the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, reminded the Committee, the principle of consulting with such groups, though not necessarily being held to ransom by any of them, is certainly the right way forward. Following up the questions that have already been asked as to whether or not there will be any requirement on Sir Bernard Crick's committee to call witnesses, can the Minster say when we may expect the report? It would be enormously helpful if an interim report on this particular subject could be issued before we meet again to consider such matters on Report.
	As soon as September falls, we are all acutely aware that another set of Sir Bernard's recommendations are due. I refer to those that have been incorporated into the Education Bill, and which will be implemented in our schools. Indeed, for the first time ever in secondary schools, citizenship will be taught. Many of us also hope that that will not turn into a dreary round of dry-as-dust British constitutional civics. However, important issues that affect the whole population of the United Kingdom, not just incomers, are raised by the teaching of citizenship in schools and by Part 1 of the Bill. For instance, Part 1 raises the possibility of the removal of citizenship. That interests me. There may, sometimes, be good grounds for removing citizenship, as a way of showing someone that he has behaved in an unacceptable or anti-social way. That might make him take the matter rather more seriously than previously.
	I strongly support what the Government are doing to encourage the celebration of citizenship. It is right to encourage such celebration, and the United States model is a good one. I am glad that that seems to be part of the Government's thinking.
	The noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, has done the Committee a service by putting the amendment before us. We have had a useful discussion, and I hope that the Minister will address some of the issues raised.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: I shiver slightly when the Minister talks about delivering a curriculum. That is a bad way of looking at things. Sir Bernard must decide what people must know; the people who teach will decide what the curriculum will be. I hope that the Home Secretary's carry-over from the Department for Education and Employment will not affect this issue. That would damage the exercise.

Baroness Uddin: I also support the amendment. The Government began on the principle of being open and of consulting as wide a group of people as possible. The amendment is entirely in line with that.
	I agree with Members of the Committee who have said that we should not, at this stage, advocate the prescription of the different groups. In fact, advocacy is precisely what the amendment aspires to—advocacy by the Commission for Racial Equality, the Citizenship Foundation and, of course, the Immigration Advisory Service, whose work I know well. The community can have some confidence that such groups act as advocates on its behalf with powerful government institutions.
	The amendment would give us some leeway to send out an important message. At a time when so many messages about nationality, immigration and asylum seem to have gone wrong, it is important that we leave the door open to public bodies that are supported and nurtured by ordinary folk. Many people depend on such organisations and vice versa.

Lord Filkin: I strongly agree with the central thrust of the debate. It is important that we get the regulations right and, in the light of the matters on which Sir Bernard is focusing, that we have processes that ensure that all those with interests and expertise can contribute. We consulted widely with NGOs on the White Paper, Secure Borders, Safe Haven, and the views of many of the organisations that responded were interesting and helpful.
	The advisory group that Sir Bernard has been invited to chair is still at a relatively early stage of development. It is a little premature for us to debate the membership. No doubt Sir Bernard will put his thoughts on that matter to the Home Secretary, who will make the relevant announcements. The thoughts expressed in our debate will, no doubt, be of interest and of potential use.
	Does Sir Bernard have a blank sheet of paper? He is expected to understand the policy objectives set out in the White Paper. We talked about those in some detail this afternoon. We want to have such an expert on the advisory group to give others with, we hope, varying but related expertise a free hand to come forward with their views. That is very much in the spirit of what has been said. We want people to succeed—or get by—as citizens, rather than expecting them to be academic or anything of that type.
	As ever, there will be a tension between, on the one hand, openness, consultation and the opportunity for people to participate and, on the other, an early response. My view is that it is unlikely—and would, perhaps, be unwise—that we would try to get Sir Bernard to report by, say, early September, in time for the Government to give our considered view. That would, arguably, be too short a time in which to get the benefit of his expertise. That expertise will inform the regulations that the Government will make, and the House will have an opportunity to consider whether it is content with those regulations.

Lord Brougham and Vaux: I am sure that the Minister will not mind if I interrupt him to point out that we are sitting not as the House but as a Committee.

Lord Filkin: I am grateful for that advice. I shall seek to recollect that we are in Committee.
	The noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, made a point about whether the group would call witnesses. That is a matter for Sir Bernard and the committee, and it will have a bearing on the speed with which he can report. He will decide whether he can fulfil his remit adequately with or without doing that. We should leave such issues to him.
	I agree with the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Carnegy of Lour. If I talk about what people need to know and what organisations need to teach them, it might produce a less dire feeling than words such as "curriculum". That is the essence of what I meant. We must be clear about the competencies that people will be helped to achieve.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: Would not it be better to express the whole thing in terms of outcomes and by referring to what people need to know? People may not need to go through a course, as they may know it all already. It would be an another way of putting it. That may not have sprung to the mind of the people who drafted the Bill, but it is an important point.

Lord Filkin: In essence, I was informally shaking hands with the noble Baroness on that point. We are talking about the skills and knowledge that are needed to allow someone to be a competent and effective citizen, in their own interest and as a participant in society. That is the issue that we seek to address with this measure.

The Earl of Onslow: I am a little confused by the concept of the test. Will it be a set test for everybody? If so, the answers to the test will be publicly known, and no one will need to do any work. Will there be a different test for everybody? How will it work?
	I am in sympathy with the Government about this, and they know that. However, some practical problems will raise their ugly heads. If people know that one of the questions will be, for the sake of argument, "What is heptarchy?", will that be all that they need to know—nothing else? Will people need to know only the answers to six, eight or 10 questions? Will there be generic, general knowledge questions? Some people may say that the test set by an immigration authority in one part of the country is harder than that set by another. I see terrible problems, and the Government must take them into account.

Lord Filkin: We are slightly in danger of going back to the previous amendment. The Government recognise that we do not have a monopoly of wisdom on such matters. That is why we are forming an external advisory group to report to the Home Secretary and, no doubt, in public as well. Everyone will see the nature of the advice before we make regulations. It is as well to leave that process to take its course, informed, no doubt, by the contributions made in Committee.
	I think that I have responded to most points raised in the debate. Respectfully, I suggest that the amendment be withdrawn at this stage.

Lord Dholakia: I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. I was not expecting a report to be produced in time for the Report stage of the Bill. However, it would be useful to our discussions on Report to have available an outline of the requirements. There is a fear among ethnic minority groups in this country about the demands to be made of them—it is not that they do not want to comply with them. They are concerned about what is expected of them in terms of the knowledge or the test under discussion. What better bodies are there in this country than the Commission for Racial Equality, the Citizenship Foundation and the Immigration Advisory Service to be involved? They have considerable knowledge of the community. Ultimately, the provisions must be sold to those who are affected by them and that can be done more easily if those bodies are involved in the process.

Lord Filkin: I apologise for interrupting the noble Lord but I failed to address that issue in my response. It is only proper that I do. In making regulations, we will consult widely, as we normally do. I find it inconceivable that we would not consult with those three bodies—we will want to consult with them and many others. We would not feel it appropriate for government ever to give a power of veto to an external body over such matters, while respecting that we want to consider properly comments that it makes. I hope that that reply is helpful.

Lord Dholakia: I am grateful to the Minister. On the basis of his comments, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendment No. 9 not moved.]

The Earl of Sandwich: moved Amendment No. 10:
	Page 2, line 15, at end insert—
	"( ) make provision for the Secretary of State to make payment to provide specified courses for these purposes and to make payment for travel and childcare costs for those attending."

The Earl of Sandwich: In the absence of my noble friend Lord Hylton, and on his behalf, I rise to move Amendment No. 10. Its purpose is to secure funding to enable asylum seekers who are required to do so, but who do not have adequate means, to learn the English language and acquire knowledge about life in the UK so that they are not further disadvantaged.
	I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, who laid the groundwork for the proposal in the previous group of amendments. I listened to the Minister's reply and was a little troubled when he mentioned problems and shortfalls relating to colleges of education. Perhaps he would elaborate on that.
	A sufficient knowledge of English is recognised by every Member of the Committee but it requires access to facilities for asylum seekers which they may not enjoy in induction or accommodation centres, especially if they are dispersed to areas away from language teaching centres or colleges of education. What provision is intended and will the Government undertake to meet travel and perhaps childcare costs where necessary? If not, those will have to be met from the limited funds of non-governmental organisations. That is why many such organisations, including the highly respected Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture, support the amendment. I beg to move.

Lord Clinton-Davis: I rise to support what has been said by the noble Earl. It is important that the Government should answer the point and I am sure that my noble friend will do so. Where the Bill is silent on this matter, it is important that the Government should make payments to enable people to attend the courses. If the Government have not specified that either in the Bill or in the regulations, they should do so.

Lord Dholakia: I, too, rise to support the amendment. The reasons are clear; in many parts of the country there is a considerable amount of unemployment and people do not have adequate resources. In many cases, women go to work and support the family. If they are expected to benefit by such provision, it is right and proper that facilities and finances are available to enable them to undertake the task. We shall be delighted if the Minister can say that those facilities will be available.

Baroness Uddin: I support the amendment. Numerous members of Government have often talked about the isolation of women and their participation in British life. It is important that we put the money where our mouth is.

Lord Filkin: I thank the noble Earl for raising these important issues. However, for reasons which I shall explain, I do not believe that an amendment to the Bill is required. Although final decisions have yet to be made about precisely how courses will be delivered, it seems likely that it will be done mainly by further education colleges on the basis of funds allocated to them by the Learning and Skills Council as part of DfES's "Adult Basic Skills" programme and similar programmes in the devolved administration.
	In those circumstances, there is no need for the Bill to provide a specific regulation-making power to enable the Secretary of State to make a payment for courses. However, as was said in discussions on earlier amendments, there was concern about the adequacy of supply, for example, in English language teaching in all parts of the country. That is why I signalled that a tracking exercise was being undertaken by the department with the DfES to identify whether there were any shortfalls and to ensure that action was taken to address them where possible.
	The noble Earl rightly drew attention to the difficulties that people, in particular those with childcare responsibilities, might have in attending courses and he was supported by other Members of the Committee. That is a much wider issue and could apply to attendance on many other courses, not simply those relating to the matters we are discussing today. However, a specific regulation-making power is not needed in respect of travel or childcare costs. Learner support funds are available to those who are eligible for free-course provision, which should include most of those we envisage would need to attend citizenship courses. Learner support funds can be used to help individuals with the cost associated with, for example, transport, books and equipment, childcare provision and even residential charges.
	While respecting the reasons for arguing the amendment in Committee, for the reasons I have given I do not believe that it is needed. I respectfully request that it be withdrawn.

The Earl of Sandwich: The Minister has been most reassuring but I do not believe that this is quite the end of the matter. I shall confer with my noble friend because I believe that further explanation is required before the Report stage. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendment No. 11 not moved.]

Lord Avebury: moved Amendment No. 12:
	Page 2, line 15, at end insert—
	"( ) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Secretary of State made under this section may appeal to a county court judge."

Lord Avebury: The amendment is grouped with Amendment No. 87, although the two are concerned with completely different issues, as the Minister will have realised. The first amendment is concerned with the right of appeal of a person who fails the test imposed by Clause 1. As the Bill stands, anyone who does not pass the knowledge test on life in the United Kingdom will automatically be refused citizenship and he will have no right of appeal. I am sure that Members of the Committee will agree that that is not satisfactory.
	Without knowing anything about the decisions that will be made as a result of Sir Bernard's committee, we ought to include a provision in the Bill ensuring that people who fail have some kind of right. We suggest that it should be to the county court. I am open to any suggestions that the Minister may have, provided that he accepts the principle.
	Amendment No. 87 is of a different order of magnitude because it concerns the refusal of an application for naturalisation. I note that in Clause 7 the provisions of the British Nationality Act 1981, which prevent anyone making an appeal to a court if he is aggrieved against the refusal of such an order, are repealed. Perhaps that means that the person has a right now to go to court or some other tribunal and contest the decision of the Secretary of State to refuse him citizenship.
	It is not an academic point. Over the years I have had a number of cases where citizenship has been arbitrarily refused; and with a great deal of persistence it is sometimes possible to overturn that decision. I mention a recent case which occurred during the regime of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. A friend of mind who has been resident in this country for 28 years was refused his application for citizenship. After a great deal of discussion the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, told me that it was because of adverse information given to the Home Office by the Foreign Office about his activities in connection with his home country. On 6th January, I finally obtained an interview with the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, at which he was unable to give me the details of the information that he had received from the Foreign Office but said that he would investigate the matter further and come back to me. In due course, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, overturned the decision that he himself had made and granted my friend citizenship.
	In the absence of any right of appeal, it needed a lot of work to get through the bureaucracy to establish to the satisfaction of the Minister that my friend had been wrongfully refused citizenship on the basis of false information which had been supplied by another department. Are we to say that in those circumstances the only remedy a person has is to come to a Member of Parliament or of this House and, after months of work, finally to get the decision overturned? It is surely more satisfactory to provide for appeal on the face of the Bill so that everyone can take advantage of the provision and it is not simply those who happen to know a Member of this House or another place who can act. I beg to move.

Lord Clinton-Davis: I fail to understand the amendment. New Section 40 provides for an appeal where there has been deprivation of citizenship. Every point made by the noble Lord is answered by that provision.

Lord Filkin: I agree with the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, to table Amendment No. 12 to ensure that naturalisation applicants should be treated fairly when it comes to testing the requirements relating to knowledge of a relevant language and of life in the United Kingdom. But the Government are opposed to introducing a right of appeal against nationality decisions. That is partly because in practical terms there are limited consequences stemming from a refusal to grant nationality. More importantly, however, no one has a right to acquire citizenship of another country. In the United Kingdom such matters are usually discretionary. Granting appeal rights against discretionary decisions would in effect be transferring that discretion from the Secretary of State to an appellate body while decisions can, if necessary, be challenged through judicial review or making representations, as has been indicated, through a Member of Parliament.
	The intention is that when an applicant applies to the Home Office he or she will provide evidence that he meets the necessary requirements in the form of some certificate or similar indicating that he has reached a certain standard or attended a particular course. The Home Secretary will not normally look behind that evidence unless, of course, he has some sound reason to think that the evidence may be false.
	So it would not be appropriate in our view to provide for a right of appeal against the Secretary of State's decision in these matters. If an individual is dissatisfied with the assessment of his or her competence in a particular language or of his knowledge of the citizenship curriculum this could no doubt be taken up in the usual way with the relevant body.
	I accept that there is also a broader concern about the lack of appeal rights in the context of applications for British citizenship. To some extent the case for an appeal is met by existing procedures and by new provisions contained in Part 1 of the Bill. That refers to Clause 7 which enables the Secretary of State to give reasons for his decision and removes the bar on a full judicial review which currently exists. Clause 7 would repeal the Secretary of State's statutory exemption from the common law obligation to give reasons for his discretionary decisions under the Act. In practice, however, reasons are already being given in all cases and there is a long-standing policy of re-examining and, where this seems justified, reversing contested nationality decisions. Caseworkers have been given clear instructions on that.
	Furthermore, where maladministration is alleged, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration may be asked to investigate. Clause 7 removes the limitation on the power of the courts to review discretionary nationality decisions by enabling the decision to be subject to a normal judicial review, as I have indicated. That will include consideration of the reasonablenesss of the Secretary of State's decision.
	In general, however, no one has a right to acquire another country's citizenship. In the UK it is for Parliament to lay down the conditions for the acquisition of British citizenship and the various rights and privileges that go with it. As I indicated previously, the introduction of a full right of appeal would result in the transfer of that necessary discretion to the appellate body. The tradition has always been, and I think rightly, that it sits with the Secretary of State.
	However, it is proper to draw a distinction between, on the one hand, a decision not to grant citizenship—I indicated that that does not have severe penalties—and on the other a decision to withdraw citizenship already acquired or granted, which we shall consider later in Committee. After careful consideration the Government have decided that they are justified in conceding a full right of appeal against deprivation of citizenship because the burden of that is so much more painful than the non-award of citizenship, which in most cases would be because a person had not demonstrated through the processes we have indicated—an external assessment body, a college of further education—that he had met the necessary competence. In the light of those comments, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

The Earl of Onslow: As I understand, the Government want a fair and open system of assessment of someone's right to apply for citizenship. The Minister, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, says yea or nay. If the Minister has acted wrongly or capriciously I cannot understand why there should not be an appeal to a body. That seems fair. Ministers occasionally, not often, make mistakes.

Lord Filkin: I indicated that in the circumstances suggested by the noble Earl—that the Minister had acted capriciously—there is exactly the remedy he seeks through judicial review.

Lord Avebury: I am not sure that that gives an adequate remedy to the person aggrieved by the refusal of his application for citizenship. He has to demonstrate for the purposes of judicial review that the Secretary of State made a decision which was manifestly unreasonable. That is a pretty stiff hurdle to surmount. If the person can go to the courts, other matters could be argued: for instance, that the Minister has assessed incorrectly his character under the good character requirement.
	Many years ago there was an argument about someone who was driving in this country on an international driving licence. In answer to the question, "Have you ever thought of taking the test in this country?" he replied that he had thought of taking the test but was absent when the test date was given to him and, therefore, did not take it. The Secretary of State refused him citizenship on the ground that he had given a misleading answer. The best I could get out of the Secretary of State at that time was that he would review that person's citizenship application if he applied again after two years. He did so and then sailed through despite the argument about the driving test and whether he was entitled to drive in this country on an international driving licence. So there can be completely frivolous reasons why the Secretary of State believes that the good character requirement has not been met.
	As I mentioned when introducing the amendment, certain facts were alleged against that person which proved to be quite wrong, as the Secretary of State admitted. He was not manifestly unreasonable in relying on the advice given to him by the Foreign Office and my friend may not have succeeded in an application for judicial review under those circumstances. It seems a very heavy hammer with which to crack the nut of wrong decisions by the Secretary of State. We shall return to this matter on Report.
	As regards the failure of the examination under Clause 1, we shall need to see a little more of how Sir Bernard gets on with the job he has been given by the Government. We may also come back to that matter in October.

Lord Ackner: Will the Minister indicate from where the material on which to base an application for judicial review is to come? As I understand it, there is no obligation on the Minister, when refusing an application, to give his reasons. I do not follow quite how it will be shown that the Minister has acted wholly unjudicially.
	Judicial review is not a process of appeal. It is only there to ensure, to put it in round phrases, that there has been fair play. It does not go to the merits of the decision. That is its inadequacy.

Lord Avebury: Perhaps I may help the noble and learned Lord. In the case that I am talking about the applicant did not know what exactly had been alleged against him until I went to see the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. He was very frank when I went to see him on 6th January and he told me precisely what the Foreign Office had said against this person. But up until that time he had no way of knowing the reasons for the refusal.

Lord Filkin: As I sought to make clear, Clause 7 will repeal the Secretary of State's statutory exemption from the common law obligation to give reasons. Put in plain English, the Secretary of State will give his reasons for refusal. Therefore it would be more open for an aggrieved person, if they so wished, to make a challenge.
	However, before anyone rushes away thinking that they will have to go to court, there are obvious alternative processes. Perhaps I may focus on an area where there clearly is a discretion for the Secretary of State—that is, the relevant clause in regard to good character—and put to one side the colleges of further education issues. There has never been an appeal process up to now and, to the Government's knowledge, there has not been any significant number of problems. I do not say no problems.
	It is important that the Home Office has in place, as I believe it has, processes by which, if someone did appeal against a refusal by the Secretary of State, the case can be reconsidered by a different official from the one who made the original recommendation and gave advice and at a higher level in the Civil Service than the level at which the original decision had been made. So there would be a fresh pair of eyes looking at the issues and seeing, in the light of representations that had been made in response to the reasons given by the Home Secretary, whether or not the original decision was justifiable.

Lord Avebury: That is not the same as a proper judicial hearing in which all the facts can be thrashed out in the open. A different set of civil servants looking at the issue behind the scenes is not a satisfactory remedy. We will come back to this matter on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 1 agreed to.
	Clause 2 [Naturalisation: spouse of citizen]:

Lord Dholakia: moved Amendment No. 13:
	Page 2, line 17, after "paragraphs" insert "2,"

Lord Dholakia: The Minister will breathe a sigh of relief that we have passed from Clause 1 to Clause 2. These amendments concern the issue of citizenship by naturalisation, which we wish to probe further because we did not get an adequate reply when the matter was raised in another place.
	In moving Amendment No. 13, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 14 and 15. The amendments address a very simple point, which was referred to us initially by the Immigration Law Practitioners Association. Clause 2(1) extends the existing language requirement to include those who are applying for naturalisation as the spouses of a British citizen or British Overseas Territories citizen. Under the Bill, spouses will have to comply also with the knowledge of the UK requirement.
	As we have been told, it will continue to be possible for the Secretary of State to waive the language requirement on grounds of age or physical or mental condition, but there is as yet no provision to allow the Secretary of State to waive the knowledge of the UK requirement in such circumstances. The argument is that it should be possible to waive that requirement for those who come and apply on residence grounds and for those who come on marriage grounds.
	The logic is fairly clear. Some people, perfectly reasonably and lawfully, meet someone and decide to marry them. It may not take them six years to make a decision. We cannot expect people suddenly to fit in to those arrangements the learning of the language and so on. The person from this country may speak the other language, or a couple may not have a language in common. Sometimes this does not prevent people from deciding that they love each other and want to get married. We must be sensible about this.
	What is the minimum residency requirement, if any, that the Government have in mind before any residence in Britain by virtue of marriage can be turned into a citizenship entitlement? When people apply as spouses they usually get a conditional right to be here. The period has traditionally been a year but the Government have talked about it being two years. Would that apply in the context that we are discussing in the amendment? If someone married a UK citizen and wanted to be naturalised, would it be assumed that there would be a minimum of two years before they could put in their application? The clause would be more sensible if it were amended in the way that we suggest.
	Amendment No. 15 is slightly different and concerns the current nationality law which allows a spouse to apply for naturalisation after three years of having been living legally in the United Kingdom. The amendment would allow a spouse who has been in the United Kingdom for three years exemption from the language test as it is as present. This is on the basis that after such a time it is expected that a spouse would be sufficiently integrated into the community of the spouse who is the existing British citizen. I beg to move.

Lord Kingsland: I should inform the Minister that we shall not be promoting our amendment in this group.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, but I am slightly confused. My understanding—I may be wrong—is that this group contains Amendments Nos. 13, 14 and 15, all of which stand in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Dholakia and Lord Avebury, not the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland. So what appeared to be a helpful remark has left other Members of the Committee rather bewildered.

Lord Dholakia: I would not mind if the noble Lord cared to join with our amendments.

Lord Kingsland: This was an amendment that we pursued in another place. I suppose that I have rather come to espouse it.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: The essence of the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, in support of these three amendments is, first, that there should be a discretion to waive the requirement; and, secondly, that in certain cases it should not apply at all to spouses.
	The first two amendments seek to provide for the exercise of a discretion in special cases to waive the Government's proposed knowledge about life in the United Kingdom requirement. We share that aim with the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia. This is achieved by Clause 1(2), which we inserted into the Bill by way of amendment in the Commons. I hope that that satisfies the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, in regard to Amendments Nos. 13 and 14.
	The third amendment in the group would provide a complete exemption for the language and knowledge about life in the United Kingdom requirements for people applying for naturalisation as British citizens on the ground of marriage to British citizens. We find such a proposal unacceptable. We believe that it is in the best interests of all concerned that, irrespective of marital status, all naturalisation applicants should have the knowledge and linguistic skills necessary to play a full part in society. As, however, with unmarried naturalisation applicants, there would be a discretion to waive the knowledge requirements for the spouses of British citizens where age or medical grounds justify that. I hope that my response gives the noble Lord some comfort in respect of his amendment.

Lord Dholakia: I am glad that Amendments Nos. 13 and 14 have seen some consent from the Minister. We shall certainly consult the organisation that brought this matter to our attention on Amendment No. 15. It may be necessary to return to it on Report. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendments Nos. 14 and 15 not moved.]
	Clause 2 agreed to.

Lord Avebury: moved Amendment No. 16:
	After Clause 2, insert the following new clause—
	"NATURALISATION BY DESCENT
	(1) A person within this section shall be entitled to register as a British citizen so long as an application is duly made within a period of five years from commencement.
	(2) A person is within this section if—
	(a) he was born after February 1961 but prior to 1st January 1983; and
	(b) at the time of his birth he would have been a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies under section 5 of the British Nationality Act 1948 (acquisition by descent), had the reference therein to "father" been a reference to either parent; and
	(c) as a result he would immediately prior to 1st January 1983 have had the right of abode in the United Kingdom.
	(3) A person registered under subsection (1) shall be a British citizen by descent."

Lord Avebury: This amendment is grouped with Amendment No. 88, which aims to achieve the same objective but by a slightly different route. The main difference between the two is that in Amendment No. 16 the cut-off date of February 1961 is retained from the British Nationality Act, whereas in Amendment No. 88 it is removed entirely.
	The point of this proposal is that, when the Government partially removed the general discrimination in the British Nationality Act 1981, having previously done it by administrative discretion in 1979, so as to allow the children of a British mother who were born abroad to be registered as British citizens, provided it was done while they were still minors, that obviously applied only to children born after 1961 because, by definition, they would not have been minors at the time of the 1981 Act. That was the reason for the cut-off date. There is no logic in it. If we say—as the Government did by implication—that we are going to remove the gender discrimination that existed prior to 1981 by allowing the children of British mothers to be registered as citizens just as much as the children of British fathers, it should have made no difference that they had already reached the age of majority, because they could have been given the right to apply in their own right. So Amendment No. 88 removes the 1961 date, but Amendment No. 16—which is by far the lesser of the two demands that we are making—would retain that provision from the 1981 Act. We believe that if you are removing gender discrimination, you should do it entirely and not in part, and that the second solution is much the better if we can persuade the Government to accept it.
	How did it come about that there are still people who were not registered even though their mothers had the right to register them? In many cases it was simply because the mothers were unaware of the 1981 provision and therefore did not take advantage of it until it was too late.
	Perhaps I may give an example. It relates to the leader of a new NGO called CAMPAIGNS—I shall not read out what the acronym stands for, but it is an ingenious usage. He was born in the United States in 1967 to a British mother and a US father. At the time, his mother made inquiries at the British Consulate in the US and was told that he could not obtain UK nationality. That was presumably because the correct information had not been fed across to our Consulate in the US. Additionally, while his mother was in Britain she approached the Home Office directly—so she told her son—in an attempt to get recognition of the right to pass on her UK nationality to her children. She was told that, because she was a woman, she could not pass on her nationality, in spite of the fact that the 1981 Act was then in force.
	Mr Turberville, the leader of the CAMPAIGNS organisation, has two siblings who were born in the UK with the same parents and both of those children have UK nationality. He also has three siblings born outside the UK and outside the Commonwealth. They are in the same boat as he is. They are not entitled to UK nationality under current legislation because they have already reached the age of majority.
	Mr. Turberville is resident in this country and has been here for eight years as an over-stayer. He was served with a deportation order—or so the Home Office said—but he did not receive it. He went to court and a date was set for the hearing, but in the meantime the Home Secretary revoked the deportation order, then issued another one three days later. That action delayed the process for another two years. A hearing with an adjudicator finally took place on 27th June to determine the legitimacy of the reissuing of the notice by the Secretary of State. A decision on the case is expected in about six to eight weeks' time.
	What is all this for? It is to deprive someone who has a British mother of the right to citizenship on the same basis as if his father, instead of his mother, was the basis of the claim. I do not think that anyone would defend that situation now. If anyone did, I suggest to the Minister that it is likely that Mr Turberville and the 50 other people of whom he knows who were in the same boat would have a right to go to court under the Human Rights Act. But let us hope that the case does not get to that point. I am sure that the Minister, being a reasonable person, will accept the amendment. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I am grateful to the noble Lord for his comment regarding my reasonableness. I hope that what I say will further persuade him that, although there are clearly some difficulties, the Government's approach is reasonable.
	It is perhaps worth reminding the Committee that the British Nationality Act 1981 came into force on 1st January 1983. Prior to that date, the law on nationality was contained principally in the British Nationality Act 1948. There are many similarities between the 1981 Act and the 1948 Act, but, as one might expect, some significant differences.
	Both Acts placed a general limitation on the ability of one generation to pass on citizenship to the next, subject to a few exceptions the nature of which has varied over time. Citizenship has traditionally not been transmissible beyond the first generation born outside British territory. Both Acts achieved this by dividing people into citizens "by descent" who, because their own UK connections are not particularly close, cannot pass on citizenship to any children born abroad and citizens "otherwise than by descent" who can so transmit.
	The rationale for all of this is that, by the time a second generation is born abroad, the link with the United Kingdom is too remote to justify the automatic conferral of citizenship. Instead, provision has usually been made for the second generation to obtain citizenship on application provided certain criteria relating to UK residence have been satisfied. This seems to us to be entirely reasonable. We see no reason to interfere with the arrangement in respect of those born abroad before 1983 or subsequently.
	Where the 1981 Act and the 1948 Act take a different approach is on the ability of women to transmit their citizenship. Under the 1948 Act a female citizen could not pass on citizenship, even if she was a citizenship otherwise than by descent. The 1981 Act reversed that position and now allows women to transmit on equal terms—quite rightly in our view—with men. But for a number of reasons this change was not made retrospective. In other words, those born abroad before 1983 derive no automatic nationality benefit from a UK connection in the maternal line.
	Since 1979, such people have been able to rely on the Secretary of State's discretion to register any minor as a citizen, but an application has to be made for that purpose and the person concerned must be under 18 when he or she applies.
	I accept the limitations of that approach, but we would not be justified in conferring on those who are now adults an unconditional entitlement to register as citizens. Some may have spent their whole life in another country and acquired the citizenship of that country. That is a telling point in the argument. Those who have come to the UK since birth will have been able to qualify for naturalisation as a citizen. It is right that as adults they should be able to demonstrate connections with this country—we believe that to be a very important criterion—beyond those based on parentage.
	That is the rationale behind our thinking, although, as the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has pointed out, there can be difficulties in some circumstances. The Secretary of State's discretion is an important issue. It has been valuably exercised in many cases.
	I hope that with those comments the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Earl Russell: The Minister over-simplifies a little by suggesting that those affected by the amendment do not have a particularly close connection with this country. I declare an interest. I have a pupil who is directly and squarely within the words of the amendment. He has just completed his degree at the college and been awarded the History Today prize for the best dissertation by any candidate in the whole of history finals. He wishes to do postgraduate research in this country. His father is a New Zealander. His mother is British. Three of his four grandparents are British. His father and mother intend to settle in Cambridge on their retirement. He has not been permanently resident in this country because his father is a lecturer at the Free University of Berlin. He is therefore ineligible for funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Board for postgraduate research. That is a severe handicap to him, which would not be the case if the genders of his two parents had been reversed, if I may make such an Irish suggestion. The situation does not seem fair, reasonable or in the interests of this country.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: The noble Earl has picked out a bad case. I shall not commit myself to suggesting that it would translate itself into good and effective law, but we shall read through with great interest what the noble Earl and the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, have said and take those points into consideration. I have not heard anything today to persuade me that our general approach is wrong.

Lord Avebury: I am obviously not going to persuade the Minister to agree to the amendment this afternoon, but I am grateful for his assurance that he will take the matter away and consider it. Perhaps he will confirm that he would be prepared to meet me to discuss the problem with members of CAMPAIGNS, of whom there are about 50. The concession would not affect a vast number of people and make a difference to the immigration figures.
	I do not see how people can comply with the requirement of having to live here and demonstrate the connection if, like the leader of CAMPAIGNS, they are treated as overstayers. He comes here intending to reside permanently in the United Kingdom, but he has no right to do that and after eight years he is up against the possibility of being deported. Does the noble Lord consider that members of the organisation are in a Catch-22 situation? Maybe they have lived overseas for many years and therefore cannot demonstrate the connection with the United Kingdom that the Minister demands. On the other hand, if they come to the United Kingdom in an attempt to establish their connection with this country, they become illegal entrants and the noble Lord and his minions will throw them out. That does not make sense.
	The noble Lord has already admitted that there is gender discrimination, which was only partially corrected by the 1981 Act. He did not answer my question about the Human Rights Act. Does he think that the gender discrimination that is incorporated into our nationality law, without the amendment, will land the Government in severe trouble?
	Those are the matters that I would like to discuss with the noble Lord. On the basis that we shall have an opportunity to talk about them with those who are aggrieved by the rejection of the amendment, I beg leave to withdraw it at the moment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 3 agreed to.
	Schedule 1 [Citizenship Ceremony, Oath and Pledge]:

Lord Dholakia: moved Amendment No. 17:
	Page 80, line 9, leave out "citizenship" and insert "nationality"

Lord Dholakia: The amendment is grouped with a large number of others. The purpose is to seek clarification, because there is confusion in the early part of the Bill, which continues to refer to citizenship when it really means nationality. Will the Minister explain that? There is a legal definition of nationality, whereas there is not yet a legal definition of citizenship.
	The amendment follows a discussion that we had with the Citizenship Foundation, which explained that not much thought has been given to the distinction between the legal understanding of nationality and the social and philosophical understanding of citizenship. Many of us who have applied for a visa to travel to other countries know that we are frequently asked not about citizenship, but about nationality. That is where confusion occurs between the two expressions.
	In part, this is a probing amendment. However, there is also an underlying question of whether it would be more consistent for legislation to deal with the well-understood legal concept of nationality rather than muddying the water by adding citizenship, the meaning of which is nowhere properly defined. It would be helpful if the Minister would clarify that. Should we substitute "nationality" for "citizenship"? I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, for raising this issue. Some legal systems and treaties consistently use the term "nationality", whereas others consistently refer to "citizenship" while trying to convey the same meaning. Our understanding is that both expressions are in current usage in the UK. They have been used interchangeably and still are to a large extent. Nationality has tended to be used in the narrow, more technical sense of a person's international identity, belonging to a particular state. It may be evidenced in the use of a passport. Citizenship is more about the various rights, duties and opportunities that define one's place and conduct in a society. It has an internal complexion to it. We talk about active citizenship within a society. Nationality is a concept primarily of international law for inter-state purposes such as diplomatic protection.
	In the context of the oath, pledge and ceremony that the Government have in mind, we prefer the term "citizenship" because of the wider implications with which it is associated.
	We have made it clear in earlier debates that we see the acquisition of British citizenship as a significant life event. We are seeking to enhance the process of becoming British. As a sign of the importance that we attach to the matter, we want to encourage that feeling. The use of "citizenship" is therefore more appropriate. I think that, linguistically, other countries conduct themselves in a similar way. We think that, in seeking to persuade us to reverse our position, the noble Lord may have it the wrong way round, as "citizenship" means rather more and "nationality" rather less in these circumstances.
	I understand the debate which the noble Lord is trying to stimulate. We recognise that it is a very important debate. However, we believe that our term is not only more user friendly but perhaps more relevant in achieving our policy objectives. With that, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Greaves: My Lords, I did not intervene earlier because I wanted to hear the Minister's reply. Having heard it, I am now as much confused as enlightened by it. He said that citizenship is more about rights and opportunities. However, he also said that the terms "citizenship" and "nationality" tend to be interchangeable—although they tend to be used for different purposes. That seems a very unsatisfactory basis for legislation, where words need a precise meaning and not simply to tend to mean one thing or another according to the whim of the person using them.
	I think that the Minister said that the terms are not synonymous in this legislation. If that is so, I think that we will need to know the difference. The process of naturalisation is quite clearly intended to confer both nationality and citizenship. If they are different, what is the difference?
	This debate all comes down to the difficulty we have in this country in defining "citizenship" and a "British citizen". A few days ago, we heard a very eloquent exposition from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Guildford who gave us a very traditional view of the British constitution and the role of the people of Britain within that constitution. I think that he said that sovereignty rests with the Sovereign in Parliament and under God. In such a traditional view, the people of this country are clearly not citizens but subjects. That is the position in England, although it may be different in Scotland. I have no idea of the position in Wales. Scots have told me, however, that the position is definitely different there, where there is a tradition of citizenship which we do not have.
	Citizenship is referred to very specifically and clearly in the part of the legislation dealing with the oath and the pledge that people will be asked to take during the citizenship ceremony. The Bill proposes the words,
	"I will observe its laws faithfully and fulfil my duties and obligations as a British citizen".
	I think that anyone asked to take such a pledge will have to know what the duties and obligations of a British citizen are. Perhaps the Minister can enlighten us. If he cannot do so now, perhaps we can be told later.

Lord Dholakia: I think that the Minister is rather reluctant to get into this argument.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I am not reluctant. I was interested in the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, but I do not think that they added much more to the debate. I am actually slightly surprised about where he is coming from. I think that the term "citizenship" as used here is rather broader than the rather more narrow meaning that "nationality" would connote in this circumstance. It is certainly our intention to encourage and foster a broader sense of citizenship and a more welcoming approach. I was therefore genuinely surprised by some of the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia.

Lord Dholakia: If the term citizenship is broader, is the Minister prepared to give a legal definition of it? Does he know whether there is a legal definition of nationality?

Lord Bassam of Brighton: Tempting though it is, I think that I would probably be a bit barmy to try to achieve that at the Dispatch Box on an afternoon when we are trying to examine some of the broader concepts in the legislation.

Lord Dholakia: I do not want to prolong the discussion. However, I do not think that the Minister would be barmy to try to do that, because there is no such legal definition. I do not think that he needs to worry about that. However, in relation to Clauses 1 and 2, I think that he should bear in mind that all naturalisation relates to the process of immigration and gaining nationality rather than to citizenship. Later, we shall discuss the issue of the deprivation of citizenship. How are we to deprive someone of something for which there is no legal formula or definition? I think that the Minister will find himself in considerable difficulty there. My advice is that, even at this late stage, he should take this back, consult civil servants and other authorities, and decide whether nationality is a better expression than citizenship. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendments Nos. 18 to 24 not moved.]

Viscount Bridgeman: moved Amendment No. 25:
	Page 80, line 25, leave out "thinks it" and insert "is satisfied that it is"

Viscount Bridgeman: In moving this amendment, I should like also to speak to Amendments Nos. 26, 105, 106, 107, 112, 113 and 114.
	Amendment No. 25 would replace the word "thinks" with the words "is satisfied". As noble Lords will be aware, the word "thinks" is one that is not often, if ever, used in legislation. This was the subject of some debate in another place in relation to Clause 4 which, as it was then drafted, proposed to allow the Secretary of State to remove someone's citizenship on that test. Members of another place were concerned during the debate in Standing Committee, on 30th April, at cols. 50 to 61 of the Official Report, that the word "thinks" set the threshold for deprivation of citizenship far too low. At that stage, the Minister's opinion was that there was no difference in law whatsoever between "thinks" and "is satisfied". However, at Report stage, the Government amended the Bill to remove the offending word "thinks" from Clause 4, replacing it with the term "is satisfied".
	Amendments Nos. 25, 105 and 114 seek to replicate that piece of redrafting in other areas of the Bill where the Government have retained the word "thinks" in relation to the giving of support and assistance to asylum seekers. The Government have already accepted this point in relation to Clause 4, and I note that the noble Lord, Lord Filkin, has tabled Amendments Nos. 189 and 190 to Clause 65 to remove the phrase "the Secretary of State thinks".
	Amendments Nos. 106, 107, 112 and 113, which are two pairs of alternatives, use the terms "believes" and "has reason to believe" rather than "thinks" or "is satisfied". I should be grateful if the Minister would explain whether the Government's view is that these forms of words differ in the legal meaning from "is satisfied", and particularly whether the words "reason to believe" put the test higher than "is satisfied". That was a matter of some controversy in another place, and it would be helpful if the Minister could clarify the issue. The point raised by these amendments might seem a small one, but it is none the less important to get the terms of the statute right so that the appropriate test is applied. I hope that the Minister will be able to accept some of the amendments in this group.
	Amendment No. 26 is a probing amendment relating to the disapplication of the requirement to take part in the citizenship ceremony and make the citizenship oath and pledge. The Secretary of State will be empowered to do this,
	"because of the special circumstances of a case".
	I wonder whether the Minister, in responding to the amendment, could tell us what the Government have in mind as the sort of "special circumstances" in which the new test might be disapplied. Could these circumstances relate to the applicant's religious beliefs in terms of the oath or pledge, or perhaps to any difficulty the applicant might have in attending the ceremony? I hope that the Minister will be able to answer this small point. I beg to move.

Lord Renton: My Lords, I wish to support the comments of my noble friend Lord Bridgeman in speaking to his two amendments. They are both drafting amendments, but we have to be very careful about our drafting. The expression "thinks" is too vague for these circumstances in which important matters are at issue. I think it much better that the Secretary of State should be "satisfied". It is best to leave out the expression,
	"because of the special circumstances of a case"
	as that makes what the special circumstances are a matter of controversy. If the matter goes to court, the lack of a definition of "special circumstances" will be a disadvantage. My noble friend is right to move the two amendments. I hope that the Government will accept them.

Earl Russell: I hope that the Minister will listen to the noble Lord, Lord Renton, whose expertise on draftsmanship is well known. To put the point in a nutshell, if the Minister says that he "is satisfied that", he may in legal proceedings be asked why. If he says that he "thinks", and he is asked why, he can simply reply, "Because I do". The difference is important.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: During the time I have spent in your Lordships' House I have learnt to listen carefully to the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and also to the noble Lord, Lord Renton, particularly as regards drafting matters. I am sure that the noble Earl and the noble Lord will not be disappointed when I say that we shall of course consider carefully their comments on those matters.
	I shall try to meet the points made by the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman. As has been said, the amendments seek to replace the use of the word "thinks" where it appears in Clauses 15 and 22 with a selection of alternatives: "has reason to believe", "believes", or "is satisfied". As I made plain, we understand the concern to be that using the word "thinks" would mean that there would be a less rigorous examination of the facts than would be the case if one of the alternative words or phrases were adopted. The use of the word "thinks" was part of a drive to encourage the greater use of plain English in law making. I realise that that is a rather bold claim. However, I always thought that your Lordships' House rather favoured that approach. That is our genuine intent.
	We are content that there is no difference in substance between the various words and phrases in question. Therefore, from our perspective the amendments are unnecessary as the practical result is exactly the same—a subjective test. "Thinks", as with all of the three alternatives suggested, is a subjective test. Enforceable principles of administrative law import a requirement that the discretion be exercised reasonably. I am sure that the Committee will be aware that we brought forward amendments in another place in respect of Clause 4—as has already been mentioned—where particular concern was expressed at the use of the word "thinks" in respect of deprivation of citizenship. We were happy to try to allay those specific concerns, particularly in the context of ensuring consistency with the relevant parts of the British Nationality Act 1981.
	This matter raises an interesting point. I emphasise that we do not accept that "thinks" involves a lesser examination of the facts than the other alternatives put forward. However, let us assume for a moment that we accepted that proposition. As regards Clauses 15 and 22, that would mean that the Secretary of State would be more rigorous in his assessment of who qualified for support with the consequence that fewer people might be eligible to be supported. I should be surprised if that was the intention behind the noble Viscount's amendments. I am not aware of any concerns that we have been supporting people who are not really destitute.
	As I said, both "thinks" and "is satisfied that" are subjective and are legal equivalents.

Earl Russell: I am most grateful to the Minister for giving way. I do not think that the question concerns rigour but rather reason. One may have reasons for giving or refusing support which may make one more generous as well as more rigorous.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: The noble Earl makes a fair point. Our argument is that to transpose one term for the other would have little effect on the provision in Schedule 1, which is sought to be amended by Amendment No. 25. However, the term "thinks" is consistent with the way other similar discretions are currently expressed in the British Nationality Act 1981. At present, the Secretary of State has discretion to waive certain naturalisation and registration requirements if the circumstances of a particular case demand it. We wish to ensure simply that the Secretary of State also has discretion to waive certain requirements in regard to citizenship ceremonies and the citizenship oath and pledge. The language of the discretionary provision set out in Schedule 1 of the BNA is consistent with that which already appears in other parts of that legislation.
	I was asked a specific question on the use of the term,
	"special circumstances of a case".
	That matter was raised in another place. The intent in introducing a special circumstances test is that the Secretary of State would have the discretion to disapply certain requirements in respect of citizenship ceremonies and the citizenship oath and pledge on a case by case basis. It is envisaged that the circumstances under which the Secretary of State might exercise that discretion would be exceptional; for example, when there are national security implications or when an applicant cannot attend due to chronic illness or disability. I hope that those examples will reassure the Members of the Committee who raised that concern.

Lord Renton: Before the noble Lord sits down, I hope that I may ask him to explain something. He used the word "disapply" just now in relation to special circumstances. Does that mean that the Secretary of State would be entitled to ignore particular facts?

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I do not think that it would mean that the Secretary of State would ignore certain facts. However, he has discretion to disapply the provision. That is the important point. I hope that the examples that I have given clarify that matter to the noble Lord's satisfaction.

Viscount Bridgeman: I am grateful for the Minister's reply on Amendment No. 26. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Renton and to the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for supporting my comments on Amendment No. 25 and on the other amendments in the grouping we are discussing. If I may say so, those remarks were made more impressive by their brevity.
	However, given that the Government think that the word "thinks" needs to be changed, as we have seen in regard to Clause 4 and in the proposed government amendments to Clause 65, we are disappointed that they have not given a rather more positive and immediate response to our concerns. I feel that I must test the opinion of the Committee.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 25) shall be agreed to?
	Their Lordships divided: Contents, 89; Not-Contents, 121.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.
	[Amendments Nos. 26 to 34 not moved.]

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: moved Amendment No. 35:
	Page 81, line 31, leave out "the Second"

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: In moving this amendment, which stands in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Anelay, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 37, 39 and 40, which are concerned with the same point.
	These are probing amendments; under no circumstances would I divide the House on the matter. They follow up a question that I asked the Minister on Second Reading and a helpfully detailed reply that the noble Lord, Lord Filkin, was kind enough to send me. I emphasise that I am making a political, not a legal, point.
	The amendments relate to the oaths of allegiance for new British citizens, which are proposed in paragraph 2 of Schedule 1. The wording as it stands styles the Queen as "Queen Elizabeth the Second". I am suggesting that in the Bill Her Majesty should simply be entitled "Queen Elizabeth".
	I understand why the Government carried over into the Bill the same wording as that used in the oaths employed under the British Nationality Act 1981. That is logical and legally correct. "Elizabeth the Second" was the title that Her Majesty adopted under the Royal Titles Act 1953. When that title was challenged in that year in the Court of Session in Scotland, the challenge failed and the matter was settled.
	Her Majesty's legal title as Queen Elizabeth the Second is well known and accepted. At the same time, the sensitivity of the people in Scotland has been increasingly taken into account over the years in a number of ways. The pillar boxes in which we post our letters in Scotland, for example, have long borne the initials "ER" rather than "EIIR", as they do south of the Border, recognising that there has been no previous Queen Elizabeth of Scotland. At the recent Scottish Jubilee service in Glasgow, the Queen was named throughout as either "Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth" or "Her Majesty the Queen".
	The Minister points out in his letter that, so far as the Government know, no one taking the present oath of allegiance has ever objected to its formulation. I suggest that that is hardly surprising. Someone who is keen to become a British citizen is unlikely to quibble at that particular detail. But the day may come when there is a problem. We have a Scots Parliament now. There is a growing sense of Scots identity, happily within a growing understanding of Scotland's place as a nation within a nation and as an integral part of the United Kingdom.
	Nationality matters are reserved under the Scotland Act to the Westminster Parliament. But I suggest that this Westminster Parliament cannot and must not ignore what is going on north of the Border. All of us who believe in the Union must constantly remind the Government of that.
	The Government are right legally in the oath that they propose. But I suggest, with diffidence, that they look to their politics. In fact, there is clearly no need to refer in the oath to "Queen Elizabeth the Second". I have discovered that the oath which Members of Parliament and Peers take at Westminster happens, for no other reason than precedent, to be simply one of allegiance to Queen Elizabeth. "Queen Elizabeth II" is not mentioned in our oath. Why do we not follow suit in this Bill?
	The Government appear to be alienating enough voters at present for their comfort. I suggest that a little more sensitivity in relation to this matter would be wise. If they pay no heed to this suggestion, they may well regret it.
	I want to ask the noble Lord one other question. It has been drawn to my attention by a noble Lord that the oaths included in the schedule to the Bill do not include an affirmation for those who wish to swear allegiance to the Queen but do not believe in God. Is that an omission or is there a reason for it? It would be interesting if the Minister could tell us. I hope that the Government will listen to what I am saying. I believe that they would be very wise to do so. I beg to move.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: I put my name to the amendment and rise briefly to support the points made so ably by my noble friend. It is certainly my practice to listen to my noble friend, who has a finger on the pulse when it comes to detecting points that need to be debated in relation to matters in Scotland.
	I certainly do not claim to have a great knowledge of history—certainly none that would match that of the noble Earl, Lord Russell. My days of teaching history were more than a quarter of a century ago. However, even I am aware that it would perhaps be legally correct to refer to Queen Elizabeth II, although I would think twice before doing so in Scotland.

Earl Russell: I believe that the need for the amendment is proved by the fact that it did not occur to me to table it, although this is a subject to which I have given a great deal of thought and on which I have done a considerable amount of professional work. The first reason for the amendment is that the present form of the oath north of the Border is simply and plainly wrong.
	I turn to the second reason. Earlier this afternoon we all heard the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, talk about the fact that we are a multicultural, multi-ethnic, multifaith society. The moment when that hit us was 24th March 1603. The English have put a vast amount of effort into trying to hide from what has happened. It is only now, on the verge of the 400th anniversary, that we are beginning to realise that that is what happened to us—that is, we have not been a sovereign nation state since 24th March 1603. The fact that even I needed reminding of that suggests that we need to pay some attention to this amendment, and I hope that it will be accepted.

Lord Desai: I want to raise one point in relation to the oath. The Justice (Northern Ireland) Bill makes a modification to the oath that judges must take in order to serve as judges in Northern Ireland. We debated the matter. In that oath, the words relating to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II are not used at all. I simply want to point out that there is much flexibility and that we can shape the oath in a variety of ways. In respect of our multicultural, multifaith society, perhaps we should have two or three different versions of the oath and allow people to choose one of them.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I shall start at the end and thank my noble friend Lord Desai for his very helpful comments. While the parliamentary oath uses the designation "Queen Elizabeth" rather than "Queen Elizabeth II", we have been unable to find any evidence to suggest that the intent of the designation was to take account of the fact that Queen Elizabeth I of England did not reign over Scotland. Indeed, it appears more probable that the use of this designation, rather than the Queen's official title, is simply the result of a transposition in identical form of "Queen Victoria" in the Promissory Oaths Act 1868.
	Schedule 5 to the British Nationality Act 1981 uses the style adopted by the Queen under the Royal Titles Act 1953. We see no difficulty in carrying that forward into proposed Schedule 5 to the British Nationality Act 1981 as amended by Schedule 1 to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill. So far as we know, no one who has taken the present oath has ever objected to the formulation "Queen Elizabeth II".
	One is always at one's peril when debating with the noble Baroness, Lady Carnegy of Lour, matters relating to Scotland. I recognise that point most emphatically. But we believe that we have this matter right. The issue is, after all, one of British citizenship and it is a reserved matter. The title used by Her Majesty is very much a matter of constitutional law. Indeed, as I indicated, the Bill simply maintains and continues the wording used in the 1981 Act. That Act was made not under our watch but under the watch of noble Lords and noble Baronesses opposite. Therefore, it is a matter which they themselves brought about in the past, and I am reminded of that fact in this debate.
	We believe that the wording continues a tradition. It is part of our history and heritage and it is a matter of constitutional law. Obviously, we must be sensitive to issues of concern raised by the new devolved Assembly and the Scottish Parliament. But this is not specifically such an issue. The Bill has obviously been drawn to the attention of the Scottish Parliament. Although we did not specifically draw the attention of the First Minister to this aspect of the oath, we have not received back any comments in regard to this matter.
	Of course, we should be sensitive at all times to representations on these matters. So far as we are concerned, there has never been an objection to the current formulation and we see no reason to depart from it.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Carnegy of Lour, raised a specific point as regards affirmation. New Section 42(7) as proposed under Schedule 1 applies Sections 5 and 6 of the Oaths Act 1978 which allows for affirmations to be made. I am sure that the important and valuable point raised by the noble Baroness is answered by that provision, and I hope that she will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: I thank the Minister for that last point. Had there been more time since the point was raised with me by the noble Lord, I should probably have followed that through. I apologise to the Minister for perhaps unnecessarily asking the question.
	The rest of the reply given by the Minister is not satisfactory. He simply has not taken my point. I have said all the things which he said. I understood them before I received the letter from the noble Lord, Lord Filkin, and they were reiterated in that letter. My point is that the Government are unwise to do this.
	The Minister is right about the oath which we swear here in Parliament. I asked the Clerk of the Parliaments to research the matter, which he kindly did. Following the reign of Queen Victoria, with all successive monarchs the oath has been to George V, Edward VIII and George VI; and so to Elizabeth, without the nomenclature. It is completely by chance that we have such an oath. However, when the row happened in Scotland at the time of the original Act when the Queen's name became Queen Elizabeth II, which it is in law, the Lord President of the Court of Sessions in Scotland wrote to the Clerk of the Parliaments here to ask what was the oath here. It was of interest to him and was taken into account in the exercise. That is interesting; there is a history to the matter.
	I simply point to the oath here to show that there is no need for the Government to name the Queen as Queen Elizabeth II in the oath taken by new citizens of this country. They are legally correct. As part of her prerogative the Queen can call herself anything she likes. Her name was decided in the original Act. Everyone—including everyone in Scotland—knows her name. However, it is a matter of sensitivity. I simply warn Government that if an asylum seeker or a new citizen is taking the oath in Scotland and will live in Scotland, there may be trouble in future. Certainly, the name of Her Majesty in an oath should not be a matter of political controversy or a political football.
	Nevertheless, the Government should take the matter seriously. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Filkin, will take the matter back to the department and consider my comments. I tabled the amendment with care. It is important that the Government should do this. However, I shall not raise the matter again. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendments Nos. 36 to 50 not moved.]

Baroness Turner of Camden: Before calling Amendment No. 51, I must inform the Committee that if that amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments Nos. 52 and 53.

Viscount Bridgeman: moved Amendment No. 51:
	Page 83, leave out lines 7 to 9.

Viscount Bridgeman: Amendments Nos. 51, 52, 54 and 55 relate to the role of local authorities in the citizenship ceremonies. Paragraph 7 of Schedule 1 enables the Secretary of State to require local authorities to provide facilities and exercise functions in relation to citizenship ceremonies.
	In the White Paper Secure Borders, Safe Haven, the Government stated at paragraph 2.21 that:
	"we envisage that ceremonies will be conducted by registration officers in Register Offices and other suitable places. These might include venues associated with community activity such as schools."
	Paragraph 7 of the schedule grants broad powers to the Secretary of State in that respect to require local authorities to make arrangements in connection with citizenship ceremonies. Members of the Committee will observe that the power to make regulations does not just allow the regulations to require local authorities to provide facilities, but will allow the Secretary of State to be given the power to direct local authorities to provide facilities and to impose functions on local authorities and registrars.
	I hope that the Minister will be able to tell the Committee that the Government have consulted local authorities and registration officers throughout the United Kingdom; that they are content with the proposals and that they do not foresee any problems with them. Obviously, as many applicants for naturalisation may have to come to Britain to work in our towns and cities, there may be a particular burden on local authorities in London and other urban areas in that respect.
	Can the Minister also comment on the "other suitable places" at which the Government envisage citizenship ceremonies will be held? Will they include such buildings as town halls, places of worship or venues already approved for the celebration of civil marriage ceremonies? Will the applicant for naturalisation have a choice of venue, or will it be up to the registration officer to decide? I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I am grateful to the noble Viscount for raising the issues through the amendments, which is valuable.
	The purpose of paragraph 7 of Schedule 1, which proposes amendments to Section 41 of the British Nationality Act 1981 is to provide for the activities for which the Secretary of State may make regulations in order to enable citizenship ceremonies to take place. Among those activities is the ability to require local authorities to provide specified facilities and to make specified arrangements for citizenship ceremonies.
	The Government have tried to make clear that if citizenship ceremonies are to be meaningful and fitting, it is essential that they have an important local dimension so that new citizens can be welcomed into the communities in which they live. Therefore, it is proposed that local authorities and registrars should be responsible for the delivery of this new service in a localised context.
	Local authorities already have a key role in the delivery of the services associated with the registration of births, deaths and marriages. The Government decided that they could build on that role by widening it to include citizenship ceremonies. We see that as the continuing development of an issue about which there is well-established policy which has had cross-party agreement. I know that because in another life I was responsible for ensuring that it happened, so I take great delight in this.
	In order to ensure that local authorities are able to discharge that new function, it is necessary for the Secretary of State to be able to require them to provide certain facilities. In particular it will be necessary—I believe it will be essential—for local authorities to provide suitable premises for the conduct of ceremonies; to arrange ceremonies at frequent intervals so that applicants are able to meet the prescribed time limits for attendance; and to determine the suitability for other venues, which is an important part of their current work.
	The amendments would remove the ability of the Secretary of State to make regulations that would require local authorities to provide specified facilities and to make specified arrangements for citizenship ceremonies. The Government believe that it is entirely appropriate that the Secretary of State should specify such matters in regulations. It is appropriate that a standard is set out and made plain.
	I turn to Amendments Nos. 54 and 55. Registration officers can undertake functions only if enabled to do so by primary legislation. Due to the proposed changes in the registration service announced by the Government earlier this year, it was not felt appropriate to include this statutory duty in the registration Acts. As such, the legislation had to be free-standing and will be included in the British Nationality Act.
	The proposed changes to the registration service will result in local authorities assuming statutory responsibility for the delivery of face-to-face services including citizenship ceremonies. When that occurs and registration officers become local authority employees, the statutory duty to conduct citizenship ceremonies will be transferred to the local authority.
	There has been consultation with the Local Government Association. In general, it is happy with the developments that are taking place. It recognises the importance of the citizenship ceremonies. Local authorities see it as a natural development of their work.
	My understanding is that the consultation has been wide and welcome. The registration officers are content with the progress that has been made.
	As to the venue of citizenship ceremonies, applicants may have a choice of venues. Of course they need to be prepared to pay any additional costs over and above the standard facilities. It is expected that venues will bedignified and considered suitable by the local authority. They will undoubtedly apply a test.
	I think back to the introduction of legislation in this field. When I was the leader of my local authority we had the choice of providing for marriage ceremonies in the Royal Pavilion. I was keen to champion and promote that. Because of the history of that fine building, these are suitable and appropriate premises in which to conduct such citizenship ceremonies. Many local authorities will rattle through their property portfolios to try to come up with something as excellent. It is within that kind of framework that we see this as a positive and progressive development. I hope that with those explanations the noble Viscount feels able to withdraw his amendment.

Viscount Bridgeman: I am grateful to the Minister for that comprehensive explanation of the arrangements. It is particularly useful always to have his experience of carrying them out. We are grateful that this matter has been put on the record. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendments Nos. 52 to 55 not moved.]

Viscount Bridgeman: moved Amendment No. 56:
	Page 83, line 31, leave out "may" and insert "shall"

Viscount Bridgeman: In moving Amendment No. 56, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 57. This follows on from the debate on the previous group of amendments. The Committee will see that paragraph 8 of the schedule enables the Secretary of State to make payments to local authorities in connection with the costs they incur in relation to citizenship ceremonies.
	The paragraph uses the word "may" rather than "shall". Therefore, as the Secretary of State is not obliged to reimburse local authorities, I hope that the Minister can reassure the Committee that the Secretary of State will, as a matter of course, ensure that local authorities do not suffer any significant financial burdens as a result of conducting citizenship ceremonies. As I said during the previous debate, it may be that some local authorities face more costs than others in this respect simply because of their geographical position. I look forward to a positive response from the Minister such as he gave on the previous group of amendments.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I have great respect for the spirit with which the amendment has been moved by the noble Viscount. I make plain by putting the matter on the record that it is not the Government's intention that local authorities should bear any of the financial burden of providing citizenship ceremonies.
	As I made clear on the previous group of amendments, the cost of a standard citizenship ceremony will be met in its entirety by the applicant as part of a composite fee collected by the Home Office. It has been decided that the Home Office should pay the local authority a set fee—still to be agreed, I might add—for each applicant. The amendment therefore is not, strictly speaking, necessary.
	The amendment may also limit the opportunity for concessional rates. That would be unfortunate. For example, married couples currently pay one joint fee if they apply for naturalisation at the same time. Similar concessional rates may be considered when the fee structures are considered.
	With regard to Amendment No. 57, it is important that administrative costs are kept to a minimum and that this scheme is efficient in that regard. A complex system of individual fees would be cumbersome and inevitably would have to be passed on to the applicant.
	It will also be open to the local authority to recover costs directly from the applicant for an enhanced ceremony, as I made clear earlier. As I also made clear, those enhanced ceremonies will be able to take place at venues other than—if you like—the bog-standard ones provided by local authorities.
	The noble Viscount made a good point about there being a burden on specific authorities and that that would perhaps be a reflection of where people settle or choose to settle. However, because of the way in which this scheme is designed and will be introduced, there should not be an unnecessary burden placed upon the local authorities. Of course, we shall continue with the important dialogue with the service providers to ensure that that is the case.
	Accurate forecasts of numbers and spread of applicants will enable local authorities to plan to comply with their proposed duty. We do not think that that should lead to any additional incurring of costs over and above the current operation of registration.

Viscount Bridgeman: The Minister once again has given a most helpful reply for the record. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendment No. 37 not moved.]
	Schedule 1 agreed to.
	Clause 4 [Deprivation of citizenship]:

Lord Dholakia: moved Amendment No. 58:
	Page 2, line 43, at end insert "provided the citizenship was obtained by registration or naturalisation"

Lord Dholakia: Amendment No. 58 relates to one of the most contentious clauses in the Bill. Clause 4(2) gives the Secretary of State power to deprive even UK-born nationals of UK citizenship, except where it leaves that person stateless. The proposed amendment ensures that such persons cannot be deprived of citizenship regardless of the statelessness issue.
	The Government will no doubt say that the provision of not allowing someone to be made stateless addresses the issue, as most UK-born citizens will, if deprived of UK citizenship, be made stateless. The amendment seeks to change the deprivation of citizenship. We believe that the Bill gives the Secretary of State excessive powers. I hope that the Bill does not reflect what the Government plan to do.
	We rely very much on briefs supplied to us by people qualified to comment on such issues. We received one such brief from the Immigration Law Practitioner's Association, in which Laurens Fransmann QC makes a strong case. He states:
	"The proposed new section 40(2) of the 1981 Act"—
	that is the Act that will be amended by Clause 4—
	"provides a sweeping power to deprive a person of British nationality not just where that nationality was acquired by grant in response to an application but also where it was acquitted automatically by birth in the UK by descent. This draconian new power arises as presently drafted wherever the Secretary of State just 'thinks' that the person has done something 'seriously prejudicial to the vital interests' of the UK or an overseas territory, he may remove that person's citizenship. ILPA [the organisation] is concerned that these expressions are far too vague, that a requirement only to 'think' there is prejudice lays down an unacceptably low threshold for the Secretary of State to attain in invoking the power".
	The proposed amendments go some way to rectify this situation.
	We know from a number of cases that have arisen in the past on other Bills that the "seriously prejudicial" test is poor and can cover a multitude of sins. The "vital interests of the United Kingdom" test is a general test which allows the Home Secretary vast discretion. We also know that under the Bill the Home Secretary will have the power to deprive even UK-born nationals of UK citizenship, except if that leaves a person stateless. We want to ensure that such people could not be deprived of citizenship, even if it would not render them stateless. This is a strong point because many written constitutions declare that citizenship is a fundamental identity right.
	There is a real worry about the retrospective deprivation of citizenship—a point made to us by several organisations, including the Immigration Advisory Service, which deals with cases of that nature. We hope that the Minister will seriously consider this amendment to remove the draconian powers that the Home Secretary is expected to exercise. The clause is dangerous and I hope that the Minister has a better explanation of why it is required in the Bill. I beg to move.

Lord Avebury: The power to deprive people of their British citizenship contained in Section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981 applies solely to people who have acquired citizenship by registration or naturalisation, not to those who acquired it by birth. So we are considering a novel concept in the Bill. Someone who has been born and brought up here may nevertheless be deprived of his citizenship on the fiat of the Secretary of State on the grounds, as my noble friend said, that he has done something "seriously prejudicial". I do not know what that means—no doubt, the Minister will explain it to us later—but at present, the grounds on which someone can be deprived of the citizenship under Section 40 of the 1981 Act are precise. They are that he,
	"has shown himself by act or speech to be disloyal or disaffected towards Her Majesty . . . has, during any war in which Her Majesty was engaged, unlawfully traded or communicated with an enemy or been engaged in or associated with any business that was to his knowledge carried on in such a manner as to assist an enemy in that war . . . has, within the period of five years from the relevant date, been sentenced in any country for imprisonment for a term of not less than 12 months".
	Those are tests that can be evaluated, and if the person concerned does not think that they are satisfied, that is a matter of fact, whereas what is "seriously prejudicial" within the meaning of the clause is anyone's guess.
	So we are being asked enormously to extend the powers of the Secretary of State: first, to cover everyone born in the United Kingdom; and, secondly, in relation to conduct of which people may or may not have been guilty. That will be entirely a matter for the Secretary of State. That is a draconian power, and I hope that on reflection—the matter was raised in another place, so the Minister has had time to consider it—further and better advice will be given to the Minister and that he will accept the amendment.

Earl Russell: My Lords, the title of "worst clause in the Bill" is one for which there is considerable competition. I shall not claim it for this clause, but it must certainly be placed on any shortlist, not only for its content but for the extreme vagueness and gross uncertainty of its drafting. My noble friend Lord Greaves hit the nail on the head with precision earlier, when he asked the Minister what was the difference between citizenship and nationality. The Minister clearly did not have an answer. If we do not know what exactly what it is of which we are depriving people, that deprivation must be at least a little uncertain.
	In Calvin's case of 1608, which began the right of reciprocal citizenship between England and Scotland, being a citizen was simply defined as being the King's subject. Is it proposed that Mr Blunkett, by personal order, is to have the power to stop people being the subjects of Queen Elizabeth II? Does he propose to exercise that power under the Royal prerogative? If so, we have a rather curious hybrid mixture of powers. Such a power has not before been used against people born in this country. A power that was not used against Guy Fawkes is one that we should indeed regard as draconian. Indeed, I can think only of one case in which the lesser penalty of banishment was inflicted. That was on Henry Bolingbroke, who later returned as King and may well have been responsible for the death of the person who inflicted the sentence on him. So the precedents are not good. The Secretary of State is to do this, which one would have thought might have been regarded as a judicial act, by order. This is not a mere statutory instrument; this is not the old, familiar argument. "By order", if I understand this correctly, appears to be a purely executive act.
	That has a faint whiff about it of iudex in propria carta, judge in his own court. For anyone takes the trouble to supply the Minister with advice on that point, I know that in the opinion of Sir William Wade, there is a long line of authorities against that interpretation. Where the Secretary of State is thought to be the only person who can take the decision, he is not normally regarded as iudex in propria carta. But there is an older tradition to the contrary effect, from the days before Ministers accepted the rule of law as much as they have done in the recent past.
	For example, there is a splendid case in the 15th century yearbook, which I think is aimed at the burgeoning jurisdiction of the Earl Marshal, which says that if the King, without due process, utters the words, "Off with his head!", an action of murder lies against the executioner. Indeed, there was a case under King John, shortly before Magna Carta, when the King deprived someone of his land and gave as his official reason for so doing, "Because we were cross with him!" That is all that the record states.
	We do not want to go back in that direction. Were the courts to perceive the Secretary of State as heading back in that direction, they might be tempted to revert to the older line of precedent and treat such cases as examples of iudex in propria carta.
	We do not know exactly of what the person will be deprived. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, which, together with the Select Committee on the Constitution, has been much concerned by the clause, raised the question of deprivation of benefit. If the clause gives that power, it is by a particularly back-door way. I should like to know now whether it does.
	I should also like to know whether deprivation of citizenship deprives people of the right to vote. Imagining a Secretary of State from a party not presently represented with the power arbitrarily, by order, to deprive people of the right to vote, I view that power with some misgiving; or, to take the smooth with the rough—or the rough with the smooth, as the Home Office would probably see it—does the deprivation of citizenship have any effect on the obligation to pay taxes? The House should have answers to those questions before it happily agrees to put the clause on the statute book.
	I know that there is a reservation that that may not in any case be done where it makes the person stateless, but that clause is, as they would have put it in the 17th century, felo de se; it is self-destructive. When the Secretary of State exercises that power, he presumably deprives the person of the right to have a passport. Without a passport, the person will probably be unable to travel. The Secretary of State cannot know when he exercises the power whether the person's other country will recognise his nationality, or whether it will regard the Secretary of State's decision as depriving it of the right to do so. So either that restriction prevents the power from being used at all or it is nugatory. Either it is useless or it is pernicious—a phrase that I hope is familiar in this Chamber.
	We do not have much explanation as to the grounds on which the power will be exercised. It is to be exercised if
	"the person has done anything prejudicial to the vital interests of . . . the United Kingdom, or . . . a British overseas territory".
	Has the Home Office so soon forgotten Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911, which stated that something was an offence if it was done for a purpose prejudicial to the safety of the state? In the case of R v Randall 1962—a Committee of 100 case which I read with care because I was interested in the issues it raised—the defendants alleged that they were acting for purposes conducive and not prejudicial to the safety of the state. The question arose of how it should be tried. The trial judge said that it was a matter of fact and should go to the jury. It then went to the Court of Appeal, where Lord Chief Justice Parker said that it was a matter for the Royal prerogative. And so it proved.
	This is a very uncertain ground on which to decide whether someone is guilty of something. That clause and that Act have since been repealed, and this is one of the important reasons why. There is a right of appeal and of judicial review, but only on the grounds of Wednesbury unreasonableness. That is both a steep and high fence. It reverses the burden of proof. It forces the appellant to prove that he has not done anything wrong rather than forcing the Secretary of State to prove that he has. That is back to front.
	It also authorises a case to be refused appeal if it concerns national security. I appreciate that there is a problem with giving national security evidence in public, but the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, who took a distinguished part in the proceedings, will remember that we considered the issue at great length on the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill and arrived at a remedy through a hearing in camera which did honour to all parties. I do not see why that remedy cannot be adopted here.
	The appeal may be refused for any other matter "of a political kind"—because we were cross with the appellant? I fear that we are slowly on the way back to a world where the executive is freeing itself from legal control and working its way back to the world before Magna Carta. That is not something I would welcome.

The Countess of Mar: I listened closely to what my noble friend Lord Russell had to say. I heartily endorse every word. I am extremely concerned about this clause.

Lord Kingsland: We have tabled Amendment No. 70, which is in many ways similar to that tabled by the Liberal Democrats. We have also tabled a number of probing amendments.
	I share the concerns so eloquently expressed by the noble Earl, Lord Russell. I should like to add one or two thoughts of my own. The first concerns Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which says that no one shall be subject to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. I can think of no worse punishment, apart from the death penalty, than being expelled from one's country of birth with all its associations of home and family, institutions, landscape and other things. Have the Government considered whether that penalty on those born in the United Kingdom falls within Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights?
	Article 7 is also relevant. It requires that offences should be sufficiently specific so that, if one contemplates an offence before carrying out a certain course of conduct, one should know, or be reasonably certain, whether that course of conduct would fall within the terms of the offence. As the noble Earl, Lord Russell, said, the offence here is cast in extremely vague terms: seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom and its dependent territories.
	How can a citizen of the United Kingdom know in advance whether what he is about to do falls within these two definitions—especially since, as the noble Earl said, the individual who decides whether the conduct falls within these provisions is the Secretary of State deciding on purely subjective grounds?
	Surely the proper forum for dealing with someone thought to have committed an offence under the new sections in Clause 4(1) is the criminal court where the burden of proof is clearly on the prosecution. It is for the Government to demonstrate to your Lordships' House why someone who is thought to have acted in a seriously prejudicial manner against the vital interests of the UK should not be tried in the criminal courts.
	Finally, I turn to statelessness, of which there appears to be no definition in the Bill. I hope that the Government will enlighten us on what that means; for example, does it mean that a citizen of this country has no passport issued by another state, or has no right to a passport issued by another state, or do the Government have other criteria in mind in determining whether an individual is stateless?
	Many people have dual nationality as a consequence of a set of circumstances over which they had no control. I know that one of the Government's arguments is that it is wrong to make a distinction between birth and naturalisation. But these situations seem so distinct that I wonder why the Government believe that is a cause for concern. In any event, surely the Government are introducing another form of discrimination between those born without another nationality and those born with dual nationality.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: I, too, do not understand how the Government can make no distinction between birth and the acquisition of citizenship by naturalisation. We all know in our bones that they are two different things. In his letter to the Select Committee on the Constitution, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, says, on page 6 of the report, that such a distinction is,
	"inconsistent with Article 7 of the European Convention on Nationality, which we hope to ratify in due course".
	It would be interesting to know how much this decision has to do with the Government's intention to ratify that convention.
	I agree with what my noble friend Lord Kingsland and the noble Earl, Lord Russell, said. I am very concerned about the ability to deprive people born British of their nationality in this way.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: At Second Reading I presented the views of the Joint Select Committee on Human Rights on this and other provisions. I do not intend to repeat anything I said then. But there is one point I want to mention to the Committee that is not a lawyer's point; it is far more important. It is about the concept of British citizenship which is threatened with devaluation by the Bill. The Home Secretary has rightly spoken about the need for British citizens to understand what citizenship means: the positive content of citizenship and the duties that flow from it; the notion of allegiance to this country as well as the civil and political rights of citizens.
	Until the law was amended we had a muddled concept of citizenship in this country. Citizenship of the United Kingdom and colonies was one concept; a strange, complicated, hybrid concept. We had the notion of Commonwealth citizenship. But we did not have the notion of British citizenship—that is to say, citizenship of this country. In that respect, we differed from other independent Commonwealth countries. It was, therefore, possible for a previous government in 1968 to take away the rights of entry of one group of British/Asian passport holders from East Africa. Indeed, that is the worst thing that I believe Parliament has done since the Second World War. It was held to be "degrading", in breach of Article 3 of the convention by the European Court of Human Rights in a case where I acted for the complainants.
	There are some parts of the Bill that I believe to be admirable, but I have one worry about this part of the Bill. If, on subjective grounds where the material, if it is political, cannot be shown to an adjudicator but only to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission and then not shown to the individual concerned but to the special advocate—an attenuated form of appeal without judicial review—citizenship can be taken away on political grounds however sincere the motivation of a future Minister, that would send a message that the precious notion of "citizenship", which should be the right of people born in this country and of those who come to this country, can be taken away by a Minister of the Crown for reasons that he may regard as serious but which are not accompanied by full judicial process of law.
	Leaving aside all the legal objections, it seems to me that the message that would go out to people is that British citizenship is some kind of commodity, not a matter of birthright, that Ministers can take away on political grounds, provided that there is no violation of the statelessness convention. That is not a sensible message to send to the new citizens of this country when other parts of the Bill are seeking to persuade them that equal citizenship, equal rights, and equal obligations are to be shared by all of us.
	Therefore, when he replies, I hope that the Minister will not simply stand pat on the position that he took in a letter that he has kindly sent to me and other Members of the Committee, based on what the Joint Committee on Human Rights has said by way of criticism. This goes to a matter of political judgment about what "citizenship" means, and how precious it ought to be for all of us.

Lord Filkin: Clause 4 is one of the most important clauses for debate. As Members of the Committee have rightly said and as the Constitution Committee remarked, this clause touches on very important issues both to the state and to its citizens. There is no space for a full response to the thoughtful points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lester, but the summary response is that the Government believe that citizenship is something of very significant meaning and value. During our previous discussion on Clause 1, we sought to try to make it have more meaning and to help more people come into citizenship with the ability to exercise the rights and responsibilities that flow therefrom.
	In essence, the Government's position on those points is as follows. Because citizenship is a thing of value as well as something that confers rights, it also confers obligations. It is conceivable that there are circumstances in which a citizen has, by his actions, deprived himself of his entitlement to his rights. Therefore, it is right for citizenship to be denied. The latter is nothing new; indeed, it has been going on throughout the past century, albeit infrequently, as one would expect. Citizens have had their citizenship taken away from them by the government in the past.

Lord Avebury: When the matter was discussed in Standing Committee in another place, can the Minister confirm that Angela Eagle said then that there had been one case only where someone was a victim of a deprivation of citizenship under Section 40 of the 1981 Act?

Lord Filkin: I believe that I wrote to the noble Earl, Lord Russell, on this point. From my recollection, the last case was in 1973. However, there have been several hundred cases since 1915 when citizenship has been taken away from a citizen.
	One of the debates is about whether there should be a distinction between the types of citizenship—in other words, whether people who have acquired citizenship as of birth should never be open to having it deprived, or whether the circumstances in which they might be open to having it deprived to them should be different from those applied to people who have acquired it through other means than birth.
	In the White Paper we indicated our intention to modernise the provisions relating to citizenship. We saw this as a corollary of the importance now being attached to citizenship. The current law was drafted more than 20 years ago and, in many respects, is little different from that contained in earlier legislation

Earl Russell: The Minister is distinguishing between the case of citizenship acquired and citizenship by birth. However, does not subsection (3) of this clause provide the basis for a perfectly logical distinction?

Lord Filkin: If the noble Earl will bear with me, I shall seek to develop my argument as I go through my response.
	The present law discriminates against those who have acquired citizenship by registration or naturalisation. As such, it tends to devalue these processes by marking out people who became citizens in either of these ways as, potentially, second-class citizens compared with those who have acquired it by birth. It enables deprivation of citizenship to be applied as an additional penalty to that provided by the criminal law for any misdemeanour that has resulted in a sentence of imprisonment, in any country, of 12 months or more.
	In the Government's view, that is out of step with the practice in those countries that have ratified the European Convention on Nationality of 1997. It seems to us to be an entirely inappropriate response to acts of a general criminal nature, however serious. Finally, it imposes a check on the Secretary of State's power to deprive—the "conducive" test, the exact nature of which has always been somewhat difficult to pin down. This uncertainty has acted as a disincentive to the commencement of deprivation proceedings in the past.
	For those general reasons, the Government believe that it is time for change. We see no good reason for maintaining the present distinction between natural-born and naturalised citizens, especially where the actions of the person concerned have caused significant harm to the vital interests of the United Kingdom, or a British Overseas Territory, and where the removal of British nationality seemed likely to prevent or deter the individual from engaging in such activity in the future.
	We do not consider that deprivation—

The Countess of Mar: The terminology in the Bill is "British citizenship", but the Minister has just referred to "British nationality". I believe that the noble Earl, Lord Russell, made the distinction between the two. Can the noble Lord make it clear whether he is speaking about the removal of British nationality or of British citizenship?

Lord Filkin: It would probably take several hours to give the noble Countess a full legal answer on the exact distinction between "nationality" and "citizenship". For most of the purposes of this clause about which we are talking, I believe that there is no substantial difference. However, if she wishes me to do so, I think the best way to answer this question would be to write to the noble Countess subsequently in more detail.
	We do not consider that deprivation of citizenship should in future be applied as a penalty for acts of a general criminal nature. We shall continue to regard deprivation as a serious step, albeit one that we are prepared to contemplate in any case where someone has been granted citizenship while concealing a material fact—such as an involvement in war crimes, in terrorism, or where, as a British citizen, the person has conducted himself in a manner that is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom, or of an British Overseas Territory.
	I turn now to some of the more specific issues. I shall do my best to respond to all the points that have been raised, but there were many of them. It may require a period of reflection to do them all justice. First, there is the question of what Clause 4 is intended to achieve. As the Committee knows, Clause 4 will replace existing Section 40. It has two main effects. First, liability to deprivation is extended to all British nationals, irrespective of the means by which that nationality was acquired.
	The removal of the distinction is justified because the issue is whether the actions concerned cause significant harm to the vital interests of the United Kingdom, irrespective of the route by which the citizen acquired nationality. That seems to us to be right and clear. It is the nature of the threat created by the citizen's actions that should determine whether there should be deprivation, not the mechanisms by which they got citizenship.
	Several Members of the Committee asked whether it was right that a person could be deprived of citizenship on the subjective view of the Secretary of State. It is a tough issue, and I make no bones about that. The idea that it is appropriate for the deprivation of nationality to be based on the view of the Secretary of State has a long history. The current provision, in the British Nationality Act 1981, refers to the need for the Secretary of State to be satisfied of certain matters before a deprivation order will be made. That follows on from similar provisions in the British Nationality Act 1948 and the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914.
	It is entirely appropriate that the Secretary of State should be able to act on his view that a particular set of circumstances amounted to, for example, conduct seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK or of a British Overseas Territory. There is room for a good deal of argument on the issues, but it would place an unreasonable burden on the Secretary of State if he were unable to proceed unless absolutely certain in all respects. In some cases, the individual may have fled the country after committing a terrorist act. The certainty of conviction—using conviction as a route to certainty—would not be attainable. It would be wrong to be unable to act in such circumstances.
	The Court of Appeal, endorsed by the House of Lords, has stated that, in matters relating to national security, the Secretary of State is undoubtedly in the best position to judge what national security requires. The relevant case is Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Shafiq Ur Rehman from 2001. The fact that the Bill would facilitate deprivation of nationality on the subjective view of the Secretary of State does not mean that the power would be exercised arbitrarily.
	The Secretary of State is compelled by new Section 45 to give written reasons for the intended deprivation order. The person against whom it was proposed to make such an order would be free on appeal to raise any issue bearing on the legality or the merits of the decision. The Secretary of State would be prevented from making a deprivation order until such time as the appeal had been determined finally or, if there were no appeal, until such time as the deadline for bringing an appeal had passed. That requirement, coupled with proposed Section 45B, which requires that reasons must be given with the notice of the decision, provides adequate safeguards against arbitrary deprivation.
	I was also asked whether the words "seriously prejudicial" were vague.

Baroness Whitaker: Before my noble friend the Minister concludes the point about deprivation, could he clarify the force of Clause 7? As I read the Bill, the requirement not to give reasons and the absence of a right of appeal will now disappear. Does Clause 7 mean that the Secretary of State is under a requirement to give reasons for a discretionary decision and that there is a right of appeal in a case of deprivation of nationality?

Lord Filkin: My noble friend is exactly correct in both respects.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: Can the Minister confirm that the position at the moment is that someone who is born in this country and acquires citizenship by birth has a right to citizenship and to a passport? The big change that is being made, in the guise of equality of misery or non-discrimination, is that the Bill takes that right away from people—such as most of us here—who were born here. They will be treated with wide subjective discretion—in the same way as people who acquire their citizenship by naturalisation—rather than as having an entitlement. Is that right?

Lord Filkin: I would like a little more space to examine the noble Lord's words more carefully, but I can say that, in essence, he is right, for the reasons that I gave. Because we think that there is no fundamental reason for treating British citizens differently, we believe that it is right that citizens—regardless of how they came to their citizenship—should be open to the possibility of deprivation in certain defined circumstances, such as their having acted treasonably against the state.
	I do not think that the noble Lord asked for particular detail about passports. I shall not give any further detail on that.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I would be grateful for that at some point. As the Minister knows, many groups, including Justice, the NGO, have campaigned for years for the right to a passport, knowing that previous governments censored the right to travel by arbitrarily taking away passports. That happened during the Korean War, for example. It would be helpful to know the consequences for the right to a passport.

Lord Filkin: I shall, as far as I can, address that issue now, if that would be helpful. The general position is that there is not, as some believe, any right to a United Kingdom passport or to British consular protection; such things are better described as privileges. United Kingdom passports are issued at the discretion of the Home Secretary, exercising the royal prerogative. In practice, refusal is limited to people who have no claim to British nationality; minors whose journey is known to be contrary to a court order, for example; persons for whose arrest a warrant has been issued in the UK; persons repatriated at public expense who have not repaid the debt; or, in rare cases, persons in respect of whom the issuing of a passport would be contrary to the public interest for some other reason. That information may be of some interest, even if it is slightly tangential to the thrust of the noble Lord's question.
	I think that I have dealt with the question of why we felt that issues of a general criminal nature did not go to the heart of citizenship, regardless of how a person had achieved that citizenship. I was also asked about vital interests. Of course, that includes national security, but it also covers economic matters, as well as the political and military infrastructure of our society. After the events of 11th September, it is not difficult to see why that should be so; it touches on the general well-being of citizens.
	The Joint Committee on Human Rights raised several issues. We reflected seriously on those issues and will continue to do so as the Bill proceeds. We recognise that deprivation has serious consequences, including the loss of the right to a passport or, rather—I should qualify that—the loss of the privilege of a passport. It affects the ability to travel, removes British consular protection and bars the person from participation in the democratic process, a subject to which I shall return. However, it would not be a routine act; it would be confined to the most serious cases. There is a full right of appeal against any decision to remove nationality.
	The ability to deprive on the grounds listed reflects the provisions made in that regard by the Council of Europe in the 1997 European Convention on Nationality. The noble Baroness, Lady Carnegy of Lour, is right to say that the changes are necessary if we wish to sign up to the policy of the Council of Europe in that respect. We do, but we think that the changes would be right even if there had not been a proposal from the Council of Europe on the table.
	The Joint Committee on Human Rights and the noble Earl, Lord Russell, raised the issue of the burden of proof. I have explained the Government's view of the fact that it is the exclusive province of the Secretary of State to make the first decision that deprivation is justified. However, the question on appeal for, for example, obtaining citizenship by fraud, would be whether the citizenship was obtained by fraud rather than whether the Secretary of State was satisfied that it was. In that respect, we come to the same point.
	I turn to what is implied by the powers. At present, the broad nature of the appeal right is implied by the lack of provision for certain matters to be excluded from consideration by the appellate body. We could have, although we did not, set that out clearly on the grounds on which an appeal will lie. That might have made it easier for the JCHR by confirming that the appeal right granted is a formal one. However, in our view the legal position was clear: it was implied that there was a broad right of appeal in this respect.

Lord Dholakia: Am I right in believing that according to the protection afforded under the Terrorism Act, those appearing before SIAC would be entitled to some of the sensitive information, whereas in this case anyone who appeals against the Home Secretary's decision will not be entitled to know about politically sensitive information at the appeal?

Lord Filkin: In circumstances in which the Secretary of State has exercised his power to move to deprive someone of citizenship on grounds of a threat to the state in some way, he would have to give reasons. He may give reasons on the generality to the effect that it is a threat to the security of the state, but say that he does not feel able to give the full details of those in public. In those circumstances, the person would have the right of appeal to SIAC and, as I understand it, in the privacy of SIAC would be expected to give fuller details in camera so that the person would not be deprived of challenging the allegations made by the Secretary of State.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: Is not the position that under the Bill the Minister is entitled not to make public the grounds relating to, for example, matters of a political kind? In new Section 40A(2) there is a right of appeal to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, but the procedure in such an appeal—it caters for cases such as terrorism—is such that if the material is sensitive, it does not have to be disclosed to the appellant. It is disclosed instead to an independent special advocate, who may see the material but may not show it to the individual.
	Let us suppose, for example, that I or Arthur Scargill were regarded as sufficient trouble-makers because we had seriously been damaging the economy by our strike or other militant action, and that there was a Home Secretary like those of the 1920s who chose to deprive me or the militant trade unionist of our citizenship. He could then refuse to disclose the material but would have to show it to a special advocate who could then do his best for me or the militant trade unionist. However, we would not be able to see it. Is not that the effect of applying the anti-terrorist procedure to a deprivation of citizenship in this wider area?

Lord Filkin: I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Lester, is correct in that respect and that I went further than was right.
	The noble Earl, Lord Russell, also asked how, when citizenship is so vague, we can deprive someone of it. In relation to citizenship and deprivation, subsection (4) of new Section 41 defines citizenship status for the purposes of this provision on deprivation and sets out exactly who is liable to deprivation under the proposals. We do not believe that there is vagueness in this respect.
	The noble Earl, Lord Russell, also asked about the loss of voting rights. It is a complicated matter. Few rights flow directly and exclusively from British citizenship. The right to vote depends partly on Commonwealth citizenship and partly on residence. For example, on a loss of British citizenship a dual British/Japanese citizen would lose the right to vote; a dual British/Jamaican citizen would not. The Bill changes nothing in that respect. Furthermore, taxes are liable irrespective of citizenship, as one can well understand and imagine.
	The noble Earl also asked about the method or legal basis of deprivation. We do not believe it is important to exercise the prerogative. The Bill would give Ministers the statutory power to remove citizenship in closely defined circumstances. The order would merely be the instrument of deprivation, as it has been in successive statutes since at least 1915. The deprivation decision is evidenced by the deprivation order.

Lord Avebury: I do not believe that right of abode was mentioned, but will someone coming from a country from which an entry certificate or visa is required automatically lose the right to live in the United Kingdom if he is deprived of his citizenship? How would he acquire a right of abode, if at all?

Lord Filkin: The deprivation of citizenship does not automatically mean that one has lost one's right to reside here. A separate action must be taken by the Secretary of State to deprive of residence and to deport the person. The two are separate actions.
	The noble Earl, Lord Russell, suggested that the only appeal is a judicial review. We do not believe that that is the case. The appeal against deprivation is a full appeal on the merits. We believe that perhaps the JCHR does not have that clearly in sight or perhaps we have not made it as clear as we could have done.
	The appellate body will be able not only to remove the legality of the Secretary of State's decision, but also to hear arguments at his discretion on whether or not the right to deprive should have been exercised differently. The Bill proposes no restrictions on the issues which might be raised in an appeal either to an adjudicator or, where that body has jurisdiction, to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. The appellate body will be able to hear argument not only that the Secretary of State has failed to observe the statutory requirements, but also that his discretion whether to deprive should have been exercised differently.
	The noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, raised the relevance of Article 3 of the ECHR. Deprivation of citizenship is separate from deportation. Deportation does not necessarily follow from the former. It is a separate matter for a separate decision against which Part 5 of the Bill provides separate appeal rights. It will be an appeal against deportation which would engage ECHR Article 3 rather than the citizenship issues.

Lord Kingsland: I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. My point about Article 3 was simply that being excluded from the country of one's birth is tantamount to inhuman and degrading treatment. It is was as simple as that.

Lord Filkin: Undoubtedly, it is an extremely serious act but the Council of Europe, most other European countries and the British state, which have the powers to deprive people of citizenship, have acted in such ways previously. Clearly, states have acted in that way subsequent to the passage of the ECHR.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill: Would the noble Lord accept that there are situations in which depriving someone of his citizenship, for example, on racial grounds would be inherently degrading, as found by the ECHR looking at some American cases of the Supreme Court? In other words, there are extreme cases, which one hopes will never happen again, where to deprive someone of his citizenship on the basis of his skin colour, for example, would, among other things, breach Article 3 of the convention?

Lord Filkin: For several reasons, in particular the severity of the challenge, I am extremely reluctant to give an immediate answer to that question, and to say that I do not think so. I would like to look into the matter for reasons which the noble Lord, Lord Lester, will understand.
	I was asked also about the meaning of "statelessness". Statelessness is at present undefined in the British Nationality Act 1981. The definition is set out in Halsbury's Laws of England and is currently understood to mean that a person is stateless if no state exists according to the municipal law of which he is its national. That is a slightly convoluted way of expressing the concept. It is similarly described in the United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.
	The noble Countess, Lady Mar, asked about British nationality or citizenship. In Clause 4, the proposed new Section 40(1) employs as a drafting device the term "citizenship status". The draftsman might equally have said "nationality". There are some six types of British nationality or citizenship status itemised in proposed new Section 40(1), each of which might be subject to deprivation orders.
	I do not pretend that I have answered every question for reasons that the House may understand. Those I have not answered, I shall either give further serious consideration to and/or write to the relevant noble Lords who raised the issues.

Earl Russell: I listened to the Minister with considerable care. It has been a much considered answer. He did not answer my question about entitlement to benefit. I understand why not; it is a technical question. If he could write to me on that before Report stage I should be grateful.
	The centre-piece of his argument was the case for equality between citizenship by birth and citizenship by acquisition. That is a serious argument and deserves to be met seriously. But I do not see why we should not say that neither of those citizenships can be taken away as a penalty, although in cases where either of them has been acquired fraudulently they could be considered as having been void ab initio. If the Minister asks how a citizenship from birth can be void ab initio, the answer is surely in a forged birth certificate. Such things have been known.
	The deprivation of citizenship was never even proposed in the list of penalties people threatened against Roman Catholics in the 16th and 17th centuries. Since the whole thrust of the argument against them was that they were foreigners, the fact that no one ever considered depriving them of their citizenship is a point of some weight. They did not know that they had the option. If we are to have equality, let us not have what my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill described as an equality of misery. Let us have an equality of rank giving a proper value to the concept of citizenship, taking it away only where it is void ab initio because it is obtained by false pretences.
	The other central point of the Minister's argument was the claim that there is a long tradition that the Secretary of State decides these things in his individual capacity. There was a long tradition for the death penalty. There was a long tradition for the exclusion of women from Parliament. Long traditions perfectly properly come to an end. I think that this particular long tradition began to totter with the judgment of Lord Reid in Ridge v Baldwin. I think that it died with the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998.
	Incidentally, the Minister is wrong about the passport issue being entirely a matter of discretion. There is a clause in the Magna Carta—I think that it is No. 41 but I would not argue from memory—which states that all His Majesty's subjects shall be entitled to free entry to and egress from the realm save in time of war. That was cited in the United States Supreme Court against the denial of a passport as recently as 1955. So it is a living tradition on the other side of the Atlantic, even if not on this side. But it is the common fact between Magna Carta and the Human Rights Act. The point has been made by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor that they are both attempts to bring the executive under the rule of law. I congratulate the Government on making that attempt. I hope that they will keep it up.

Lord Filkin: Perhaps I may respond in part to the points raised by the noble Earl, and touch on a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. I shall write to the noble Earl with details on how and in what circumstances the loss of citizenship would touch on a person's right to benefits in civil society. I shall copy that to the Front Benches. That needs to be clear and on the record.
	At heart this is a debate about whether there are any circumstances in which the state is entitled to act to deprive a British citizen of that citizenship, howsoever he obtained his citizenship. In short, it is an argument about view. The view of the Government is that such circumstances should be extremely rare. It is hard to contemplate that they would occur frequently. One would expect that citizens would not act so massively against the interest of the state.
	However, at heart the Government's position is this. We can conceive of situations in which a citizen, howsoever he obtained his citizenship, so breached the behaviour that one would expect of a citizen that it is reasonable to take that citizenship away from him. We may differ on that but at heart that is the Government's position.
	The second issue to which the noble Earl, Lord Russell, rightly pointed is the process by which such a decision should be exercised and the way it is challenged. The argument that one has done something for a long time is not an automatic argument that it is right in the future; nor that it is wrong. In essence, the exercise of the Secretary of State's prerogative in such a position is still caught under the rule of law. It is inconceivable in most circumstances that a citizen who had his citizenship taken away from him would not exercise his right to legal aid and so challenge the Secretary of State. Therefore, the merits of that will be tested through the appropriate processes about which we have talked.
	I add one qualification about whether the right of abode was lost with the loss of British citizenship. The formal answer is this. With the loss of British citizenship the right to reside in the United Kingdom also falls away. But the person then becomes subject to control under the immigration legislation and, therefore, the Secretary of State is entitled to act under the immigration legislation to remove him by proper process of law.

Lord Kingsland: Before the Minister sits down, with respect to the Home Secretary's constitutional powers, I was intrigued by the noble Lord's appeal to long traditions. Respect for tradition has not been a conspicuous ingredient in the reforms by the Government of the British constitution over the past five years. So it is curious that, in this one respect, an appeal to one of the—I would say inadequate—traditions of our constitution should be used to support these measures.
	I asked the Minister in what respect our criminal law was deficient so as to lead the Government to table this clause. We have recently passed an anti-terrorism Act. Why is that Act not capable of doing the things the Government seek to do under Clause 4? In effect, under Clause 4 the Government are exporting our security problems to other parts of the world. Surely it would be better for us to deal with them here.

Lord Filkin: I shall hazard one illustration in respect of the second question of the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland. As in much of this debate, I shall reflect further on the issue and, if necessary, come back with a fuller answer. One circumstance would be where a British citizen, either by himself or in concert with others, had taken actions against the interests of the British state and its citizens in ways that were clear and blatant while not resident in the United Kingdom. In that situation, I cannot see that the British criminal law could be used against them if their acts were committed abroad, even if their acts were against the interests of the British state from abroad.
	As to the noble Lord's second point about tradition, it is not possible to give a full, serious answer. I shall merely give the response that we are in favour of tradition when it is appropriate for the future.

The Countess of Mar: In order that I may get this clear in my head, is the noble Lord suggesting that people such as Philby, Burgess and MacLean, all of whom did a bunk when they were found out, would be suitable for having their British citizenship taken away from them.

Lord Filkin: I am reluctant to go back into history and to speculate about Burgess, MacLean, Philby and others. But one can conceive of situations where a British citizen was found to have acted quite blatantly and seriously against the interests of British society and the British state but was no longer in the United Kingdom for action to be taken against him in other respects. In such a case, deprivation of citizenship would at least be open to consideration.

Lord Dholakia: I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation of the clause. He said that the heart of the debate was whether there are any reasons why the Secretary of State should not have such powers. Basically the answer is that there are existing laws under which we could exercise deprivation of citizenship without adding the proposed draconian measure.
	I have yet to hear a single speech in support of what the Minister proposes. It would appear that noble Lords on all sides of the Committee are seriously concerned about this measure. I genuinely never expected a Labour Government to introduce a draconian measure of this nature which could deprive an individual of the fundamental right of citizenship.
	I give advance warning to the Minister that this issue will not die away. The Report stage will not be until after the Recess and perhaps the Minister will give further thought to this matter. Failing that, I give him advance warning that we will divide the Committee on this issue. If we were to succeed in winning that vote, it would at least give the other place the opportunity, which it has not so far had, to consider the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. That may give a different picture from the one with which we have been presented. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I beg to move that the House do now resume. In doing so, I propose that we return to this business not before 8.33 p.m.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
	House resumed.

International Development

Baroness Rawlings: rose to ask Her Majesty's Government what action they are taking in response to the international development annual report.
	My Lords, I begin by thanking all noble Lords who will speak in this important debate. I greatly look forward to their contributions, especially to that of the noble Lord, Lord Jordan, who will be making his maiden speech. I am delighted that he has waited until today to make his contribution on such a very worthwhile subject—a subject that is rightly so highly respected in your Lordships' House.
	I should like to point out, too, that the lack of speakers from this side of the House bears no reflection on any lack of interest in international development. It is entirely due to a special dinner being held in honour of Mr John Major this evening. We even had our Opposition Day debate in the other place last month on trade justice or alleviating world poverty through trade.
	I congratulate the Department for International Development on the good work that it does in promoting development—and, at the same time, Britain—across the world. I have spoken to a number of friends who have encountered DfID in their work overseas. It has a strong reputation. This past year has seen DfID involvement in a number of difficult situations, not least Afghanistan, where it has responded well under considerable pressure. Criticisms made of DfID by Her Majesty's Opposition will, I hope, be taken in this spirit.
	The debate has been called to discuss the Department for International Development's annual report. As most of the department's work takes place overseas, it is particularly helpful to have a document showing what the department is involved in. Nevertheless, in 2001-02 DfID published almost 90 publications. Of course government should be open and transparent, but it is important to balance the necessity of providing the public with valuable information and what can become an exercise in self-glorification.
	I should like to touch on three areas. First, Africa. There are times when the report reads too much like civil-service speak. For example, the section on Zimbabwe begins,
	"During the past year, the policy environment in Zimbabwe has deteriorated steadily".
	That surely betrays a lack of emergency on the part of the Government. To talk of the policy environment deteriorating "steadily" is surely an understatement in a country where people's land and livelihoods are stolen at gunpoint, in a nation that has been brutalised into submission, a country where the economy is in tatters and where hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people are facing the prospect of starvation this summer.
	It is clear from page 59 of the report that there is no remote prospect of meeting targets. Is the Minister still of the view initially put forward by the Secretary of State that aid should go directly to the governments rather than the aid agencies? Much has been made of NePAD, the new model for aid to Africa. The G8 spent a third of its time in Canada discussing NePAD. Why then does it not merit more than two or three paragraphs in this document?
	Of course Zimbabwe is not the only African government in which standards of democratic accountability and the rule of law remain an area of concern—and it is governance to which I should like to turn next.
	The noble Baroness may have read an article in The Times a fortnight ago by Simon Jenkins in which he challenged many of the assumptions underlying the New Partnership for African Development. He pointed to the work of the late Lord Bauer, who noted that aid could be more of a hindrance than a help when it came to promoting good governance in African countries. What assurances can the noble Baroness provide that NePAD will mean a real change in the relationship with Africa and that aid will not simply be used as a means of cushioning bad government or corruption but will promote good government, the rule of law and economic competence?
	That leads me to the second area on which I should like to touch—that is, debt relief. The report paints a positive picture of the debt relief process. However, that picture fails to accord with the views presented by Jubilee 2000 and many poor countries. There is a real danger that the question of debt relief has become stagnant. The Government need some fresh thinking on how we can take forward debt relief without creating the perverse incentive of rewarding economic mismanagement with debt relief and leaving economically competent countries to struggle under debt burdens.
	I was dismayed to read in the Prime Minister's statement on the G8 summit that 20 billion US dollars had been agreed over the next 10 years to be spent on the destruction of chemical weapons and the dismantling of decommissioned nuclear submarines in Russia, and yet only 1 billion US dollars will be put aside for the HIPC trust fund.
	My third and final subject is central and eastern Europe. It is, I fear, becoming too fashionable to dismiss the problems of central and eastern Europe as insufficiently poor to concern us. It is right that we focus on Africa, the poorest continent on earth, but not at the expense of other poor countries in Central and Eastern Europe. These countries still face major challenges in overcoming the effects of decades of Communist rule—particularly if they are to join an enlarged European Union.

Baroness Whitaker: My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, on securing this timely debate and the department on its report, which joins up aid, good governance, investment and trade.
	Grant aid is needed to create the foundations: a healthy and educated population. I applaud DfID's partnership with UNICEF and its pressure for strong references to children's rights and reproductive health at the United Nations General Assembly last May. Now we need to implement the language.
	Countries also need the help DfID gives for good and clean governance. But after that, the essential levers for economic take-off are trade and investment. My noble friend the Minister's efforts in the G8 response to the NePAD plan to achieve the right conditions for investment in Africa have rightly been noted in The Times. I hope that the World Bank and the IMF might also themselves move to accrediting countries for investment.
	But trade is not working. Access to markets is skewed against the countries which need it most. Oxfam's well- thought-out campaign for trade justice needs to be taken on board by governments all over the developed world.
	Crop production most benefits poor people. But the rich world spends 1 billion dollars a day subsidising its own farm produce. If Uganda wanted to sell its excellent peanuts to the USA, it would face tariffs of up to 164 per cent. If American cotton prices were not distorted by subsidies, Burkina Faso, which exports 100 per cent of its crop, as 60 per cent of its total exports, could probably cut poverty by half in six years. And even when a country gets itself to the next stage, food processing, it is blocked: the EU puts a tariff on Ghana's delicious cocoa, so that it cannot compete with cocoa processed in the EU.
	How do we achieve change? For one, if the USA were to abandon its Corn Laws, otherwise known as the Farm Bill, we might see an even greater decline in famine than in our own country 160 or so years ago. I hope that the noble Baroness opposite will think of Sir Robert Peel and urge the same course. Secondly, the day after tomorrow proposals will be announced to reform the common agricultural policy. I ask my noble friend: can she assure us that we shall be able finally to run down these subsidies?

Lord Chan: My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, on securing this important debate.
	Poverty reduction cannot be achieved by statute and money alone. The cycle of poverty, disease, poor health and the death of young children needs to be broken by initiatives that promote child survival, the health of men, women and children and sustainable economic development of local populations.
	The United Kingdom has a good record in international development, particularly in Asia and the Pacific, where two-thirds of the poorest people in the world live. I shall speak from my personal involvement of 10 years in the five poorest states of north India when I was consultant paediatrician at the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine.
	In 1984-86 the Liverpool school sent multi-disciplinary teams to coastal Orissa to help local health teams improve their care of mothers and babies and to increase their ability to collect data and disseminate information to improve the health of vulnerable people. It soon became clear to us that the large number of children with severe diarrhoea could be reduced rapidly if every village had a supply of clean drinking water. This was achieved when we encouraged the Dutch Government team to sink deep tube wells in coastal areas where water contamination was common.
	My team, funded by overseas development through the British Council, concentrated on improving the knowledge and skills of Orissan health workers in the use of breast feeding, vaccinations, good antenatal care and safe child delivery techniques. Dangerous practices such as putting contaminated ash on the umbilical stump at birth causing tetanus, and feeding newborn babies with water before breast milk, leading to diarrhoea, had to be addressed. We did this by good communication with local grandmothers, obtaining their agreement to adopt safe alternatives.
	We promoted the supply and use of essential resuscitation equipment made in Bombay, such as face masks and rubber bags for babies, that cost only a fraction of their price in the United Kingdom.
	Between 1986 and 1990 the Liverpool team was invited by the Government of India to train trainers from the poorest five northern Indian states in mother and child care in partnership with the National Institute of Health and Family Welfare in New Delhi. Training took place in Himachal Pradesh and in Liverpool. In 1991-1994, the Liverpool team embarked on a partnership project with an Indian NGO working in the slums of old Delhi. Another multi-disciplinary team that I led worked in the slums of Andhra Pradesh and Calcutta. While working with them, I took a team of Indian doctors and nurses to Thailand to learn how Thai NGOs improved the care of people with HIV/AIDS and with malaria.
	For the future, it is appropriate that the Government work with other European governments to improve health and tackle poverty in developing countries. We should use all the talent available, such as in the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine and other academic institutions and in our NGOs with overseas experience. They would work in partnership with local professionals, health workers, community groups and voluntary bodies in poor countries. Best practice organisations in other developing countries should be encouraged to join this partnership.
	Our priority would be in the transfer of appropriate skills to local trainers and in the use of essential equipment and supplies manufactured in developing countries such as India. It is through these means that we maximise the effectiveness of developmental assistance in all poor countries.

Lord Jordan: My Lords, I, too, congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, and thank her for initiating this debate, which enables me to make my maiden speech on an issue, international development, on which I believe the success or failure of globalisation hinges.
	It also gives me an opportunity to thank Members, officers and staff for what has seemed like a conspiracy of kindness towards me since I arrived in this House.
	I must declare an interest. My working life, which started in Birmingham, in the West Midlands, has been committed to the cause of trade unionism. The greater part of my career was spent within manufacturing industry, where, as president of the Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union, now Amicus, I promoted the economic value to Britain of a strong manufacturing base and the need for a high standard of skills within the nation's workforce.
	For the past seven years I was privileged to lead the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the world's TUC. Affiliated to it are the trade union centres of 148 countries, with 157 million members, the majority of whom are from the developing world. The job let me see at first hand the heart-rending reality that lies behind the world's poverty statistics. But I have also seen in action, and commend, the focused, committed approach of the UK Government and DfID to the elimination of global poverty and to meeting the international development targets.
	The global union movement would like to see DfID place a greater emphasis on respect for freedom of association. Let us remember that trade union membership was the instrument used by workers in achieving an escape from the widespread poverty that once afflicted all today's rich industrial countries. I believe that that same power can help to transform the tragedy that we now see in the developing world.
	Yes, DfID employs to great effect a range of powerful policies in its war against poverty, but enlisting the millions of trade unionists who are fighting to establish the ILO's core labour standards as the right of every worker in the world can only reinforce DfID's efforts.

Lord Brett: My Lords, I join others in congratulating the noble Baroness on this timely and important debate. I also congratulate my good and noble friend Lord Jordan on his speech. It is normal on these occasions to praise the contribution of the maiden speaker highly. It is very rare to make a complaint against a maiden speaker. I am sorry, but I am going to defy convention and complain.
	First, I shall say the good things about my noble friend's speech. If brevity is the soul of wit, it was a very witty contribution. If personal experience brings power to a speech, it was a powerful speech. My complaint is that it was too short. It is possibly the shortest maiden speech on record. There may be others of the same length, but less than three minutes does not seem possible. It is almost not possible in three minutes even to appreciate the speech, never mind make a contribution to the debate.
	I have worked with Bill Jordan for more than 10 years on the TUC and internationally. I have seen him in operation from Brussels to Seattle, from Venezuela to Washington, from Davos to Portalegre. The World Bank, the IMF, the World Economic Forum and the World Trade Organisation have all heard Bill present strong trade union arguments for the ICFTU. His voice has been heard, although not always heeded. He has made a powerful and major contribution to those debates. In the future, we shall have the great value of him making a major contribution to our debates. The House will be greatly enhanced by his contributions to debates on international development.
	The problem with saying that is that it gives me less than two minutes to make a contribution to this major debate. I commend the report, DfID and the drive of Ministers in that department. My criticism is not about the report or DfID. I have one point to make. Under the heading, "Making the international system work better for poor people", paragraph 2.17 on page 22 says:
	"This involves maximising the effectiveness of international institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation".
	We have not been successful to date in doing that.
	I declare an interest as the chair of the governing body of the International Labour Organisation. We are not perfect by any means. We are considerably grateful for the financial support and assistance that we have had from DfID on our international programme to eliminate child labour. However, in my 12 years involved in the International Labour Organisation, I have seen the UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions at first hand. I would not say that they are coherent, but they are certainly competitive.
	I praise the Chancellor of the Exchequer for his endeavours at the International Monetary Fund and the Secretary of State for her endeavours at the bank. However, there seems to be a difference between what Ministers say, what executive vice-presidents advise and what the bank and the fund do. While the bank is supporting education as a special need, the IMF is still telling countries to cut the number of teachers and introduce charging.
	My plea to the Minister is for reassurances that the Government will redouble their efforts to bring in other European Union member states that are on the board of both the bank and the fund and impose a coherent policy on the neo-liberal economists who still run much of what comes from both institutions. I commend Joe Stiglitz and his recent book and today's leader in the Guardian on the IMF. I hope that the good work that is being done here and the excellent job that Ministers are doing will spill over and we can get some of the coherence that I have seen to be more lacking than present in the UN system over the past 10 years.

The Lord Bishop of Hereford: My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, for introducing the debate and congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Jordan, on his admirable maiden speech. He gave an interesting and important insight into worldwide trade unionism. I also had to compress my maiden speech into three minutes, so it is not unique.
	This brief but valuable debate is an opportunity to look with gratitude and even with amazement at the extraordinary scale and success of the trade justice rally which took place here on 19th June. That was evidence, if any were needed, of the enormous support that exists for the developing world across the spectrum of British society, but especially on the part of the Churches, which were strongly represented. It also shows the profound concern, shared by the public, for the business of DfID, which is so well set out in the attractive and comprehensive annual report, for which I thank the department.
	I am particularly grateful for what is described on pages 22 and 25. A significant amount is already being done to make the international system work better for the poor. That is a crucial phrase, although I suspect that it is a slightly rosy view of the Doha round from the point of view of the developing countries.
	It is encouraging to see the progress being made with the HIPC programme and the United Kingdom Government's leadership of and commitment to that programme. I believe that I speak for many Church people and others in expressing how glad I am that some important trade barriers are being dismantled. Some of your Lordships may have heard the reference on Radio 4 today to the export of textiles from South Africa to the United States creating hundreds of new jobs in areas of high unemployment round Johannesburg, thanks to President Clinton's concession at the end of his presidency. However, that process has a very long way to go.
	I am deeply concerned about the nature of much international trade and the working conditions of vast numbers of people in the developing world, on whose labour we depend. An example of the former is the large-scale export of flowers from East Africa to the Netherlands and other European markets. Jumbo jets full of unnecessary and undesirable cargo spew out their filthy pollution to add to global warming, perpetuating a pointless trade that does so much to distort the local economy. One example of the deplorable working conditions of so many in the developing world is the shocking child labour slavery in the cocoa industry of West Africa.
	However, I recognise that jobs are jobs, even slave labour or sweatshop jobs. I hope that the Minister will be able to assure the House that DfID's policy is to tread carefully the path of doing all that we can to modify or outlaw these unpleasant practices, but not moving so fast as to create even more distress before better forms of industry and trade are put in place. In that connection, I am acutely conscious of the desperate plight of the United Kingdom farming industry, threatened by easier imports from developing countries. There is much to be said for some increase in world trade, but much also, on environmental grounds, for greater self-sufficiency. I very much hope that DfID will bring its influence to bear in favour of local economic and food production systems, the shortening of the food chain and a reduction in trade miles, unless there is a very good case for creating new patterns of trade because they are of direct and unambiguous value to the poor.

Lord Parekh: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, for initiating this urgent and extremely important debate. I also congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Jordan, on his brief but wise and compassionate maiden speech.
	I do not need to rehearse the figures on the desperate conditions in which the world's population lives. One in five lives in abject poverty. That is about 1.2 billion people. Another one in five lives in relative poverty of the kind that does not ensure even a barely decent existence. It is therefore only proper that international development should be the compelling moral, economic and political agenda of our times.
	The Labour Government fully appreciate that and deserve our gratitude and congratulations. On coming to power, they set up a separate Department for International Development and gave the Secretary of State Cabinet status. They have also actively mobilised international opinion on the issue. I am pleased that the Prime Minister has taken an active interest in the New Partnership for Africa's Development. We are clearly moving in the right direction. I also place on record my appreciation of the great contribution that my noble friend Lady Amos has made in sensitising the Government to the importance of the issue.
	Although we have made considerable progress, we still have a long way to go. I am not entirely convinced that the road we have taken is necessarily right in all respects. The road to a just and balanced system of international development has four lanes: aid, trade, debt relief and political stability. I should like to comment briefly on each of these points.
	As far back as 1970, the United Nations set a target of 0.7 per cent of GNP for rich countries. This is not an impossible figure to meet. Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands and Luxembourg have all met it and sometimes even exceeded it. We in this country have never reached the figure of 0.7 per cent. Our highest figure ever was 0.5 per cent, in 1979, but it decreased to 0.26 per cent under the Tories. Labour has notched it up to just over 0.3 per cent. I very much hope that the Chancellor—whose commitment to the cause is second to none—will in the next spending review at least double that.
	There are also other ways of increasing the amount of aid in which we should take the initiative. The Tobin tax of 0.05 per cent on foreign exchange transactions would gather close to 100 billion dollars, enough to wipe out poverty in much of the rest of the world. A European-wide lottery of the type we have in Britain would generate about £20 million a week. Trans-world taxes on global commons also need to be considered.
	Poor countries need aid far more than trade. Despite all the free trade rhetoric, we continue to impose tariffs and quotas from which the developing countries lose about 2 billion dollars a day, which is 14 times more than the amount they receive in aid. It is about time that we did something about that.
	As for debt relief, we have taken the lead but our progress has been slow. Although linking debt relief to a poverty reduction strategy is a good idea, it is often a way of imposing ill-advised policy prescriptions. The poverty reduction strategy has to be approved by the IMF, which is too committed to free-market development to be fully trusted.
	Finally, no country can develop economically unless it enjoys political stability and public accountability. Civil wars spell economic disasters and so do corrupt governments. Therefore, we should do everything in our power to ensure that democratic and responsible institutions are created in those countries. Above all, however, we must bear one point in mind. Just as we supported dubious groups during the Cold War as long as they were anti-communist, we are running the risk of supporting those who help our current campaign against terrorism. There is a danger that we might be clamping down on genuinely progressive movements in the name of fighting terrorism. I very much hope that the Government will continue to provide a lead in this area.

Baroness Stern: My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, on instigating this debate; the noble Lord, Lord Jordan, on his excellent and forceful maiden speech; and DfID on its radical and determined approach to poverty reduction. I must declare an interest as a board member of Penal Reform International and as a research fellow at the International Centre for Prison Studies at King's College, as both organisations work with DfID.
	I should like to make two points. First, I refer to the programmes on access to justice which are, according to the annual report, now running in Malawi and Nigeria and in the planning stage in Ghana, South Africa, Lesotho, India and Mozambique. I understand that £35 million is to be spent in Malawi and £30 million in Nigeria. The basis of these programmes is that a lack of justice is an important element of poverty. Those who are vulnerable to having their livelihood threatened by petty theft, or to being arrested by the police and held until they pay a bribe which they do not have money to pay, or held in prison for perhaps five years waiting for their trial to start, possibly contracting a deadly disease while they wait, are poor people. The lack of a functioning and fair justice system affects their ability to earn their living and their opportunities to right wrongs done to them.
	The success of these programmes in Nigeria and Malawi and the others that are planned are very important because they are trailblazers. DfID is to be congratulated on making these attempts to work with partner countries to reform their justice systems since past attempts have not succeeded. However, the information that we have so far suggests that in both Nigeria and Malawi there are difficulties. In Nigeria, according to the annual report,
	"the government's reform effort has been disappointing. Corruption remains endemic".
	Of Malawi, the Annual Portfolio Performance Review 2001 notes that,
	"The Malawi Government shows hints of increasing authoritarian tendencies",
	and that there is,
	"less demand for good government",
	than was assumed.
	If the Minister could give us any indication of how these programmes are performing, and if there are successes to report, I would be most grateful.
	My second area of concern is the situation in Russia and the spread there of HIV/AIDS. The figures are startling. The rate of spread is one of the fastest anywhere in the world. Researchers at Imperial College working for UNAIDS has found that 5 per cent of adult Russians will be HIV positive by 2007. The figures for the penitentiary system are even more startling. The fact is that 15 per cent of registered HIV cases are in prison. Prison is a high-risk environment, and dealing with HIV infection there is complex. Yet it cannot be ignored in any programme for AIDS prevention. Prisons are a concentration and a reservoir of infection.
	I know that the Ministry of Justice in Russia is taking steps to deal with this problem. I am also aware of the DfID country strategy for Russia and of plans for a major programme of perhaps £25 million for AIDS prevention in Russia. I would welcome a categorical assurance from the Minister that this strategy will include the Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for prison healthcare, and that the practical work on the ground will include the prisons in the locality.

Lord Judd: My Lords, I must declare an interest as a member of the Oxfam Association. I also hope that I will be forgiven for perhaps breaking convention by adding my appreciation to my noble friend Lord Jordan for his outstanding maiden speech. If that is what he can do with three minutes, we look forward to what he will do with the more usual 10 or 15. It is great to have him in the House. I add my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, for having secured this debate. I also congratulate DfID on its outstanding work and my noble friend Lady Amos on the lead she has given on the issues of Africa.
	There is no room for complacency; the challenges are immense. Let us consider health. The United States AIDS programme estimates that, by 2010, life expectancy in 11 African countries will be barely 30 years. It will be much lower in countries such as Botswana. Around the world, measles kills three children every minute. We have no room for complacency. We cannot congratulate ourselves yet on the level of our aid performance, let alone that of our colleagues in other parts of the world.
	Following September 11th, we all wanted to see a stable, secure world. We talked about the necessary security measures, but we also argued very strongly that there had to be economic and social justice. There had to be a redistribution of wealth and resources around the world, because without that there could be no hope of security for the future. If that is to be tackled, we shall have to look at the international institutions.
	It is not simply a matter of the redistribution of wealth and resources; it is also a matter of the redistribution of power. Too many people in the world feel powerless. They do not feel that they decide the agendas that are addressed by those institutions; they feel that they respond to the agendas established by others. We therefore have to look at the governance of the IMF, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation. We have to look at the voting balance within those organisations to ensure that, in future, they reflect the interests of the world population as a whole.
	I must mention one other issue. We talk about the importance of the rule of law, but I think that we are sometimes being cynical in effect when we do so. Law costs money. I say in great friendship to DfID that I should also like to see more evidence of its commitment. If we are to see the rule of law around the world, we shall have to ensure that the judges are there and trained and that the courts, prison administrations and the lawyers are there and trained. It will not happen just by demanding the rule of law; it will happen because we put our money where our aspirations are. The issue of establishing a system of law in Afghanistan, to give but one example, is absolutely crucial to the stability of that country.

The Earl of Sandwich: My Lords, DfID has enjoyed five years of relative freedom from parliamentary scrutiny. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, on her persistent questioning of it. I also warmly welcome the noble Lord, Lord Jordan, to this House.
	The Government's two White Papers have brought a marked change of emphasis in the aid programme, especially its new poverty focus. There have been welcome increases in the aid budget; notably, the latest announcement on Africa; and yet spending aid funds is getting much more difficult just as the international development targets in Africa are receding.
	Some in DfID may long for the days when a project was a project—it soaked up the money and the auditors were well satisfied. Now we have civil society, local participation, good governance, and it all seems like hard work. Much of this has been NGO-led. Here I declare an interest as someone who has worked with Christian Aid and the Save the Children Fund which have long campaigned to enable the poor to have a voice in programmes designed to help them. As has been mentioned, even the IMF is now supposed to see things from a pro-poor perspective. It is not easy for the IFIs to turn themselves inside out and see the world from the underside, but they must try.
	The focus of much of the Government's expectations is now on the PRS process, to be found prominently in Chapter 2 of the report. The participation of civil society, evidence of direct benefit to the poor, proper co-ordination of partners and donors and the involvement of the IFIs which have the final say are among the factors critical to its success.
	Personally, I am not so sure whether governments can ever involve people directly. I remember the famous Laxman cartoons in India which have long satirised Gandhian politicians pretending to help the poor, and few believe that any government are capable of truly understanding local need. However, the PRSPs are the latest attempt to overcome that scepticism.
	Christian Aid has done some work on the methodology of PRSPs looking in particular at the quality of participation and using case studies from Rwanda, Malawi and Bolivia. One key finding is that,
	"Poor people and CSOs are more likely to participate in the process during the analysis phase, and more likely to be excluded in the policy formation".
	The case studies show, unsurprisingly, that the more vertical the government structure, the less likelihood of participation. The Malawi Government did not take kindly to the process. In Bolivia the NGOs had expectations of joint decision-making which were not matched by commitment from government. Only in Rwanda where local democracy had received a boost from intensive development efforts was there a measurable degree of participation.
	I have one question for the Minister: does she agree with Christian Aid that a stronger framework for CSOs is needed in the next round of PRSPs, and that the views of civil society on the process itself should be represented in the final document approved by the boards of the IFIs?
	In conclusion, I suggest that the PRS process, while it depends on the good will of governments, may easily become another smokescreen. Obviously, at this early stage participation should be encouraged. But whether a strong civil society by acting as a quasi-opposition contributes to lasting good governance, I am not sure.

Lord Hunt of Chesterton: My Lords, I welcome this opportunity to participate in the debate introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, on the excellent work on poverty reduction being done by Her Majesty's Government in the Department for International Development and to hear the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Jordan.
	I have four brief points informed by my interests as chairman of ACOPS and member of the Risk Group. First, I welcome the mainstreaming of sustainability into national development (page 51 of the report). The NePAD environmental projects in Africa are, as I saw in a lively meeting in Nigeria in June with NGOs and governments bashing away at each other, really being led by Africans and being supported by the Global Environment Facility. It is good news on page 106 that there will be a 50 per cent increase in the UK contribution to GEF. But surely the UK should participate in these projects by also funding them bilaterally. The current policy means that UK GEF funds are in some large projects effectively not involving relevant UK expertise and NGOs, as I have seen in Africa and Russia.
	Secondly, we must welcome in the report the support of humanitarian projects at times of natural disasters which sometimes have the largest impacts on societies. However, the emphasis here is on assistance in disasters and conflict. There is not much on preventive measures, which are also important and where the UK insurance industry and technical institutions could help very effectively.
	On page 28 the report refers to information exchange as a means of reducing the impact of natural disasters. It is essential that the developed and developing countries must improve their practices. For example, the effect of flooding in Mozambique could have been considerably reduced if the data between hydrological and meteorological services in Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe had been more rapidly exchanged. In this and many other matters, action and training in developing countries need to be implemented by other government departments, perhaps even in the much maligned business of air traffic control. I am surprised that the report makes little reference to the role of other government departments and agencies which have an enormous role to play.
	This brings me to my last point, about corruption. I heard a Nigerian businessman in Abuja criticising the hypocrisy of western countries talking about governance when the banks of those countries seem happy to receive the proceeds of corrupt practices. That is an extremely urgent matter which could have a huge impact, almost as huge as trade. I commend the report and the persistent work of the noble Baroness, Lady Amos.

Lord Joffe: My Lords, I, too, should like to express my appreciation to the noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, for initiating the debate. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Jordan, on his maiden speech. It is fortunate that the House has another Peer who is able to talk with such authority on international development.
	The DfID report is a model of clarity with clear objectives, clear priorities and clear strategies, demonstrating a deep understanding of the complexities of sustainable development. It is immensely encouraging that, in addition to the outstanding leadership of the Secretary of State for DfID, both the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer have taken such a prominent role on key initiatives such as NePAD, debt relief, finance, development and trade.
	As the noble Lord, Lord Brett, pointed out, it is also encouraging that under this Government the aid budget has steadily increased and is scheduled to rise to 0.33 per cent by 2003. Like the noble Lord, Lord Parekh, I hope that the Chancellor will go beyond the 0.39 per cent target fixed at Monterrey when he shortly announces his comprehensive spending review so as to set an example to other European Union laggards.
	It is a sobering thought that, based on the current speeded-up rate of UK aid increases, it would take the United Kingdom at least another 20 years to hit the UN target of 0.7 per cent—a target which, as the noble Lord, Lord Parekh, pointed out, has already been attained, and in some cases exceeded, by Sweden, Denmark, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
	The DfID report deals at some length with the initiatives it has supported in relation to conflict resolution and prevention which are to be applauded. The importance of focusing on peace and stability is also touched upon by the Prime Minister in his report on the recent G8 summit in which he states:
	"Peace and stability are preconditions for successful development everywhere . . . eight million Africans have died in conflict in the last 20 years".
	Against that background it is incomprehensible that in the Export Control Bill presently before Parliament the Government steadfastly, and without presenting any credible reasons, refuse to impose controls on the extraterritorial trafficking of small arms by UK nationals who have been responsible for so many deaths in the developing world. Perhaps the Minister in her response could touch upon that deep gap between the Government's words and action in that respect.
	In conclusion, it occurred to me as a former chairman of Oxfam and a trustee of a number of other development agencies, that it would have been pleasing for NGOs to have received some recognition in the DfID report of the important role that they play in development, often working with or alongside DfID. I think that their millions of supporters would have been surprised that the only recognition that NGOs even existed was 12 words in a 135-page report. That said, I warmly congratulate DfID on its report and achievements. It is undoubtedly one of the outstanding government departments.

Lord Shutt of Greetland: My Lords, I, too, should like to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, for introducing the debate. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Jordan, on his maiden speech. I trust that he will have an opportunity to speak at greater length on another occasion.
	In this debate of three-minute speeches, in summing up the debate from these Benches I let the 10 splendid contributions stand. This report is a very useful document; it contains some very useful tables and charts, leaving us quite well informed. The noble Lord, Lord Parekh, mentioned four subject headings, of which I have three: aid, debt and trade. I had not considered political instability but the noble Lord rightly raised it. I also have a fourth heading: joint enterprise for the developed world. Reference has already been made to the Scandinavian countries, Holland and Luxembourg. I hope that this country can take others forward with us towards the 0.7 per cent figure.
	I have three questions. First, in the introduction to the report, the Minister, Clare Short, referred in the penultimate paragraph to the work being done with the EU. It absorbs one-quarter of UK development assistance but spends an ever-declining percentage of its budget on poor countries. It appears as if the EU is going in a different direction from that of DfID. What is to be done about that?
	Secondly, having looked at the many tables, I wonder, bearing in mind the scourge of HIV/AIDS, whether the balance is right in terms of resources. Of the £3,400 million spent by this country, which is referred to in the report, does the £11 million or £12 million or so represent the right balance in terms of the attempt to eradicate HIV/AIDS?
	Thirdly, reference has been made to trade. The document contains a paragraph entitled, "How are we doing?" but there is no answer to the question: how are we doing so far as trade is concerned? Do the international initiatives mean that there is more trade? It will be very difficult to assemble in a table in such a document details about what is happening in international trade, but the fact that the document refers to Britain suggests that there might be some indication of what trade there is between developing countries and the United Kingdom.

Baroness Amos: My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, for giving us this opportunity to debate DfID's annual report. It has been an excellent and wide-ranging discussion. I thank my noble friend Lord Jordan in particular for choosing to make his maiden speech in this debate. It was a notable maiden speech and we all look forward to benefiting from his experience and wisdom.
	I apologise at the outset if I am unable, because of time constraints, to respond to all the points that have been raised. I shall do my best. I also thank noble Lords for the positive comments that they made about the work of DfID and some of the work in which I am engaged specifically on Africa.
	All noble Lords will be aware of DfID's core aim: the elimination of world poverty. Poverty reduction is now established in law as the first objective of UK overseas aid. Many noble Lords who contributed to this debate were involved in the passage of the International Development Bill—it is now an Act—earlier this year.
	Achieving the elimination of global poverty is an ambitious but achievable objective. To deliver that requires collective action by the entire international development system. Important progress has been made during the period of the 2002 departmental report. In November last year, the World Trade Organisation meeting in Doha laid the foundations for a round of negotiations focused on making the international trade system fairer to developing countries. I shall come back to trade.
	In March this year, the Financing for Development conference in Monterrey agreed a reform agenda focused on achieving the millennium development goals, with commitments by both developed and developing countries on the action needed to tackle poverty. At Monterrey, the European Union made a commitment to reach 0.39 per cent of GDP by 2006, which, with the commitment from the United States, will increase annual levels of development assistance by 12 billion dollars by 2006. My noble friend Lord Parekh and the noble Lord, Lord Joffe, in particular, mentioned aid levels. Of that additional 12 billion dollars, 6 billion dollars or more could go to Africa as a result of the G8 Africa action plan. The Prime Minister pledged that the United Kingdom would be giving £1 billion in aid to Africa by 2006.
	Just 10 days ago in Canada, the Prime Minister and other G8 heads of government and state agreed a comprehensive and important package of measures to support development in Africa, building on the leadership and commitment being shown by African leaders themselves. Developing country leadership is vital for making rapid, sustainable progress with poverty reduction. African leaders have set a bold vision for African development, peace and good economic and political governance in the New Partnership for Africa's Development.
	At the heart of the G8 Africa action plan is the concept of mutual accountability and partnership. The noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, asked about the governance element within that. I quote from the document:
	"assuming strong African policy commitments and given recent assistance trends, we believe that in aggregate half or more of our new development assistance could be directed to African nations that govern justly, invest in their own people and promote economic freedom".
	DfID is committed to building development partnerships based on a shared agenda that is set by a credible poverty reduction strategy. We are now looking forward to the world summit on sustainable development, which will provide a unique opportunity to bring together the development and environment agendas.
	My noble friend Lord Judd spoke of the importance of working multilaterally and in particular of the importance of the redistribution of power. The UK spends nearly half of its development funds through multilateral agencies. Noble Lords will know that we have a strong commitment to ensuring that those organisations work effectively. We have produced institutional strategy papers for each of those organisations. I assure my noble friend Lord Brett that we shall continue to work to ensure that those organisations work effectively.
	The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Hereford raised the importance of trade and in particular what the United States Government are doing through AGOA. We have looked at AGOA and the EU has the Everything but Arms initiative. As part of the commitments made in the G8 Africa action plan, we are committed to raising awareness of what is available through Everything but Arms to facilitate greater trading.
	The noble Lord, Lord Shutt, mentioned the European Union. We are aware that the EU does not spend enough of its resources on the poorest countries. We want that to change. We have been pressing for reform for many years. Some progress has been made but I agree with the noble Lord that it is not enough.
	I shall say more on trade. My noble friend Lady Whitaker, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Hereford and the noble Lord, Lord Shutt, all discussed the importance of trade. We know that long-term sustainable development requires economic growth. In Africa alone, we need growth rates of 7 per cent. The World Bank estimates that international trade reforms for developing countries could lift 300 million more people out of poverty.
	The Doha ministerial meeting resulted in agreement on the need to reduce, with a view to phasing out, subsidies and barriers to trade in agriculture. The challenge now is to ensure that those commitments become a reality and that there is a genuine development round.
	My noble friend Lady Whitaker raised the issue of the common agricultural policy. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister made it absolutely clear that we want to see CAP reform.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, discussed debt and the debt relief initiative in particular. So far, 26 countries have qualified for debt relief worth more than 62 billion dollars under the initiative. The HIPC trust fund currently stands at some 30 billion dollars, and the 1 billion dollars agreed at Kananaskis is in addition to that 30 billion dollars. The 20 billion dollars agreed with respect to the cleaning up of the nuclear arsenal will cover a 10-year period.
	The noble Lord, Lord Chan, talked in particular about the importance of health and he referred to his own experiences. We have been working in four provinces in India for many years. In Andhra Pradesh, for example, our current portfolio includes health. We are working specifically in the area of maternal mortality, where we are committed to making an effective contribution to the Millennium Development Goals in order to reduce such mortality. We are doing so through improving coverage of skilled care at delivery and improving access to and use of emergency care.
	I assure my noble friend Lord Jordan, who talked in particular about the importance of trade unionism and freedom of association, that we strongly support the protection of fair rights and conditions for workers. We have a current programme with commitments and plans of more than £30 million to support the work of the ILO.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Stern, and my noble friend Lord Judd raised issues relating to access to justice. The document, Voices of the Poor, identified the lack of public security and personal safety as a major concern. Justice systems are key to supporting people's development. That is why DfID has developed a new approach to safety and security which starts with the law. It is a huge agenda, ranging from legal reform, community policing, judicial reform, capacity building and penal reform. We shall continue to make that a priority.
	The noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, and the noble Lord, Lord Joffe, talked about the role of NGOs. We recognise their importance and the fact that civil society is weak in many countries. That is why we work to strengthen civil society in many developing countries. The noble Earl made a very important point about the political role of NGOs. We shall, of course, need to consider that in the long term.
	I agree with my noble friend Lord Hunt that we in the developed world also have a responsibility to ensure that we have effective controls so that our businesses do not act corruptly. We must also ensure that our financial systems act robustly to prevent money laundering. Those areas are covered in the Proceeds of Crime Bill.
	The noble Lord, Lord Joffe, raised the issue of small arms. DfID is the lead department in implementing the joint FCO, MoD and DfID three-year small arms strategy, which comes under our global conflict prevention pool.
	Huge challenges remain. We must deliver on the commitments that we made at Doha and Monterrey and ensure that they lead to real opportunities for poor countries and poor people. We must find ways to reduce conflicts and support change in countries which are not committed to poverty reduction. We must be ready to seize opportunities to promote stability and development as countries emerge from conflict. This Government remain totally committed to working towards a safer, more just world.

Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill

House again in Committee on Clause 4.

Lord Dholakia: moved Amendment No. 59:
	Page 3, line 2, after "satisfied" insert "on reasonable grounds"

Lord Dholakia: This amendment is grouped with Amendments Nos. 63, 67 and 73. I refer to the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and, in particular, to paragraphs 27, 28 and 29.
	I turn to paragraph 27. The committee reported that it was concerned that there was no requirement for the Secretary of State to show that there were objectively reasonable grounds for depriving someone of British citizenship. That appeared to put at risk a person's legal status without adequate safeguards against arbitrariness.
	In reply, the Home Office referred to a long history of allowing the Secretary of State to deprive people of British nationality on the basis of a subjective view. It argued that it was entirely appropriate that the Home Secretary should be permitted to decide whether a person had done something seriously prejudicial to the vital interest of the United Kingdom or a British overseas territory.
	The committee said at paragraph 29 that it could not agree with that line of argument. It recognised that the Secretary of State was likely to be in a particularly good position to form a judgment and that it may, in consequence, be entitled to considerable respect. However, it considered that the Secretary of State should be required to justify the decision by showing that there were reasonable grounds for it.
	The conclusion of the Joint Committee is interesting. It said:
	"As a matter of general principle, we consider that it is a far more effective guarantee against arbitrariness, and a better way of assuring good administrative decision-making (as well as being far more compatible with the rule of law which underpins human rights), to require public authorities to justify the deprivation of a person's status to a standard of reasonableness, than to require the person subject to the decision to establish that it is wholly unreasonable".
	In taking into account the arguments of the committee, I believe that we need to insert the words "on reasonable grounds" into Clause 4, as Amendment No. 59 seeks to do. Similarly, Amendment No. 63 seeks to insert those words into Clause 4 at page 3, line 8. Amendment No. 67 seeks to leave out the words "he is satisfied" and insert "there is reason to believe" in Clause 4 at page 3, line 13. Finally, Amendment No. 73 seeks to insert in Clause 4 after the word "satisfied" the words "on reasonable grounds" at page 3, line 26.
	Those are the requirements which will satisfy the Human Rights Joint Committee. This matter has not been discussed by the House of Commons. Therefore, I hope that the Committee will agree to the amendment and that the Minister will consider this request sympathetically. I beg to move.

Lord Kingsland: I believe that, to some extent, the debate on this amendment runs on from the debate on the previous group of amendments. Therefore, I do not believe that it is necessary to go into all the arguments that were deployed immediately before the dinner adjournment.
	I share the noble Lord's approach to the text of the clause. In my submission, it is appropriate to require the Secretary of State to justify his or her decisions on reasonable grounds. That will have the effect of placing the initial burden of proof on the Secretary of State. As things stand, the noble Lord the Minister is correct in saying that the Secretary of State will have to give reasons. But, in these circumstances, the onus will be on the defendant to judicially review, in some circumstances, or question in the course of appeal, in others, their reasonableness.
	In this context, "reasonableness" means something different from the word "reasonable" in the tabled amendment. Here, "reasonableness" is an expression used in the context of the famous Wednesbury case. Has the Secretary of State behaved within a range of conduct which is regarded as reasonable by the courts? That is a far lighter test than that which the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, wishes to insert into the Bill, and I respectfully support his approach. Given the subjective nature of the Secretary of State's power, it will be extremely difficult to use, successfully, the Wednesbury weapon.

Lord Avebury: I rise to quote briefly from the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, to which my noble friend referred. For the sake of those outside this Chamber who may read the debate and not understand what Wednesbury entails, it is important to spell it out, as the Select Committee did. The committee stated that to prove that a decision was unreasonable within the terms of Wednesbury means,
	"that it was so unreasonable that no reasonable Secretary of State, properly understanding the relevant facts and applicable law, could have come to that conclusion".
	That is a difficult hurdle for anyone to surmount in challenging a decision of the Secretary of State. The insertion of the words proposed by my noble friend would redress the balance.

Lord Filkin: As the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, said, this runs on from our important and challenging debate before the dinner break. I do not expect that any of us is likely to substantially shift our opinions, even after a good dinner. Nevertheless, I shall seek to explain why the Government believe that the amendments are unnecessary.
	As we have indicated previously, and as we informed the noble Lord, Lord Lester, in response to the JCHR report, we believe there are strong grounds for the Secretary of State having the power to make the initial judgment, which we believe has to be essentially subjective in the light of both the evidence before him and his judgment about the risk to the state, which is the second element which is germane to this issue.
	There is provision elsewhere in Clause 4 for the reasonableness of the Secretary of State's position to be tested on appeal. In any event, the enforceable principles of administrative law import a requirement that the discretion be exercised reasonably, as has been indicated.
	The fundamental point is that the appeal is not limited to judicial review, nor is it limited to the Wednesbury test; it is broader. The statutory appeal is a full appeal on the merits as well as on the law. Therefore, it is not, I suggest, simply as the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, or perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, suggested: that one had to overcome the quite severe burden of demonstrating that it was an act that no reasonable Secretary of State would have taken, but it is level on the merits of the case.
	As presently defined, Clause 4 would empower the Secretary of State to withdraw citizenship by deprivation order if he is satisfied as to certain matters. As I have indicated, we believe that it is only the Secretary of State who is in a position to make that judgment.
	As regards the ability to deprive someone of the basis of fraudulently obtained naturalisation or registration as a citizen, again the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the registration or naturalisation has been obtained by fraud before he can deprive.
	Amendment No. 67 suggests that potential statelessness should be a matter capable of objective determination. But the reality is that there is endless scope for discussion, debate or disagreement over whether a person has a claim to another nationality. That has been our experience in implementing the British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act 1997, Section 1 of which confers in certain circumstances an entitlement to registration as a British citizen on a British overseas citizen who,
	"would have been a stateless person if he had not been such a citizen".
	Requiring the Secretary of State to prove possession of an alternative citizenship to a reasonably objective standard before proceeding under proposed Section 40(2) would be impractical.
	The fact that the Bill would facilitate deprivation of nationality on the subjective view of the Secretary of State does not mean that it would be exercised arbitrarily. The Bill requires him to give written reasons, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, for his decision, and the right of appeal for which we provide would enable a person to bring before an independent body any issue bearing on either the legality or the merits of the decision in order for it to be sustained on appeal. It would not be a case of the Secretary of State simply saying that he was satisfied without explaining why.
	The appeals provided for in Clause 4 are full appeals, as I have signalled, where the appellate body could review both the legality and the merits of the decision. It would not, as the JCHR suggested in its report, be limited to considering whether the Secretary of State had acted wholly unreasonably.
	I should add finally that a requirement for the Secretary of State to be "satisfied" that certain pre-conditions are met presently occurs at various points in the 1981 Act without the express qualification that his satisfaction would be "on reasonable grounds". We believe, therefore, that the proposed amendments are unnecessary, particularly because of the opportunity to exercise a full appeal on the merits if so chosen.

Lord Dholakia: I thank the Minister for that explanation. I shall obviously study his comments carefully. It may be appropriate to consult the members of the Joint Committee on Human Rights which came to that conclusion, as to whether the explanation offered by the Minister was available to them. The committee seemed to reach a particular decision. It may be necessary to reflect on that decision and come back on Report. I am sure that the arguments on Clause 5 will continue for a long time. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Gould of Potternewton: Before calling Amendment No. 60, I must inform the Committee that if that amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments Nos. 61 or 62.

Lord Dholakia: moved Amendment No. 60:
	Page 3, line 3, leave out "vital interests" and insert "national security"

Lord Dholakia: I shall be brief. While the definition given in the Bill mirrors that of the European Convention on Nationality, we find that it is too loosely drafted. Again, citizenship is of fundamental importance. Many of us see it as a right; its deprivation should not be treated lightly. Therefore, we propose that instead of the vague phrase "vital interests", which has little case law and does not come from British tradition, we use the phrase "national security" as the test in new Section 40(2). It is well tried and tested, far clearer, more specific, much less general and therefore much less worrying. I hope that the Minister will accept the amendment. I beg to move.

Lord Kingsland: As the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, said, this group of amendments relates to the criterion by which the Government propose to allow the Secretary of State to deprive a person of his or her citizenship.
	The existing criteria in the British Nationality Act, which relate to disloyalty to Her Majesty; trading with the enemy in time of war, and the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment of 12 months or more, are to be abolished and replaced with a single criterion of doing anything seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom.
	As has been said in previous debates, the Government do not attempt to define "vital interests". Amendment No. 61 attempts to correct that by defining them in terms of national security, economic well-being and the safety of the population. The first two, national security and economic well-being, are terms already used in the Security Service Act 1989 to define the functions of the Security Service.
	The third, the safety of the general population, was an example of a "vital interest" given by the Minister in another place in the Standing Committee report, when she said that national security does not necessarily cover some of the potentially prejudicial activities that are worthy of deprivation, such as to those to do with infrastructure, vital economic interests or the general safety of the population.
	I apologise to the Committee for a drafting error in the amendment, which rendered the Minister's,
	"general safety of the population"
	as,
	"safety of the general population".
	However, the point, such as it is, remains good.
	Amendment No. 62 seeks to take an alternative route by defining the phrase "vital interests" in terms of the two international conventions in which it appears: the United Nations convention on statelessness and the European Convention on Nationality. Those were the measures referred to in another place by the Minister as being the source of the term "vital interests". However, I do not believe that "vital interests" is defined in detail in either of those conventions. Thus the same problem of definition may well remain, even with the amendment.
	I hope that the Minister, especially in view of the fact that the debate in Committee in another place was curtailed by the operation of the timetable Motion, will be able to respond positively to the amendments and to set out in detail the Government's interpretation of the words "vital interests".
	I ought to say that these amendments, and the way in which I have sought to explain them, in no way resile from the views expressed by the Official Opposition in the last two groups.

Lord Filkin: I thank both noble Lords for their contribution to the discussion of whether or not the term "vital interest" is beneficial. I shall seek to suggest why it is in the general interest for the term not to be defined further.
	Ever since the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914, the law has made provision for citizenship conferred by administrative grant to be withdrawn where the person concerned is found subsequently to have harmed, or posed a threat to, vital state interests.
	In current legislation, such actions are expressed in terms of disloyalty or disaffection towards the Crown, or as unlawful trade or communication with an enemy in time of war.
	Those expressions, while they still carry meaning, have become dated and perhaps fail to reflect the full width of activity that might threaten our democratic institutions and our way of life. September 11th provides a horrific illustration of the sort of threat that we have in mind.
	The Government are on record as stating that the term "vital interests" will be interpreted as covering threats to national and economic security and to public safety—in that respect we are foursquare with the points made by the Official Opposition—but not to actions of a more general criminal nature, of which Members of the Committee will be aware from the debate in another place.
	The term occurs in the 1961 and 1997 conventions. It is not expressly defined in either of those places. As a term of international law, the concept is an evolving one. That is right and necessary. If one reflects on how our perceptions of the vital interests of a state could be threatened and how all of us have shifted in the past 12 months. One hopes that it will not occur, but it is conceivable that we may yet further change our perception.
	For that reason, the concept being an evolving one, and states being allowed a margin of appreciation in applying it to situations arising within their own jurisdictions that they might not previously have conceived were possible, seems to me to be right and proper.
	I hope that the Committee will understand, therefore, why we do not consider "vital interests" to be a term that benefits from an attempt at further definition on the face of the Bill.
	I remind the Committee of the safeguards, both in the Bill and in current legislation, against the arbitrary use of the deprivation powers. A right of appeal against deprivation will lie either to an immigration adjudicator in the first instance or to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. To repeat the points we made on a previous amendment, the challenge in such a hearing is on the merits and on the law. A defence could be that this does not touch on the vital interests of the state. That would be a perfectly open line of argument to be made by a defence counsel at an appeal hearing before an adjudicator or before SIAC.
	For those reasons, I hope that both Benches will recognise why we feel that it is not in the interest of the Government or of the state that the term is given a tighter definition than it already has.

Lord Dholakia: I thank the Minister and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendments Nos. 61 to 64 not moved.]

Lord Avebury: moved Amendment No. 65:
	Page 3, line 13, after "(2)" insert "or (3)"

Lord Avebury: As the Bill stands the Secretary of State cannot use the powers under Clause 4(2) if as a result of so doing it would make the person concerned stateless. We seek to extend that prohibition to Clause 4(3) under which a person may be deprived of citizenship for the reasons mentioned—fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact.
	Obviously, the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness comes into the picture. It would be interesting to know from the Minister whether the exercise of this power making someone stateless for the reasons given would in fact bring us into some difficulty with the convention. I think it probably would. In any case, it may also cut across the obligations that we have under Article 2(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Under that article we undertake:
	"(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms . . . are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity".
	In this case a person's rights have been taken away from him by the Secretary of State. He has even less chance of contesting a declaration of citizenship under Clause 4(3) than he has under Clause 4(2) because the offence is virtually an absolute one. It is not a matter of opinion. In Clause 4(2) the Secretary of State has to be satisfied that a person,
	"has done anything seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom".
	That matter can be argued, as the Minister has already told us, before an adjudicator and in the final analysis before a court in terms of judicial review.
	But where the person has obtained citizenship by means of fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact, those are ascertainable facts which would be very difficult for anyone to contest. So he does not have an adequate remedy under Article 2(3) of the covenant for the deprivation of the right of citizenship under the clause. I hope that for the sake of our good name with the international community, and also for the sake of consistency between Clause 4(2) and (3), the Minister will accept the amendment. I beg to move.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: As the noble Lord has said, Clause 4 proposes the removal of the present distinction on deprivation between those who have acquired nationality by registration or naturalisation and those who acquired it automatically at birth. My noble friend Lord Filkin has gone through that issue.
	As the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has pointed out, the impact of the change is mitigated by the proviso in proposed Section 40(4) of the 1981 Act which would prevent deprivation on grounds of seriously prejudicial activities where the person concerned had no other citizenship. Again, as the noble Lord has rightly pointed out, deprivation would still be possible, even where statelessness might ensue, where the citizenship is being removed on the grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. The question posed by the amendment is, why should that distinction exist? "Please"—the noble Lord is saying—"bring it into line with all the other circumstances".
	The distinction is where the citizenship has been obtained by fraud, misrepresentation or concealment and that person should not have acquired the citizenship in the first place. That is unlike the other situation where he or she should have received it, but then has done something to deprive himself or herself of it. The allowing of the deprivation of citizenship, even where that would make one stateless on those grounds, is consistent with the provision made in that regard by the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, to which the United Kingdom is a party. It is also consistent, we say, with the 1997 European Convention on Nationality, which we hope to ratify in due course.
	So there is a reason for the distinction. It is consistent with our obligations under international law which we have either signed and ratified or signed and hope to ratify. Looking at the picture as a whole, Clause 4 represents a significant improvement on the present situation regarding the avoidance of statelessness. At present, potential statelessness is an obstacle to deprivation only on grounds of a serious criminal conviction.
	As a footnote, perhaps I may clarify our position on dual nationality. Generally speaking, it is one of tolerance. There is no restriction in our law on the ability of British citizens, British Overseas Territories citizens, British overseas citizens or British nationals overseas to acquire or retain a second nationality or citizenship. For historical reasons, the same is not true of British protected persons and certain British subjects, who lose their British status on acquiring another citizenship. The Bill will not change these arrangements. But that is a footnote to the main point raised by the noble Lord. I hope that in the light of what I have said, the noble Lord will understand why we have drawn the distinction, why it is consistent with international law and why we think that it is sensible to retain it.

Lord Avebury: My Lords, I shall obviously consider carefully what the noble and learned Lord said. Returning to his initial remark that the individual concerned should not have acquired UK citizenship in the first place, of course that is so, but the result of depriving him of citizenship is the same.
	I am thinking of the matter from the point of view of the subsequent fate of an individual who has no other citizenship. If, when he acquired our citizenship, he was a citizen of another country and retained that nationality—as the noble and learned Lord said, we have no objection to people having dual nationality—presumably, he will simply usually revert to his former citizenship. But there may be unusual cases in which that other country does not allow dual citizenship and in which, when someone loses his British citizenship, he becomes stateless. That would not be a good idea.
	So I shall consider the matter in the light of what the noble and learned Lord said, but I do not guarantee that I shall not return to it on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendments Nos. 66 to 70 not moved.]

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: moved Amendment No. 71:
	Page 3, line 20, leave out "2(2A)" and insert "2B"

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: In moving the amendment, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 75 to 78 and 81 to 85. Although at first sight the amendments appear somewhat complex, they are designed to secure two fairly simple and, I hope, uncontroversial objectives.
	First, we want to remove certain inconsistencies between Clauses 4 and 85 of the Bill. Each of those enables, albeit in different circumstances, an appeal to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission if the Secretary of State has certified that his decision was made in reliance on information that should not be disclosed in the interests of national security or on similar grounds. However, Clause 4 as drafted refers to,
	"another matter of a political kind",
	whereas Clause 85 refers to,
	"another reason of a political kind".
	The amendment will ensure that both clauses refer to,
	"another reason of a political kind".
	The second objective is to provide a free-standing provision in the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 for appeals against deprivation of citizenship. That would avoid complications that would result if other provisions in the 1997 Act relating to appeals against immigration and asylum decisions were to be amended. I beg to move.

Earl Russell: My Lords, this is an appropriate moment at which to ask: what exactly is meant by,
	"another reason of a political kind"?
	Presumably, it means a little more than that one does not like the chap's politics. If so, perhaps the noble and learned Lord could tell us what.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, I am loath to say too much. That is a matter for the court to decide, but it refers to matters of equivalent significance to those mentioned in proposed new Section 40A(2)(a), national security, and in proposed new Section 40A(2)(b), international relations, but not of precisely the same nature. Information from non-state sources proving relevant to the decision to deprive on the basis of activity prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom would be an example. Sensitive information relating to industrial espionage may be another.

Earl Russell: My Lords, presumably the provision must add something to the interests of national security and the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country, or it would not be there. What does it add?

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, the relationship is that it will cover matters of equivalent significance to national security and international relations, but not of precisely the same nature. There are categories of things that would fall within the category that I have defined.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Baroness Gould of Potternewton: My Lords, before calling Amendment No. 72, I must inform your Lordships that, if Amendment No. 72 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment No. 73 for reasons of pre-emption.

Lord Dholakia: moved Amendment No. 72:
	Page 3, leave out lines 22 to 30.

Lord Dholakia: My Lords, there is concern about the retrospective effect of Clause 4. It appears to give the Secretary of State power to apply the powers conferred on him by Clause 4(3) retrospectively. For example, anyone who obtained citizenship through fraudulent means, even before the Bill came into force, could be deprived of citizenship. That retrospective application of the law runs counter to basic legal principles. More interestingly, perhaps, why do the Government feel the need to assume that retrospective power? Do they have any particular case in mind?
	We have been advised by the Immigration Advisory Service that the clause would effectively be retrospective legislation, giving a power to remove people's existing rights to a lower standard of proof than that of "beyond reasonable doubt". The fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact need not have been committed by the person losing his citizenship but could have been made, or be alleged to have been made, by a third party. That is a matter of concern, and we await the Minister's explanation. I beg to move.

Earl Russell: My Lords, one further point arises. Has the noble and learned Lord taken advice on the application of Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights? I have heard the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General describe the article as a provision against retrospection. No doubt, there is some reason why it does not apply here, but I should be glad to know what it is.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: A power to withdraw citizenship on the grounds that the registration or naturalisation from which it results was obtained by fraud, false representation or the concealment of a material fact is included in subsection (3) of proposed new Section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981. Proposed subsection (6) would simply make it clear—one might say for the avoidance of doubt—that a similar power exists in relation to persons who derive their present citizenship from registration or naturalisation granted before the 1981 Act entered into force on 1st January 1983.
	In setting out the provisions in this way we have followed the pattern of the existing Section 40, in which subsections (2)(b) and (c) serve a similar purpose to that of our subsection (6). We are therefore simply continuing the power to deprive that existed pre-1983. There is no obvious justification for excluding those who became citizens by registration or naturalisation before 1983 from the ambit of the powers to deprive on these grounds. The present law makes no such distinction, and the general thrust of the Bill is to treat all our citizens equally in that respect. I hope that that explains the proposition.

Lord Dholakia: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendment No. 73 not moved.]

Lord Kingsland: moved Amendment No. 74:
	Page 3, line 30, at end insert—
	"(7) The exercise of any power conferred on the Secretary of State by virtue of this section shall not affect the rights of abode or leave to remain of any person or his dependants."

Lord Kingsland: Amendment No. 74 probes what effect, if any, the deprivation of citizenship would have on the right of abode, or leave to remain, of both the person affected and his dependants. Having deprived a person of his citizenship, the Secretary of State may wish to deport him in the public interest. The amendment seeks to prompt an explanation from the Government as to such a person's immigration status, and the way in which any revocation of permission to stay in Britain and any deportation action would have to be taken under other provisions of the law.
	Such a person might have a spouse who is not a British citizen, but who has the right to live in this country. I presume that this person's rights would not be affected by the deprivation of citizenship of his spouse. I trust that the Minister will be able to clarify the point. I beg to move.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving us an opportunity to explain the effect of removal. The effect of granting British citizenship is to remove a person from the scope of our immigration controls. Any pre-existing leave to remain in the United Kingdom automatically lapses, since the person concerned no longer requires such leave and, indeed, cannot be made subject to it.
	Following the removal of British citizenship, which is what the amendment is probing, the person concerned becomes once again subject to control under the immigration legislation. Consideration would need to be given by the Secretary of State to whether the person should thereafter be permitted to remain in the United Kingdom and, if so, on what terms.
	I accept that it is a probing amendment, but as drafted it seeks to take the decision out of the hands of the Secretary of State by providing that any right of abode or leave to remain in the United Kingdom would survive the loss of citizenship; I presume with the intention—although it is doubtful whether the amendment would in fact achieve it in all cases—of preventing the person's removal, and that of his family, from the United Kingdom.
	It would be wrong to take such a step. It is implicit in what I am saying that the right of abode goes with the removal of British citizenship. The ability to remove from the UK a person deprived of his citizenship is a power which should not in the Government's view be given up. Its use in certain circumstances might be appropriate; for example, when someone is engaged in terrorist activity. The position of dependants would, of course, be taken into account in any case where removal or deportation from the United Kingdom was under consideration, but I should make it clear that the citizenship of a spouse would not be affected by the removal of citizenship from his or her spouse. I hope that that explanation is helpful.

Earl Russell: Will the noble and learned Lord clarify the point raised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights of the effect on an unborn child of the parent being deprived of his citizenship?

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: I cannot do so immediately. I suspect that the answer is that if the citizenship had been removed before the child was born, the position of the child would be as if he was born to someone who was not a citizen. But perhaps I could confirm that if I turn out to be wrong; I am now told that I got it right.

Lord Kingsland: I am most grateful to the Minister for his reply. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: moved Amendments Nos. 75 to 78:
	Page 3, line 38, leave out "on grounds relating to"
	Page 3, line 40, at beginning insert "in"
	Page 3, line 41, at beginning insert "in"
	Page 3, line 43, leave out "another matter" and insert "for another reason"
	On Question, amendments agreed to.

Lord Dholakia: moved Amendment No. 79:
	Page 3, line 44, leave out from "(1)" to end of line 46 and insert "shall have a right to appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal within 28 days"

Lord Dholakia: The purpose of this amendment is to entitle people to an automatic right of appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. It is far too important for people not to have such a right. I hope that the Minister will find the proposal appropriate in this case. I beg to move.

Lord Kingsland: Most telegraphically, our Amendment No. 80 is grouped with this amendment. It seeks to widen the scope of the appeal to the IAT by excluding the limit of the appeal to an appeal on a point of law only; in other words, it seeks to clarify the scope of the appeal rights.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: Presently, a person against whom it is proposed to make a deprivation order has the right to have his case referred to a committee of inquiry. The committee is appointed by the Secretary of State, and its findings are not binding upon him. Under proposed Section 40A, to be inserted by Clause 4, a right of appeal against deprivation—replacing the existing inquiry procedure—will lie either to an adjudicator in the first instance, or, where sensitive information might otherwise be disclosed, to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.
	The proposed Section 40A(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 would mirror the provisions in Clause 89 of the Bill, which place certain limitations on the right of appeal to the tribunal in immigration and asylum cases. An appeal may be brought only with the tribunal's permissions, and can be made only on a point of law. The wider merits of the Secretary of State's decision are for adjudication at an earlier stage by an immigration adjudicator. The appellant will, therefore, already have had a substantive appeal hearing on both fact and law before an adjudicator. It is the intention that the Immigration Appeal Tribunal should be able to focus just on whether the adjudicator's determination gives rise to a point of law. We believe that that is a better use of judicial resources in a two-tier legal system.
	The removal of the restriction that the appeal to the second appeal tier must be on a point of law only is in conflict with the report on the review of tribunals by Sir Andrew Leggatt. The purpose of the requirement that the tribunal's permission must be obtained before bringing an appeal against the adjudicator's determination is to avoid unmeritorious appeals coming before the tribunal.
	Experience of the operation of the present immigration appeals machinery does not suggest that those procedural requirements conspire to deny justice to those seeking to exercise their appeal rights. Rather, the effect is to improve the efficiency of the system by ensuring that those with genuine and well-founded objections to decisions taken by the Secretary of State are able to have their appeals considered without undue delay. We have no reason to suppose that the same would not be true for appeals against deprivation of citizenship, although, as we have repeatedly emphasised, such deprivation is likely to continue to be a rare event. I hope that my explanation will prove to be helpful to noble Lords.

Lord Dholakia: I thank the Minister for that explanation. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendment No. 80 not moved.]

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: moved Amendments Nos. 81 to 85:
	Page 4, line 12, leave out "2(2A)" and insert "2B"
	Page 4, line 23, leave out "after section 2(2)" and insert "before section 3"
	Page 4, line 24, at end insert ": bail)—"
	Page 4, line 25, leave out ""(2A)" and insert ""2B"
	Page 4, line 29, at end insert—
	"(3) In section 5(1)(a) and (b) and (2) of that Act (procedure) after "section 2" there shall be inserted "or 2B"."
	On Question, amendments agreed to.
	Clause 4 agreed to.
	Clause 5 [Resumption of citizenship]:
	On Question, Whether Clause 5 shall stand part of the Bill?

Lord Avebury: Perhaps I may make a few brief remarks on Clause 5, which deals with the resumption of citizenship. I apologise to the noble and learned Lord, if he is to reply, for not having given notice of this question. However, it is a matter that I became seized of only this afternoon. The review of "full capacity" being undertaken by the Government that occurs under Section 13 of the British Nationality Act 1981 has not been completed.
	In his letter to Tony Colman in another place, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, said:
	"We were hoping to be in a position to announce our conclusions on the review of the full capacity requirement by the end of last year but work on nationality reforms already identified as requiring legislation has had to take precedence".
	I do not understand that answer. I should have thought that it would be necessary to review the full capacity requirement under Section 13 of the 1981 Act, which deals with resumption, so that any conclusions reached could have been reflected in the text of this Bill.
	The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, goes on to say to the honourable Member for Putney:
	"Although you say the forthcoming Bill ought to deal with the issue of full capacity, it seems unlikely that our review will lead us to the conclusion that legislation is the best way in which to resolve the (sometimes conflicting) concerns which have been expressed".
	That means that he has a way other than legislation in which the difficulties that have been raised about the full capacity requirement can be dealt with. I would like to know what that is.
	I shall briefly explain the circumstances that led the honourable Member for Putney to raise the point. He had a constituent whose son was mentally ill and who made a declaration of renunciation of citizenship, which comes into effect immediately. When he tried to get his citizenship back, there was a difficulty caused by the requirement in Section 13 of the 1981 Act that he had to be of full capacity. It took years for the honourable gentleman's constituent to resume his citizenship.
	That matter was being dealt with by the Home Office in its review of the full capacity requirement. I am disappointed that the review was not completed as part of the study of this Bill. I would be grateful if the Minister could deal with the matter—if not now, on Report—so that, if necessary, we can table an amendment.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: I am grateful for that full explanation. I cannot deal with the issue at the moment, and I apologise for that. I shall certainly write to the noble Lord before Report, so that he has an opportunity to consider his position in the light of my reply.

Clause 5 agreed to.
	Clause 6 [Nationality decision: discrimination]:

Lord Dholakia: moved Amendment No. 86:
	Page 4, line 40, leave out from "(1)" to end of line 41 and insert "leave out "immigration and nationality functions""

Lord Dholakia: This is the perennial problem with race relations legislation and the matter of immigration and nationality functions.
	We welcome the clause, in general, as it removes the exemption of the exercise of nationality functions from the provisions of the Race Relations Act 1976. The exemption for immigration functions remains in place. The amendment would change that. Why should immigration be exempt from the standards imposed by the 1976 Act?
	We had some correspondence with the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, on the matter of Zimbabwe. In his response, he stated that no discrimination was made between white and black Zimbabweans. Would not making immigration subject to the 1976 Act provide a legal safeguard?
	The amendment has the support of the Mayor for London, despite his recent difficulties. I hope that the Minister will consider removing such an anomaly from race relations legislation. I beg to move.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: Clause 6 repeals provisions in the Race Relations Act 1976, as amended by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, which exempt discrimination on grounds of nationality or ethnic or national origin in the carrying out of functions under nationality legislation from the general prohibition on such discrimination by public authorities. As the Race Relations Act stands, it would be open to Ministers to make a written authorisation for citizenship applicants from certain countries to be singled out for treatment different from that of applicants from other countries. The ability to discriminate in that way was originally thought to be useful, for example in the detection of forgery and fraud. In fact, no use has ever been made of it, and we are satisfied that it can safely be removed.
	The clause would leave intact a similar provision that allows discrimination, if authorised by a Minister, in the carrying out of functions under immigration legislation. It is essential to retain the latter provision because the Immigration and Nationality Directorate has a continuing need to prioritise—under close ministerial supervision—the management of its business on the basis of nationality and sometimes of ethnic or national origin. Current ministerial authorisations cover matters such as the examination of arriving passengers at ports of entry, the management of asylum casework and expert language analysis of certain asylum seekers if there are doubts about the applicant's true nationality. Removal of the facility could lead to massive delays at ports of entry and a rigid, inflexible, unmanageable asylum system.
	The need for the immigration authorities to be able to discriminate where authorised by Ministers in accordance with public instructions was extensively debated by the House during the passage of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000. The Act creates the post of independent race monitor to monitor the likely effects and practical operation of ministerial authorisations and to make an annual report to Parliament, providing clear public accountability over the exercise of these tentative but necessary powers.
	Mary Coussey was appointed as race monitor in April this year and her first report is expected in the autumn. It is important to bear in mind that all applications for leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom continue to be determined on their individual merits in accordance with the Immigration Rules and our international obligations. The current ministerial authorisations simply enable the immigration authorities to use their limited resources sensibly to manage the system and to confront the activities of people smugglers and traffickers.
	I hope that in the light of that explanation the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Dholakia: I thank the Minister for that explanation. As he rightly pointed out, the matter was discussed extensively during the passage of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act and I would want to consult the Commission for Racial Equality. The Minister said that Mary Coussey will be considering matters related to immigration and nationality. Perhaps I may point out that at one time she was a member of the staff of the Commission for Racial Equality and was keen that the Race Relations Act immigration matters should have the same provision as those of nationality.
	I shall return to the matter at a later stage, but in the meantime I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 6 agreed to.
	Clause 7 [Nationality decisions: discrimination]:
	[Amendment No. 87 not moved.]
	Clause 7 agreed to.
	Clause 8 agreed to.
	[Amendment No. 88 not moved.]
	Clause 9 [Legitimacy of child]:

Viscount Bridgeman: moved Amendment No. 89:
	Page 6, line 31, leave out from "shall" to "House" in line 32 and insert "not be made unless a draft of the regulations has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each"

Viscount Bridgeman: The amendment would require regulations under paragraph (c) of new subsection (9B) of Section 50 of the British Nationality Act 1981 to be made by affirmative resolution. However, the amendment also has a probing implication, for we are seeking to question the Government's thinking in respect of the prescribed requirements which will be laid down to satisfy paternity in respect of a child for nationality purposes.
	What other requirements do the Government have in mind that go further than those laid down in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the subsection; namely, the husband of the mother or the person treated as the father under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act? I hope that the Minister will be able to clarify the position. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: Taken as a whole, Clause 9 will for the first time allow an illegitimate child to derive a nationality benefit from the status of his or her father. But where paternity is not determined by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, which makes provision as to the parentage of children born as a result of certain fertility treatments, such derivation will be dependent on the satisfaction of requirements as to proof of paternity. These evidential requirements will be set out in regulations.
	The regulations have yet to be drafted and I am afraid that I am not in a position today to give an undertaking that we shall be able to publish them in draft form while the Bill is still before this House. However, I can say that our expectation in most cases will be that, where the child was not born during the continuance of a marriage and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act does not apply, paternity will be proved by DNA evidence. Our intention is to adapt, for this purpose, the non-statutory scheme which has for many years operated successfully in the entry clearance context. However, where a requirement to produce DNA evidence would be inappropriate, for example, where the alleged father had died before the citizenship claim could be established, other evidence such as judicial declarations of paternity would need to be considered.
	In these difficult and delicate matters there will need to be flexibility to amend the regulations in the light of experience and in response to changing circumstances such as scientific or legal developments bearing on the determination of paternity. Moreover, there will need to be some flexibility in the application of the prescribed requirements, given the range of situations with which officials are likely to be confronted. It would, accordingly, be inappropriate to set out the evidential requirements on the face of the Bill. I submit that the negative resolution procedure would enable sufficient parliamentary scrutiny of what would be essentially administrative arrangements.
	I have also had the opportunity to read the report of the Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform. I draw noble Lords' attention to paragraph 13, which covers Clause 9. The paragraph states that although some parliamentary scrutiny of the regulations is thought to be desirable the negative resolution procedure is considered sufficient. We would normally follow the recommendation of the delegated powers Select Committee. In view of that, and other matters I have raised in response to the amendment, I hope that the noble Viscount will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Viscount Bridgeman: I am grateful to the Minister. I appreciate that the Select Committee's report requires a negative resolution. We appreciate that time is required to get the regulations right. Can the Minister assure us that they will be available before Third Reading?

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I am not able to give that assurance. We shall, of course, endeavour to speed matters along. We shall keep the noble Viscount abreast of developments as regards the regulations.

Lord Avebury: Did I understand the Minister to say that DNA evidence could not be adduced in cases where the father had died? Will he amplify that? If the family is agreed that DNA evidence should be obtained from the corpse of the putative father, that would be a legitimate way to proceed. I can see no reason why the alleged father's death should prevent DNA evidence from ever being used.

Earl Russell: While the Minister is filling in time awaiting the answer to that question, perhaps I may say that he is right to say that it is not practical to spell out on the face of the Bill all the procedures that will be used. We are in a rapidly advancing field of science. Were we to specify every procedure that would be appropriate today, and even were we to get it right, it still would not follow that it would be right in 18 months' time—or still less that it would be right in 18 years' time.
	The case for flexibility is overworked but if there is one place where it stands out this is probably it. I think that the Minister is justified in citing it.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I said in my initial response that there were circumstances where DNA evidence would be inappropriate. I cited the example of the father having died before the citizenship claim could be established. In those circumstances, other evidence would be sought.
	With regard to the noble Earl's comments, perhaps the front page of today's Evening Standard makes it patently plain that we have at all times to see what happens with the developments of these areas of scientific evolution. I am grateful to the noble Earl for that observation.

Viscount Bridgeman: I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation and in particular for his assurance that we shall be kept in touch with regard to the regulations, as and when they appear. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 9 agreed to.
	Clause 10 [Right of abode: certificate of entitlement]:

Lord Bassam of Brighton: moved Amendment No. 90:
	Page 7, line 18, leave out "(c)" and insert "(a)"

Lord Bassam of Brighton: Clause 10 enables regulation of the procedure for applying for a certificate of entitlement to the right of abode in the United Kingdom. The procedure is currently unregulated, except in regard to the level of fee and procedure for appealing against a refusal to issue such a certificate.
	Regulations are to be made by statutory instrument, which will be subject to negative resolution. The regulations may specify such matters as the person to whom an application is to be made, the form of the application and the documents which must accompany it. Regulations may also make provision for certificates to be revoked in certain circumstances—for example, where obtained by the provision of false information—and/or to cease to be valid after a given date.
	The amendment would allow the regulations to include provision as to the consequences of a failure to submit the application to the appropriate authority. The provision might state, for example, that an application will still be valid if sent to a part of the Home Office other than the Immigration and Nationality Directorate. It accordingly affords a degree of flexibility with regard to the practical application of any formal requirement on this point. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Dholakia: moved Amendment No. 91:
	Page 7, line 29, leave out from "shall" to end of line and insert "not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by resolution of each"

Lord Dholakia: Amendment No. 91 has the support of my noble friend Lord Avebury, the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, and the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay of St Johns.
	Under Clause 10 the Secretary of State may make regulations in 11 major areas. I do not need to read out the areas in which regulations can be made. It is a matter of serious concern that, if these regulations are made by negative resolution, there will not be an opportunity to comment on them or discuss them in the House. The amendment seeks to ensure that any regulations made by the Secretary of State under Clause 10 are subject to the positive rather than the negative resolution procedure.
	Clause 10(2) shows the scope which the regulations may assume, hence the caution we are trying to exercise. It is sensible that we should progress in this manner. I hope that the Minister will agree to the amendment. I beg to move.

Viscount Bridgeman: I anticipate that the Minister will say again that he has the protection of the Select Committee's report. I share the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia. These are comprehensive regulations. Can the Minister say when they will be available? I support the amendment.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I cannot give the noble Viscount the information he desires. However, it is for us to ensure that we produce draft regulations as early as possible. The noble Viscount anticipated my best line of argument, which is contained in paragraph 18 of the report of the Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform. The Select Committee was content that we have the right procedure in place. While I understand the concerns raised by both noble Lords, I believe that we have got it right and that the negative resolution procedure will afford the level of parliamentary scrutiny appropriate to these regulations.
	I shall again put on record that we will endeavour to ensure that an early sight of the draft regulations will be available because of the sensitive matters they will cover. With that, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Dholakia: I thank the Minister. It may be useful to have a discussion on this matter before Report and perhaps come back to him at that time. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I am more than content to have such a discussion. It is useful to keep these channels open. I am sure that some of the less obvious misunderstandings that can arise in these matters can be resolved in that way.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 10 agreed to.

Baroness Gould of Potternewton: Before calling Amendment No. 92, I have to inform the Committee that, if it is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment No. 93 for reasons of pre-emption.

Clause 11 [Unlawful presence in the United Kingdom]:

Lord Dholakia: moved Amendment No. 92:
	Page 8, line 10, leave out paragraph (c) and insert—
	"(c) did not have pending an application for leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom which was eventually granted,"

Lord Dholakia: We are strongly opposed to Clause 11, which widens the definition of,
	"in breach of the immigration laws",
	and which will act as a barrier to refugees gaining citizenship. This information was strongly conveyed to us by a number of immigration agencies in this country.
	The current practice is that the time people spend waiting for a decision on an ultimately successful asylum claim is treated as residence for nationality purposes. These delays would not be counted in future. This is unnecessary and possibly in breach of Article 34 of the UN Convention on Refugees, which provides that states must,
	"as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalisation of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalisation proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings".
	I beg to move.

Earl Russell: Before we leave this subject, I wonder whether the Minister could take advice also on whether this provision is compatible with Article 31 of the UN Convention on Refugees. The article states that a refugee may not be penalised for being unlawfully present on the territory of another state provided that he makes his presence known and makes his claim as soon as is conveniently practical.
	I wonder whether this provision contravenes at least the spirit and possibly even the letter of that requirement. Here we are dealing with a person who is being deprived of a possible privilege for being unlawfully present in the United Kingdom in a circumstance where our obligations under international law say that he must not suffer for being unlawfully present—in fact, where the unlawfulness is condoned by international treaty. The point is of some importance.

Lord Filkin: The purpose of Clause 11 is to set out exhaustively the circumstances in which a person would be,
	"in the United Kingdom in breach of the immigration laws",
	for the purposes of the British Nationality Act 1981. The clause seeks to clarify the meaning, given that there have been some areas of uncertainty. It is not intended to be controversial or significantly to shift the position.
	The concept is relevant to eligibility for naturalisation and, in some cases, registration as a British citizen under that Act. It also has a bearing on the meaning of "settled" in the United Kingdom, which a non-British parent must be if his or her UK-born child is to acquire British citizenship automatically at birth.
	Clearly, it would not be appropriate to treat a person as being,
	"in breach of the immigration laws",
	at any time when he or she did have extant permission under those laws to be here or, as subsection (2)(c) of Clause 11 puts it,
	"leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom".
	Let me explain who in practice would have such leave. In the normal course, leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom is granted, on application, either by the Secretary of State or by an immigration officer. In certain circumstances, however, leave is, and will continue to be, conferred directly by statute. That is the case where a person applies, during the currency of an existing leave, for further leave to remain in the United Kingdom, and where the existing leave would otherwise run out before the application for further leave could be determined. It will also be the case where the application for further leave is refused, but an appeal against that refusal is pending or could still be commenced. Clause 102 of the Bill contains the necessary provision for the future.
	Of course, the arrangements just described would not apply where the earlier leave had been allowed to expire before any application for further leave was submitted. In such a case, a breach of the immigration laws would occur and it is right that, generally speaking, it should be treated as such. But it is equally right that there should be discretion to disregard the breach for the purposes of determining an application for British citizenship. I am pleased to say that such discretion is already provided for in the British Nationality Act 1981.
	The noble Earl, Lord Russell, asked whether the provision breaches Article 31 of the 1951 convention on refugees. We do not believe that there is a breach of Article 31, because the person is not being penalised under the clause if he is present in the United Kingdom. Periods of presence "on temporary admission" can count towards qualification for naturalisation as a British citizen.
	With those points, I suggest that the concerns on the clause are not as serious as were first thought. I invite the noble Lord to reconsider his amendment.

Lord Dholakia: I thank the Minister and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendment No. 93 not moved.]

Baroness Gould of Potternewton: Before I call Amendment No. 94, I have to inform the Committee that if it is agreed I cannot call Amendment No. 95 for reasons of pre-emption.

Viscount Bridgeman: moved Amendment No. 94:
	Page 8, line 29, leave out subsection (4).

Viscount Bridgeman: The aim of the amendment is to probe the reasons for subsection (4), which defines the retrospective effect of being,
	"in breach of the immigration laws".
	What difference does that make and why is the provision needed? I look forward to the Minister's reply. I beg to move.

Lord Filkin: There are times when I share the noble Viscount's questioning on the clause, because at times it is particularly dense and complicated. The amendment would deprive Clause 11 of any retrospective effect. Government Amendment No. 95 would exclude certain EEA nationals and their family members from the retrospective operation of the clause. I shall explain our position.
	The purpose of Clause 11 is to give an exhaustive list of the circumstances in which a person would be,
	"in breach of the immigration laws",
	for the purposes of the British Nationality Act 1981. This concept, which is not currently defined in statute, is relevant to eligibility for naturalisation and, in some cases, registration as a British citizen under the 1981 Act. It also has a bearing on the meaning of,
	""settled in the United Kingdom",
	which a non-British parent must be if his or her UK-born child is to acquire British citizenship automatically at birth.
	The practice following enactment of the clause would be to treat a person as,
	"in the United Kingdom in breach of the immigration laws",
	if he or she were here without permission or entitlement to be so under domestic or Community law. This would be broadly consistent with the policy hitherto applied by IND when determining legality of UK residence for these purposes. However, it would mark a change in the treatment of nationals of countries forming the European Economic Area. The current practice in relation to such nationals reflects recent judicial rulings in the social security context to the effect that they are in the UK unlawfully only if they have remained in defiance of a deportation or removal order.
	There seems no good reason why European Economic Area nationals should be treated any differently from other nationals in that respect. The EC treaty, as extended by the European Economic Area agreement, confers freedom of movement, but not the right to acquire nationality of the host state. However, there is concern that if the general rule of construction in Clause 11 were applied retrospectively to European Economic Area nationals and their families, those who have benefited from the existing policy on interpretation of,
	"in breach of the immigration laws",
	could be disadvantaged. Our amendment would accordingly shield such people from the retrospective operation of the clause.
	Others would not be similarly disadvantaged by the retrospective operation of the clause, because the definition of,
	"in the United Kingdom in breach of the immigration laws",
	in Clause 11 is the same as that applied by IND since the British Nationality Act 1981 entered into force in 1983. The only difference will be that the definition has legislative force, and thus the advantage of certainty.
	It might help if I give an illustration of how the retrospective operation of the clause might disadvantage EEA nationals and their families. Let us suppose that a child was born in the United Kingdom in 1998 to Spanish parents. Neither parent by then had any Community law or other right to remain in the UK, but equally no order had been made by the Secretary of State for their removal. The current practice reflecting judicial decisions in the social security field would be to regard the parents as lawfully and unconditionally resident here at the time of the child's birth, and accordingly to document the child as a British citizen.
	The retrospective application of the rule in Clause 11 would mean that the parents could not be regarded as lawfully resident when the child was born in 1998. It would therefore have the further consequence that the child could no longer be regarded as a British citizen. I hope that that explanation is helpful.

Earl Russell: There is a complicated question about what "always" means in the case of the child who was born in this country. The Minister says that the child would not be a qualified person and that his presence would be unlawful. However, if that extends back further than one generation, perhaps none of us is lawfully here at all.

Lord Filkin: The noble Earl is renowned for always asking deeply philosophical and deeply challenging questions. I think that I shall not respond immediately but reflect on the point.

Viscount Bridgeman: We shall study carefully the Minister's reply in Hansard. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Filkin: moved Amendment No. 95:
	Page 8, line 29, at end insert "except in relation to a person who on the commencement of this section is, or has been at any time since he last entered the United Kingdom—
	(a) a qualified person within the meaning of the regulations referred to in subsection (2)(d), or
	(b) a family member of a qualified person within the meaning of those regulations."
	On Question, amendment agreed to.

Viscount Bridgeman: moved Amendment No. 96:
	Page 8, line 30, leave out subsection (5).

Viscount Bridgeman: Amendment No. 96 seeks to probe the Government's attempt to confine this term to applying only to the provisions specified in subsection (1) of Clause 11. I should like to ask the Minister what other reference to being in the UK in breach of the immigration laws there is, and how they are being interpreted differently from the new definition in the clause. Why will it not apply in other provisions as subsection (5)(b) seems to suggest? I beg to move.

Lord Filkin: As I have previously signalled, Clause 11 does not seek to assign any meaning to statutory references to being in a place outside the United Kingdom "in breach of immigration laws". Clause 11 is concerned specifically with the meaning of the phrase in the United Kingdom "in breach of the immigration laws" where it occurs in the 1981 Act. A similar expression occurs in Section 33(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 (definition of "illegal entrant").
	The construction of the phrase "for nationality purposes" is more beneficial to applicants because it does not cover every instance when a person will be here in breach of the immigration laws. To apply the construction of the phrase as it appears in Clause 11 to the Immigration Act 1971 might result in difficulties, because currently we do not treat a person as being in the UK in breach of the immigration laws in every circumstance where they are technically in breach of the immigration laws. For example, a person who has leave to enter the UK but who has conditions attached to that leave would, if they breached those conditions, be in breach of the immigration laws. However, they would not, under the current construction of the phrase used "for nationality purposes", be in the UK in breach for the purposes of assessing periods of residence for registration or naturalisation applications.
	As I indicated, Clause 11 does not seek to assign any meaning to statutory references to being in a place outside the United Kingdom in breach of immigration laws. The mechanisms for control of immigration into other countries—including the British Overseas Territories—and the circumstances in which one may be in breach of such controls, are likely to be significantly different from those operating in the UK. Except as provided by order under Section 36 of the Immigration Act 1971, the provisions of that Act and related statutes do not extend outside the UK.
	I hope that that is helpful and gives the clarification which the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, sought.

Viscount Bridgeman: I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. In view of that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 11, as amended, agreed to.
	Clauses 12 and 13 agreed to.
	Schedule 2 agreed to.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I beg to move that the House do now resume.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
	House resumed.

Royal Assent

Baroness Gould of Potternewton: My Lords, I have to notify the House, in accordance with the Royal Assent Act 1967, that the Queen has signified her Royal Assent to the following Acts:
	Appropriation Act,
	National Insurance Contributions Act,
	Industrial and Provident Societies Act,
	Tax Credits Act,
	Employment Act.

House adjourned at three minutes before ten o'clock.